M365 Identity Login from Atypical Region
Description
Detects successful Microsoft 365 portal logins from a country and region the user has not previously authenticated from in a historical window. Atypical regions are identified by combining the user's country and region geolocation history; an authentication from a new country/region pair for that user may indicate an adversary attempting to access the account from an unusual location or behind a VPN. Adversaries may leverage AiTM phishing kits or brokered credentials to gain unauthorized access.
Query · esql
FROM logs-o365.audit-*
| WHERE @timestamp >= NOW() - 14 days
AND data_stream.dataset == "o365.audit"
AND event.provider == "AzureActiveDirectory"
AND event.action == "UserLoggedIn"
AND event.outcome == "success"
AND TO_INTEGER(o365.audit.Target.Type) IN (0, 2, 3, 5, 6, 10)
AND o365.audit.UserId IS NOT NULL
AND o365.audit.UserId != "Not Available"
AND source.geo.country_name IS NOT NULL
AND source.geo.region_name IS NOT NULL
AND (source.`as`.organization.name IS NULL OR source.`as`.organization.name NOT IN ("ZSCALER, INC.", "Zscaler Switzerland GmbH", "Netskope Inc"))
AND o365.audit.ApplicationId IS NOT NULL
AND o365.audit.ApplicationId NOT IN (
"08e18876-6177-487e-b8b5-cf950c1e598c",
"29d9ed98-a469-4536-ade2-f981bc1d605e",
"38aa3b87-a06d-4817-b275-7a316988d93b",
"3e62f81e-590b-425b-9531-cad6683656cf",
"a809996b-059e-42e2-9866-db24b99a9782",
"d7b530a4-7680-4c23-a8bf-c52c121d2e87"
)
AND o365.audit.ExtendedProperties.RequestType IS NOT NULL
AND o365.audit.ExtendedProperties.RequestType NOT IN (
"BulkAADJToken:BulkAADJTokenPoll",
"Consent:Set",
"DeviceAuth:PKeyAuth",
"DeviceAuth:ReprocessTls",
"Federation:externalauthcallback",
"Federation:oauth2claimsprovider",
"Federation:oauth2msa",
"KerberosProxy:kerberos",
"Kmsi:kmsi",
"Login:reprocess",
"Login:resume",
"MessagePrompt:MessagePrompt",
"OrgIdWsFederation:federation",
"OrgIdWsTrust2:extsts",
"PermitSso:PermitSso",
"RegionalCacheAuth:regionalcacheauthtoken",
"SAS:BeginAuth",
"SAS:EndAuth",
"SAS:ProcessAuth",
"SSPR:end",
"Saml2:processrequest",
"UserInfo:Index",
"WebNativeBridgeController:WebNativeBridgeReprocess",
"WsFederation:wsfederation"
)
AND (
user_agent.original IS NULL
OR (
user_agent.original NOT LIKE "*Android*"
AND user_agent.original NOT LIKE "*PKeyAuth*"
AND user_agent.original NOT LIKE "*WebView*"
AND user_agent.original NOT LIKE "*iPad*"
AND user_agent.original NOT LIKE "*iPhone*"
)
)
| STATS
Esql.first_seen = MIN(@timestamp),
Esql.first_ingested = MIN(COALESCE(event.ingested, @timestamp)),
Esql.last_seen = MAX(@timestamp),
Esql.event_count = COUNT(*),
Esql.source_as_organization_name_values = VALUES(source.`as`.organization.name),
Esql.source_ip_values = VALUES(source.ip),
Esql.user_agent_original_values = VALUES(user_agent.original),
Esql.application_id_values = VALUES(o365.audit.ApplicationId),
Esql.request_type_values = VALUES(o365.audit.ExtendedProperties.RequestType),
Esql.object_id_values = VALUES(o365.audit.ObjectId),
Esql.result_status_detail_values = VALUES(o365.audit.ExtendedProperties.ResultStatusDetail),
Esql.user_type_values = VALUES(o365.audit.UserType),
Esql.aad_session_id_values = VALUES(o365.audit.AppAccessContext.AADSessionId),
Esql.actor_ip_values = VALUES(o365.audit.ActorIpAddress),
Esql.user_key_values = VALUES(o365.audit.UserKey),
Esql.token_object_id_values = VALUES(o365.audit.TokenObjectId)
BY o365.audit.UserId, source.geo.country_name, source.geo.region_name
| WHERE Esql.first_ingested >= NOW() - 10 minutes
| KEEP Esql.*, o365.audit.UserId, source.geo.country_name, source.geo.region_name
Investigation fields
Pivot points the source recommends for triage.
