detect-web-server-exploit-doublepulsar


Description

This query was originally published in the threat analytics report, Motivated miners. Doublepulsar is a backdoor developed by the National Security Agency (NSA). First disclosed in 2017, it is now used by many malicious actors. Software patches are available. The following query detects activity broadly associated with campaigns that use DoublePulsar to exploit web servers. See Detect DoublePulsar execution for a query that detects possible DoublePulsar execution events. References: https://www.microsoft.com/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Trojan:Win32/DoublePulsar&threatId=-2147239036 https://www.scmagazine.com/home/security-news/cybercrime/doublepulsar-malware-spreading-rapidly-in-the-wild-following-shadow-brokers-dump/ https://support.microsoft.com/help/4013389/title

Query · kql

DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp >= ago(7d)
| where
// "Grandparent" process is Oracle WebLogic or some process loading Confluence
InitiatingProcessParentFileName == "beasvc.exe" or
InitiatingProcessFileName == "beasvc.exe"
or InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains "//confluence"
// Calculate for Base64 in Commandline
| extend Caps = countof(ProcessCommandLine, "[A-Z]", "regex"),
Total = countof(ProcessCommandLine, ".", "regex")
| extend Ratio = todouble(Caps) / todouble(Total)
| where
(
    FileName in~ ("powershell.exe" , "powershell_ise.exe") // PowerShell is spawned
    // Omit known clean processes
    and ProcessCommandLine !startswith "POWERSHELL.EXE  -C \"GET-WMIOBJECT -COMPUTERNAME"
    and ProcessCommandLine !contains "ApplicationNo"
    and ProcessCommandLine !contains "CustomerGroup"
    and ProcessCommandLine !contains "Cosmos"
    and ProcessCommandLine !contains "Unrestricted"
    and
    (
        ProcessCommandLine contains "$" // PowerShell variable declaration
        or ProcessCommandLine contains "-e " // Alias for "-EncodedCommand" parameter
        or ProcessCommandLine contains "encodedcommand"
        or ProcessCommandLine contains "wget"
        //or ( Ratio > 0.4 and Ratio < 1.0) // Presence of Base64 strings
    )
)
or
(
    FileName =~ "cmd.exe" // cmd.exe is spawned
    and ProcessCommandLine contains "@echo" and
    ProcessCommandLine contains ">" // Echoing commands into a file
)
or
(
    FileName =~ "certutil.exe" // CertUtil.exe abuse
    and ProcessCommandLine contains "-split"
    // the "-split" parameter is required to write files to the disk
)
| project
       Timestamp,
       InitiatingProcessCreationTime ,
       DeviceId ,
       Grandparent_PID = InitiatingProcessParentId,
       Grandparent = InitiatingProcessParentFileName,
       Parent_Account = InitiatingProcessAccountName,
       Parent_PID = InitiatingProcessId,
       Parent = InitiatingProcessFileName ,
       Parent_Commandline = InitiatingProcessCommandLine,
       Child_PID = ProcessId,
       Child = FileName ,
       Child_Commandline = ProcessCommandLine
Raw source detect-web-server-exploit-doublepulsar · KQL
Esc
Published by Azure/Azure-Sentinel ↗, licensed under MIT ↗. Reproduced here unmodified.
id: da3b2b82-74a0-4b0e-8ef7-ac43515b4c70
name: detect-web-server-exploit-doublepulsar
description: |
  This query was originally published in the threat analytics report, Motivated miners.
  Doublepulsar is a backdoor developed by the National Security Agency (NSA). First disclosed in 2017, it is now used by many malicious actors. Software patches are available.
  The following query detects activity broadly associated with campaigns that use DoublePulsar to exploit web servers.
  See Detect DoublePulsar execution for a query that detects possible DoublePulsar execution events.
  References:
  https://www.microsoft.com/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Trojan:Win32/DoublePulsar&threatId=-2147239036
  https://www.scmagazine.com/home/security-news/cybercrime/doublepulsar-malware-spreading-rapidly-in-the-wild-following-shadow-brokers-dump/
  https://support.microsoft.com/help/4013389/title
requiredDataConnectors:
- connectorId: MicrosoftThreatProtection
  dataTypes:
  - DeviceProcessEvents
tactics:
- Execution
query: |
  DeviceProcessEvents
  | where Timestamp >= ago(7d)
  | where
  // "Grandparent" process is Oracle WebLogic or some process loading Confluence
  InitiatingProcessParentFileName == "beasvc.exe" or
  InitiatingProcessFileName == "beasvc.exe"
  or InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains "//confluence"
  // Calculate for Base64 in Commandline
  | extend Caps = countof(ProcessCommandLine, "[A-Z]", "regex"),
  Total = countof(ProcessCommandLine, ".", "regex")
  | extend Ratio = todouble(Caps) / todouble(Total)
  | where
  (
      FileName in~ ("powershell.exe" , "powershell_ise.exe") // PowerShell is spawned
      // Omit known clean processes
      and ProcessCommandLine !startswith "POWERSHELL.EXE  -C \"GET-WMIOBJECT -COMPUTERNAME"
      and ProcessCommandLine !contains "ApplicationNo"
      and ProcessCommandLine !contains "CustomerGroup"
      and ProcessCommandLine !contains "Cosmos"
      and ProcessCommandLine !contains "Unrestricted"
      and
      (
          ProcessCommandLine contains "$" // PowerShell variable declaration
          or ProcessCommandLine contains "-e " // Alias for "-EncodedCommand" parameter
          or ProcessCommandLine contains "encodedcommand"
          or ProcessCommandLine contains "wget"
          //or ( Ratio > 0.4 and Ratio < 1.0) // Presence of Base64 strings
      )
  )
  or
  (
      FileName =~ "cmd.exe" // cmd.exe is spawned
      and ProcessCommandLine contains "@echo" and
      ProcessCommandLine contains ">" // Echoing commands into a file
  )
  or
  (
      FileName =~ "certutil.exe" // CertUtil.exe abuse
      and ProcessCommandLine contains "-split"
      // the "-split" parameter is required to write files to the disk
  )
  | project
         Timestamp,
         InitiatingProcessCreationTime ,
         DeviceId ,
         Grandparent_PID = InitiatingProcessParentId,
         Grandparent = InitiatingProcessParentFileName,
         Parent_Account = InitiatingProcessAccountName,
         Parent_PID = InitiatingProcessId,
         Parent = InitiatingProcessFileName ,
         Parent_Commandline = InitiatingProcessCommandLine,
         Child_PID = ProcessId,
         Child = FileName ,
         Child_Commandline = ProcessCommandLine

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