detect-cyzfc-activity (4)


Description

These queries was originally published in the threat analytics report, Attacks on gov't, think tanks, NGOs. As described further in Analysis of cyberattack on U.S. think tanks, non-profits, public sector by unidentified attackers, there was a very large spear-phishing campaign launched in November 2019. The attackers would gain access to a target by having the user click on a link to a compromised website and download a .zip archive. Once established on a target's device, the attackers used a malicious DLL named cyzfc.dat to execute additional payloads. They would call a function in the malicious DLL via the legitimate Windows process, rundll32.exe, to connect directly to their command-and-control (C2) servers. The following queries detect activity associated with the malicious DLL, cyzfc.dat., used in this campaign. Reference - https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/rundll32

Query · kql

// Query 5: Events involving the ZIP
let fileHash = "cd92f19d3ad4ec50f6d19652af010fe07dca55e1";
find in (DeviceFileEvents, DeviceProcessEvents, DeviceEvents,
DeviceRegistryEvents, DeviceNetworkEvents, DeviceImageLoadEvents)
where SHA1 == fileHash or InitiatingProcessSHA1 == fileHash
| where Timestamp > ago(10d)
Raw source detect-cyzfc-activity (4) · KQL
Esc
Published by Azure/Azure-Sentinel ↗, licensed under MIT ↗. Reproduced here unmodified.
id: aad219ab-fed4-4360-bef1-a3166e2a2214
name: detect-cyzfc-activity (4)
description: |
  These queries was originally published in the threat analytics report, Attacks on gov't, think tanks, NGOs.
  As described further in Analysis of cyberattack on U.S. think tanks, non-profits, public sector by unidentified attackers, there was a very large spear-phishing campaign launched in November 2019.
  The attackers would gain access to a target by having the user click on a link to a compromised website and download a .zip archive.
  Once established on a target's device, the attackers used a malicious DLL named cyzfc.dat to execute additional payloads. They would call a function in the malicious DLL via the legitimate Windows process, rundll32.exe, to connect directly to their command-and-control (C2) servers.
  The following queries detect activity associated with the malicious DLL, cyzfc.dat., used in this campaign.
  Reference - https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/rundll32
requiredDataConnectors:
- connectorId: MicrosoftThreatProtection
  dataTypes:
  - DeviceFileEvents
  - DeviceProcessEvents
  - DeviceEvents
  - DeviceRegistryEvents
  - DeviceNetworkEvents
  - DeviceImageLoadEvents
tactics:
- Execution
query: |
  // Query 5: Events involving the ZIP
  let fileHash = "cd92f19d3ad4ec50f6d19652af010fe07dca55e1";
  find in (DeviceFileEvents, DeviceProcessEvents, DeviceEvents,
  DeviceRegistryEvents, DeviceNetworkEvents, DeviceImageLoadEvents)
  where SHA1 == fileHash or InitiatingProcessSHA1 == fileHash
  | where Timestamp > ago(10d)

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