Potential Beaconing Activity
Description
This query detects potential Command & Control (C2) beaconing activity by identifying remote IPs that receive a high average number of connections from a small number of devices. Beaconing is a hallmark of C2 communication where malware regularly checks in with its controller at consistent intervals. The query combines aggregated connection reports with enrichment via FileProfile to surface processes with low global prevalence making these repeated outbound connections, reducing false positives from known-good software.
Query · kql
let DeviceThreshold = 5;
let ConnectionThreshold = 25;
let GlobalPrevalanceThreshold = 250;
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where not(ipv4_is_private(RemoteIP))
| where ActionType == 'ConnectionSuccessAggregatedReport'
| extend Connections = toint(parse_json(AdditionalFields).uniqueEventsAggregated)
| summarize Total = count(), Devices = dcount(DeviceId), Domains = make_set(RemoteUrl), AvgConnections = avg(Connections) by RemoteIP, bin(TimeGenerated, 1d)
| where AvgConnections >= ConnectionThreshold and Devices <= DeviceThreshold
| join kind=inner (DeviceNetworkEvents
| where ActionType == 'ConnectionSuccess'
| distinct RemoteIP, InitiatingProcessSHA256) on RemoteIP
| invoke FileProfile(InitiatingProcessSHA256)
| where GlobalPrevalence <= GlobalPrevalanceThreshold