o365.audit.UserIdsource.geo.country_namesource.geo.region_nameEsql.first_seenEsql.last_seenEsql.event_countEsql.source_ip_valuesEsql.actor_ip_valuesEsql.source_as_organization_name_valuesEsql.user_agent_original_valuesEsql.application_id_valuesEsql.object_id_valuesEsql.request_type_valuesEsql.result_status_detail_valuesEsql.user_type_valuesEsql.aad_session_id_valuesEsql.user_key_valuesEsql.token_object_id_values
Known false positives
- False positives may occur when users are using a VPN or traveling to different locations. Corporate CASB proxies (Zscaler and Netskope) are excluded; other proxy services routing traffic through distant network points of presence may trigger this rule.
- Mobile access may also result in false positives, as users may log in from various locations while on the go. Mobile user-agents (Android, iPad, iPhone) are excluded.
Analyst notes
Investigating M365 Identity Login from Atypical Region
Detects successful Microsoft 365 portal logins from a country and region the user has not previously authenticated from in a historical window. This may indicate an adversary attempting to access the account from an unusual location or behind a VPN. Adversaries may leverage AiTM phishing kits or brokered credentials to gain unauthorized access.
Possible investigation steps
- Identify the user in
o365.audit.UserIdand the new geographic combination:source.geo.country_nameandsource.geo.region_name. - Review
Esql.first_seento confirm when this geographic combination first appeared and correlate with the user's known activity. - Inspect
Esql.source_as_organization_name_valuesfor the originating ASN. Corporate ISPs and known CASB proxies are lower-risk. Hosting-provider ASNs (cloud compute, bulletproof hosting) for interactive sign-ins are high-fidelity suspicious. - Review
Esql.source_ip_valuesfor the source IPs and correlate with threat intelligence or known VPN ranges for the user. - Examine
Esql.request_type_valuesto understand the authentication flow type.OAuth2:Authorizeis interactive browser login;OAuth2:Tokenindicates background token acquisition. - Analyze
Esql.application_id_valuesto identify which application was used. Look for unexpected applications or those commonly associated with OAuth phishing campaigns. - Review
Esql.user_agent_original_valuesfor the browser and OS. A user-agent that diverges from the user's baseline (different OS, browser version) may indicate session reuse or tool-based access. - Use
Esql.aad_session_id_valuesto pivot directly intoazure.signinlogson thesession_idfield and retrieve the full interactive sign-in record, including MFA details, device compliance, and CA policy outcomes. - Use
Esql.user_key_values(AAD object GUID) to query Entra ID user details and risk posture. - If
Esql.token_object_id_valuesis populated, cross-reference against known stolen token indicators; a token object ID appearing in multiple geographic contexts is a high-confidence AiTM signal. - Compare
Esql.source_ip_valuesandEsql.actor_ip_values— divergence may indicate proxied or forwarded requests. - Check
Esql.object_id_valuesto identify which Microsoft resource or service was accessed from the new location. - If Entra ID sign-in logs are available, also check for concurrent impossible travel alerts for the same user.
False positive analysis
- Users traveling or using VPNs may trigger this alert. Verify with the user if they were traveling or using a VPN at the time of the login attempt.
- Mobile access may result in false positives; mobile user-agents (Android, iPad, iPhone) are already excluded.
- Zscaler and Netskope CASB traffic is excluded. Other enterprise proxy services routing traffic through distant
PoPs may generate alerts; validate the ASN in
Esql.source_as_organization_name_valuesagainst the organization's known proxy infrastructure.
Response and remediation
- If the login attempt is deemed suspicious, immediately revoke all active sessions for the user and force re-authentication.
- Reset the user's password and enforce multi-factor authentication (MFA) for logins from unusual locations.
- Review conditional access policies to ensure they require MFA or block access from unexpected geographies.
- Investigate any OAuth consent grants, new authentication method registrations, or device joins that occurred near the same time as the atypical login.
- Monitor for subsequent login attempts from the same location or IP address to identify persistent adversary access.
- Consider adding exceptions for specific ASNs if the login attempts are confirmed legitimate corporate proxy behavior.