AdminSDHolder Modifications


Description

'This query detects modification in the AdminSDHolder in the Active Directory which could indicate an attempt for persistence. AdminSDHolder Modification is a persistence technique in which an attacker abuses the SDProp process in Active Directory to establish a persistent backdoor to Active Directory. This query searches for the event id 5136 where the Object DN is AdminSDHolder. Ref: https://netwrix.com/en/cybersecurity-glossary/cyber-security-attacks/adminsdholder-attack/'

Query · kql

SecurityEvent
| where EventID == 5136 and EventData contains "<Data Name=\"ObjectDN\">CN=AdminSDHolder,CN=System"
| parse EventData with * 'ObjectDN">' ObjectDN "<" *
| summarize StartTime = min(TimeGenerated), EndTime = max(TimeGenerated) by Computer, SubjectAccount, SubjectUserSid, SubjectLogonId, ObjectDN
| extend HostName = tostring(split(Computer, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(Computer, '.'))
| extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(Computer, DomainIndex + 1), Computer)
| extend Name = tostring(split(SubjectAccount, "\\")[1]), NTDomain = tostring(split(SubjectAccount, "\\")[0])
Raw source AdminSDHolder Modifications · KQL
Esc
Published by Azure/Azure-Sentinel ↗, licensed under MIT ↗. Reproduced here unmodified.
id: 52aec824-96c1-4a03-8e44-bb70532e6cea
name: AdminSDHolder Modifications
description: |
   'This query detects modification in the AdminSDHolder  in the Active Directory which could indicate an attempt for persistence. 
   AdminSDHolder Modification is a persistence technique in which an attacker abuses the SDProp process in Active Directory to establish a persistent backdoor to Active Directory.
   This query searches for the event id 5136 where the Object DN is AdminSDHolder.
   Ref: https://netwrix.com/en/cybersecurity-glossary/cyber-security-attacks/adminsdholder-attack/'
severity: High
requiredDataConnectors:
  - connectorId: SecurityEvents
    dataTypes:
      - SecurityEvent
queryFrequency: 1h
queryPeriod: 1h
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
  - Persistence
relevantTechniques:
  - T1078
query: |
   SecurityEvent
   | where EventID == 5136 and EventData contains "<Data Name=\"ObjectDN\">CN=AdminSDHolder,CN=System"
   | parse EventData with * 'ObjectDN">' ObjectDN "<" *
   | summarize StartTime = min(TimeGenerated), EndTime = max(TimeGenerated) by Computer, SubjectAccount, SubjectUserSid, SubjectLogonId, ObjectDN
   | extend HostName = tostring(split(Computer, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(Computer, '.'))
   | extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(Computer, DomainIndex + 1), Computer)
   | extend Name = tostring(split(SubjectAccount, "\\")[1]), NTDomain = tostring(split(SubjectAccount, "\\")[0])
entityMappings:
  - entityType: Account
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: FullName
        columnName: SubjectAccount
      - identifier: Name
        columnName: Name
      - identifier: NTDomain
        columnName: NTDomain
  - entityType: Host
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: FullName
        columnName: Computer
      - identifier: HostName
        columnName: HostName
      - identifier: DnsDomain
        columnName: HostNameDomain
version: 1.0.5
kind: Scheduled
metadata:
    source:
        kind: Community
    author:
        name: Vasileios Paschalidis
    support:
        tier: Community
    categories:
        domains: [ "Security - Others" ]

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