Email access via active sync


Description

This query detects attempts to add attacker devices as allowed IDs for active sync using the Set-CASMailbox command. This technique was seen in relation to Solorigate attack but the results can indicate potential malicious activity used in different attacks. - Note that this query can be changed to use the KQL "has_all" operator, which hasn't yet been documented officially, but will be soon. In short, "has_all" will only match when the referenced field has all strings in the list. - Refer to Set-CASMailbox syntax: https://docs.microsoft.com/powershell/module/exchange/set-casmailbox?view=exchange-ps

Query · kql

let timeframe = 1d;
let cmdList = dynamic(["Set-CASMailbox","ActiveSyncAllowedDeviceIDs","add"]);
(union isfuzzy=true
(
SecurityEvent
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(timeframe)
| where EventID == 4688
| where CommandLine has_all (cmdList)
| project Type, TimeGenerated, Computer, Account, SubjectDomainName, SubjectUserName, Process, ParentProcessName, CommandLine
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, AccountEntity = Account, HostEntity = Computer
),
( WindowsEvent
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(timeframe)
| where EventID == 4688
| where EventData has_all (cmdList)
| extend CommandLine = tostring(EventData.CommandLine) 
| where CommandLine has_all (cmdList)
| extend Account =  strcat(tostring(EventData.SubjectDomainName),"\\", tostring(EventData.SubjectUserName))
| extend SubjectUserName = tostring(EventData.SubjectUserName)
| extend SubjectDomainName = tostring(EventData.SubjectDomainName)
| extend NewProcessName = tostring(EventData.NewProcessName)
| extend Process=tostring(split(NewProcessName, '\\')[-1])
| extend ParentProcessName = tostring(EventData.ParentProcessName)
| project Type, TimeGenerated, Computer, Account, SubjectDomainName, SubjectUserName, Process, ParentProcessName, CommandLine
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, AccountEntity = Account, HostEntity = Computer
),
(
DeviceProcessEvents
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(timeframe)
| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_all (cmdList)
| project Type, TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessAccountDomain, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessParentFileName,  InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, AccountDomain = InitiatingProcessAccountDomain, AccountName = InitiatingProcessAccountName, HostEntity = DeviceName
),
(
Event
| where TimeGenerated > ago(timeframe)
| where Source == "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon"
| where EventID == 1
| extend EventData = parse_xml(EventData).DataItem.EventData.Data
| mv-expand bagexpansion=array EventData
| evaluate bag_unpack(EventData)
| extend Key=tostring(['@Name']), Value=['#text']
| evaluate pivot(Key, any(Value), TimeGenerated, Source, EventLog, Computer, EventLevel, EventLevelName, EventID, UserName, RenderedDescription, MG, ManagementGroupName, Type, _ResourceId)
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(timeframe)
| where CommandLine has_all (cmdList)
| extend Type = strcat(Type, ": ", Source)
| project Type, TimeGenerated, Computer, User, Process, ParentImage, CommandLine
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, AccountEntity = User, HostEntity = Computer
)
)
| extend HostName = tostring(split(HostEntity, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(HostEntity, '.'))
| extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(HostEntity, DomainIndex + 1), HostEntity)
| extend AccountName = tostring(split(AccountEntity, @'\')[1]), AccountDomain = tostring(split(AccountEntity, @'\')[0])
Raw source Email access via active sync · KQL
Esc
Published by Azure/Azure-Sentinel ↗, licensed under MIT ↗. Reproduced here unmodified.
id: 2f561e20-d97b-4b13-b02d-18b34af6e87c
name: Email access via active sync
description: |
   This query detects attempts to add attacker devices as allowed IDs for active sync using the Set-CASMailbox command.
   This technique was seen in relation to Solorigate attack but the results can indicate potential malicious activity used in different attacks.
   - Note that this query can be changed to use the KQL "has_all" operator, which hasn't yet been documented officially, but will be soon.
     In short, "has_all" will only match when the referenced field has all strings in the list.
   - Refer to Set-CASMailbox syntax: https://docs.microsoft.com/powershell/module/exchange/set-casmailbox?view=exchange-ps  
