Quick Assist Full Control Sharing Mode Enabled


Description

Identifies when Microsoft Quick Assist sharing mode is set to FullControl on a Windows host. This grants the remote helper full interactive control of the target device and may indicate IT help desk fraud, unauthorized remote access, or lateral movement preparation.

Query · kuery

host.os.type:windows and winlog.channel:"Application" and event.provider:"Quick Assist" and event.code:"0" and
  winlog.event_data.param1:(*FullControl* and *setsharingmode*)

Investigation fields

Pivot points the source recommends for triage.

  • @timestamp
  • host.id
  • host.name
  • user.id
  • user.name
  • event.provider
  • event.code
  • winlog.event_id
  • winlog.event_data.param1

Implementation guide

Windows Application event log collection must be enabled via the Elastic Agent System integration to ingest Application log events.

Analyst notes

Investigating Quick Assist Full Control Sharing Mode Enabled

Microsoft Quick Assist is a built-in remote support tool. When a sharer grants FullControl, the helper can interact with the desktop as if physically present. Adversaries abuse Quick Assist in help desk fraud and social engineering to gain interactive access without deploying separate remote access software.

Quick Assist logs these transitions in the Windows Application log under the Quick Assist provider. A setsharingmode command with sharing mode FullControl is written to winlog.event_data.param1, often alongside a JSON payload that includes "result":"true" when consent is granted.

Possible investigation steps

  • Review winlog.event_data.param1 and any related Quick Assist Application log events around @timestamp for beginsharing, setsharingmode, and endsharing commands to reconstruct the session timeline.
  • Identify the local user on host.id who initiated or approved the session and determine whether Quick Assist use is expected for that user, host role, or business unit.
  • Correlate with process telemetry for QuickAssist.exe on the same host and timeframe, including parent process, command line, and code signature details when available.
  • Check for related alerts on the same host.id or user.id, such as credential access, defense evasion, or additional remote access activity during or shortly after the session.
  • If the host is a server or privileged workstation, determine whether any follow-on actions occurred during the FullControl window, such as new logons, service creation, or lateral movement.

False positive analysis

  • IT help desk, managed service providers, and internal support teams legitimately use Quick Assist with FullControl during approved troubleshooting. Confirm the session aligns with an open ticket, known support staff, and expected host and user pairings before closing as benign.
  • Before creating an exception, anchor it on the minimum confirmed workflow: host.id, user.id, and recurring support patterns. Avoid broad exceptions on the Quick Assist provider alone.

Response and remediation

  • If confirmed malicious, terminate the Quick Assist session, isolate the affected host when feasible, and reset credentials for accounts used or exposed during the session.
  • Preserve Application log events containing winlog.event_data.param1 and related Quick Assist telemetry before remediation.
  • Review whether Quick Assist should remain enabled organization-wide or be restricted via policy for high-value hosts.
  • Hunt for additional hosts where the same remote helper pattern or concurrent Quick Assist FullControl sessions occurred.
Raw source Quick Assist Full Control Sharing Mode Enabled · Elastic TOML
Esc
Published by elastic/detection-rules ↗, licensed under Elastic License 2.0 ↗. Reproduced here unmodified.
[metadata]
creation_date = "2026/06/21"
integration = ["system", "windows"]
maturity = "production"
updated_date = "2026/06/21"

[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
description = """
Identifies when Microsoft Quick Assist sharing mode is set to FullControl on a Windows host. This grants the remote
helper full interactive control of the target device and may indicate IT help desk fraud, unauthorized remote access,
or lateral movement preparation.
"""
from = "now-9m"
index = ["logs-system.application*", "logs-windows.forwarded*", "winlogbeat-*"]
language = "kuery"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Quick Assist Full Control Sharing Mode Enabled"
references = [
    "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2024/05/15/threat-actors-misusing-quick-assist-in-social-engineering-attacks-leading-to-ransomware/",
	"https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1209/"
]
risk_score = 47
rule_id = "1b1b4236-175f-4863-89f7-7f0d2da0f0e8"
severity = "medium"
tags = [
    "Domain: Endpoint",
    "OS: Windows",
    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
    "Tactic: Command and Control",
    "Tactic: Lateral Movement",
    "Data Source: Windows Application Event Logs",
    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
]
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "query"

query = '''
host.os.type:windows and winlog.channel:"Application" and event.provider:"Quick Assist" and event.code:"0" and
  winlog.event_data.param1:(*FullControl* and *setsharingmode*)
'''

note = """## Triage and analysis

### Investigating Quick Assist Full Control Sharing Mode Enabled

Microsoft Quick Assist is a built-in remote support tool. When a sharer grants FullControl, the helper can interact with
the desktop as if physically present. Adversaries abuse Quick Assist in help desk fraud and social engineering to gain
interactive access without deploying separate remote access software.

Quick Assist logs these transitions in the Windows Application log under the Quick Assist provider. A `setsharingmode`
command with sharing mode `FullControl` is written to `winlog.event_data.param1`, often alongside a JSON payload that
includes `"result":"true"` when consent is granted.

#### Possible investigation steps

- Review `winlog.event_data.param1` and any related Quick Assist Application log events around `@timestamp` for
  `beginsharing`, `setsharingmode`, and `endsharing` commands to reconstruct the session timeline.
- Identify the local user on `host.id` who initiated or approved the session and determine whether Quick Assist use is
  expected for that user, host role, or business unit.
- Correlate with process telemetry for `QuickAssist.exe` on the same host and timeframe, including parent process,
  command line, and code signature details when available.
- Check for related alerts on the same `host.id` or `user.id`, such as credential access, defense evasion, or
  additional remote access activity during or shortly after the session.
- If the host is a server or privileged workstation, determine whether any follow-on actions occurred during the
  FullControl window, such as new logons, service creation, or lateral movement.

### False positive analysis

- IT help desk, managed service providers, and internal support teams legitimately use Quick Assist with FullControl
  during approved troubleshooting. Confirm the session aligns with an open ticket, known support staff, and expected
  host and user pairings before closing as benign.
- Before creating an exception, anchor it on the minimum confirmed workflow: `host.id`, `user.id`, and recurring
  support patterns. Avoid broad exceptions on the Quick Assist provider alone.

### Response and remediation

- If confirmed malicious, terminate the Quick Assist session, isolate the affected host when feasible, and reset
  credentials for accounts used or exposed during the session.
- Preserve Application log events containing `winlog.event_data.param1` and related Quick Assist telemetry before
  remediation.
- Review whether Quick Assist should remain enabled organization-wide or be restricted via policy for high-value hosts.
- Hunt for additional hosts where the same remote helper pattern or concurrent Quick Assist FullControl sessions
  occurred."""

setup = """## Setup

Windows Application event log collection must be enabled via the Elastic Agent System integration to ingest Application log events.
"""

[rule.investigation_fields]
field_names = [
    "@timestamp",
    "host.id",
    "host.name",
    "user.id",
    "user.name",
    "event.provider",
    "event.code",
    "winlog.event_id",
    "winlog.event_data.param1",
]

[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"

[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1219"
name = "Remote Access Tools"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1219/"

[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0011"
name = "Command and Control"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/"

[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"

[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1021"
name = "Remote Services"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/"

[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0008"
name = "Lateral Movement"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008/"

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