sap_unauthorized_execution_of_se09


Description

Detects the execution of the SAP Transport Organizer transaction (SE09), which is critical for managing development objects and transport requests. Execution by unauthorized users may indicate unauthorized system modification or bypassing of change management controls.

Query · yara_l

events:
    $e.metadata.vendor_name = "SAP"
    $e.metadata.log_type = "SAP_SECURITY_AUDIT"

    // AU3 = transaction started
    $e.additional.fields["msg_1"] = "AU3"

    // Match the SE09 transaction code
    ($e.additional.fields["param1_1"] = "SE09" or $e.security_result.detection_fields["slgtc_1"] = "SE09")

    $user = $e.principal.user.userid
    $sid  = $e.target.application

    // Exclusions commented out to prevent data table compilation errors
    // not $user in %sap_authorized_basis_admins.userid
    // not $user in %sap_excluded_users.userid

  match:
    $user, $sid over 1h

  outcome:
    $risk_score = 75
    $event_count = count($e.metadata.id)
    $principal_user = array_distinct($user)
    $target_sid = array_distinct($sid)
    $executed_tcode = array_distinct($e.additional.fields["param1_1"])
    $terminal_ip = array_distinct($e.principal.ip)
    $terminal_names = array_distinct($e.principal.hostname)
    $sap_client = array_distinct($e.target.resource.attribute.labels["slgmand_1"])
    $log_description = array_distinct($e.metadata.description)
    $audit_class = array_distinct($e.security_result.summary)

  condition:
    $e
Raw source sap_unauthorized_execution_of_se09 · YARA-L
Esc
Published by chronicle/detection-rules ↗, licensed under Apache 2.0 ↗. Reproduced here unmodified.
rule sap_unauthorized_execution_of_se09 {
  meta:
    author = "Google Cloud Security"
    name = "SAP - Unauthorized Execution of Transport Organizer (SE09)"
    description = "Detects the execution of the SAP Transport Organizer transaction (SE09), which is critical for managing development objects and transport requests. Execution by unauthorized users may indicate unauthorized system modification or bypassing of change management controls."
    severity = "High"
    tactic = "TA0002"
    technique = "T1059"

  events:
    $e.metadata.vendor_name = "SAP"
    $e.metadata.log_type = "SAP_SECURITY_AUDIT"

    // AU3 = transaction started
    $e.additional.fields["msg_1"] = "AU3"

    // Match the SE09 transaction code
    ($e.additional.fields["param1_1"] = "SE09" or $e.security_result.detection_fields["slgtc_1"] = "SE09")

    $user = $e.principal.user.userid
    $sid  = $e.target.application

    // Exclusions commented out to prevent data table compilation errors
    // not $user in %sap_authorized_basis_admins.userid
    // not $user in %sap_excluded_users.userid

  match:
    $user, $sid over 1h

  outcome:
    $risk_score = 75
    $event_count = count($e.metadata.id)
    $principal_user = array_distinct($user)
    $target_sid = array_distinct($sid)
    $executed_tcode = array_distinct($e.additional.fields["param1_1"])
    $terminal_ip = array_distinct($e.principal.ip)
    $terminal_names = array_distinct($e.principal.hostname)
    $sap_client = array_distinct($e.target.resource.attribute.labels["slgmand_1"])
    $log_description = array_distinct($e.metadata.description)
    $audit_class = array_distinct($e.security_result.summary)

  condition:
    $e
}

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