severity: Medium
requiredDataConnectors:
  - connectorId: SecurityEvents
    dataTypes:
      - SecurityEvent
  - connectorId: MicrosoftThreatProtection
    dataTypes:
      - DeviceProcessEvents
  - connectorId: WindowsSecurityEvents
    dataTypes: 
      - SecurityEvents 
  - connectorId: WindowsForwardedEvents
    dataTypes: 
      - WindowsEvent 
queryFrequency: 1d
queryPeriod: 1d
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
  - PrivilegeEscalation
relevantTechniques:
  - T1068
  - T1078
tags:
  - Solorigate
  - NOBELIUM
query: |
  let timeframe = 1d;
  let cmdList = dynamic(["Set-CASMailbox","ActiveSyncAllowedDeviceIDs","add"]);
  (union isfuzzy=true
  (
  SecurityEvent
  | where TimeGenerated >= ago(timeframe)
  | where EventID == 4688
  | where CommandLine has_all (cmdList)
  | project Type, TimeGenerated, Computer, Account, SubjectDomainName, SubjectUserName, Process, ParentProcessName, CommandLine
  | extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, AccountEntity = Account, HostEntity = Computer
  ),
  ( WindowsEvent
  | where TimeGenerated >= ago(timeframe)
  | where EventID == 4688
  | where EventData has_all (cmdList)
  | extend CommandLine = tostring(EventData.CommandLine) 
  | where CommandLine has_all (cmdList)
  | extend Account =  strcat(tostring(EventData.SubjectDomainName),"\\", tostring(EventData.SubjectUserName))
  | extend SubjectUserName = tostring(EventData.SubjectUserName)
  | extend SubjectDomainName = tostring(EventData.SubjectDomainName)
  | extend NewProcessName = tostring(EventData.NewProcessName)
  | extend Process=tostring(split(NewProcessName, '\\')[-1])
  | extend ParentProcessName = tostring(EventData.ParentProcessName)
  | project Type, TimeGenerated, Computer, Account, SubjectDomainName, SubjectUserName, Process, ParentProcessName, CommandLine
  | extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, AccountEntity = Account, HostEntity = Computer
  ),
  (
  DeviceProcessEvents
  | where TimeGenerated >= ago(timeframe)
  | where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_all (cmdList)
  | project Type, TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessAccountDomain, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessParentFileName,  InitiatingProcessCommandLine
  | extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, AccountDomain = InitiatingProcessAccountDomain, AccountName = InitiatingProcessAccountName, HostEntity = DeviceName
  ),
  (
  Event
  | where TimeGenerated > ago(timeframe)
  | where Source == "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon"
  | where EventID == 1
  | extend EventData = parse_xml(EventData).DataItem.EventData.Data
  | mv-expand bagexpansion=array EventData
  | evaluate bag_unpack(EventData)
  | extend Key=tostring(['@Name']), Value=['#text']
  | evaluate pivot(Key, any(Value), TimeGenerated, Source, EventLog, Computer, EventLevel, EventLevelName, EventID, UserName, RenderedDescription, MG, ManagementGroupName, Type, _ResourceId)
  | where TimeGenerated >= ago(timeframe)
  | where CommandLine has_all (cmdList)
  | extend Type = strcat(Type, ": ", Source)
  | project Type, TimeGenerated, Computer, User, Process, ParentImage, CommandLine
  | extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, AccountEntity = User, HostEntity = Computer
  )
  )
  | extend HostName = tostring(split(HostEntity, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(HostEntity, '.'))
  | extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(HostEntity, DomainIndex + 1), HostEntity)
  | extend AccountName = tostring(split(AccountEntity, @'\')[1]), AccountDomain = tostring(split(AccountEntity, @'\')[0])
entityMappings:
  - entityType: Account
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: FullName
        columnName: AccountEntity
      - identifier: Name
        columnName: AccountName
      - identifier: NTDomain
        columnName: AccountDomain
  - entityType: Host
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: FullName
        columnName: HostEntity
      - identifier: HostName
        columnName: HostName
      - identifier: NTDomain
        columnName: HostNameDomain
version: 1.2.1
kind: Scheduled
metadata:
    source:
        kind: Community
    author:
        name: Microsoft Security Research
    support:
        tier: Community
    categories:
        domains: [ "Security - Threat Protection" ]

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