New GitHub Self Hosted Action Runner


Description

This rule detects the registration of a self-hosted GitHub Actions runner by a user and source ASN (autonomous system) pair not seen in the last 5 days. The source IP is resolved to its ASN at query time, so address churn inside the same ISP or cloud provider does not produce new alerts. Adversaries may abuse self-hosted runners to execute workflow jobs on customer infrastructure.

Query · esql

FROM logs-github.audit-*
| WHERE event.dataset == "github.audit" AND event.category == "configuration"
  AND event.action IN ("repo.register_self_hosted_runner", "org.register_self_hosted_runner", "enterprise.register_self_hosted_runner")
  AND user.name IS NOT NULL AND github.actor_ip IS NOT NULL
| IP_LOCATION asn = github.actor_ip WITH { "database_file": "GeoLite2-ASN.mmdb", "properties": ["asn", "organization_name"] }
| IP_LOCATION geo = github.actor_ip WITH { "properties": ["country_iso_code"] }
| WHERE asn.asn IS NOT NULL
| STATS Esql.event_count = COUNT(*),
        Esql.first_seen = MIN(@timestamp),
        Esql.last_seen = MAX(@timestamp),
        Esql.ip_values = VALUES(github.actor_ip),
        Esql.event_action_values = VALUES(event.action),
        Esql.repo_values = VALUES(github.repo),
        Esql.org_values = VALUES(github.org),
        Esql.country_values = VALUES(geo.country_iso_code),
        Esql.user_agent_values = VALUES(github.user_agent)
  BY user.name, asn.asn, asn.organization_name
// The 5-day history is the rule look-back (from = now-7205m). A user/ASN pair is new when its first
// event falls inside the current interval; the 10m bound allows for the 5m interval plus scheduling drift.
| WHERE DATE_DIFF("minute", Esql.first_seen, NOW()) <= 10
| EVAL Esql.source_as_number = asn.asn, Esql.source_as_organization_name = asn.organization_name
| KEEP user.name, Esql.*

Known false positives

  • Authorized self-hosted GitHub actions runner.

Analyst notes

Investigating New GitHub Self Hosted Action Runner

Adversaries who gain the ability to modify or trigger workflows in a linked GitHub repository can execute arbitrary commands on the runner host.

Possible investigation steps

  • Validate the user is authoried to perform this change
  • Review the purpose of the self-hosted action runner and what actions will be executed.
  • Verify if there is any adjascent sensitive file access or collection.
  • Correlate with other alerts and investiguate if this activity is related to a supply chain attack.

False positive analysis

  • Authorized github self-hosted actions runner.

Response and remediation

  • Immediately isolate the affected system from the network to prevent further unauthorized command execution and potential lateral movement.
  • Terminate any suspicious child processes that were initiated by the Github actions runner.
  • Conduct a thorough review of the affected system's logs and configurations to identify any unauthorized changes or additional indicators of compromise.
  • Restore the system from a known good backup if any unauthorized changes or malicious activities are confirmed.
  • Implement application whitelisting to prevent unauthorized execution.
  • Escalate the incident to the security operations center (SOC) or incident response team for further investigation and to assess the potential impact on the broader network.
Raw source New GitHub Self Hosted Action Runner · Elastic TOML
Esc
Published by elastic/detection-rules ↗, licensed under Elastic License 2.0 ↗. Reproduced here unmodified.
[metadata]
creation_date = "2025/11/28"
integration = ["github"]
maturity = "production"
min_stack_comments = "ES|QL IP_LOCATION requires 9.5.0+."
min_stack_version = "9.5.0"
updated_date = "2026/10/07"

[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
description = """
This rule detects the registration of a self-hosted GitHub Actions runner by a user and source ASN (autonomous
system) pair not seen in the last 5 days. The source IP is resolved to its ASN at query time, so address churn inside
the same ISP or cloud provider does not produce new alerts. Adversaries may abuse self-hosted runners to execute
workflow jobs on customer infrastructure.
"""
false_positives = [
    "Authorized self-hosted GitHub actions runner.",
]
from = "now-7205m"
interval = "5m"
language = "esql"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "New GitHub Self Hosted Action Runner"
note = """## Triage and analysis

### Investigating New GitHub Self Hosted Action Runner

Adversaries who gain the ability to modify or trigger workflows in a linked GitHub repository can execute arbitrary commands on the runner host.

### Possible investigation steps

- Validate the user is authoried to perform this change
- Review the purpose of the self-hosted action runner and what actions will be executed.
- Verify if there is any adjascent  sensitive file access or collection.
- Correlate with other alerts and investiguate if this activity is related to a supply chain attack.

### False positive analysis

- Authorized github self-hosted actions runner.

### Response and remediation

- Immediately isolate the affected system from the network to prevent further unauthorized command execution and potential lateral movement.
- Terminate any suspicious child processes that were initiated by the Github actions runner.
- Conduct a thorough review of the affected system's logs and configurations to identify any unauthorized changes or additional indicators of compromise.
- Restore the system from a known good backup if any unauthorized changes or malicious activities are confirmed.
- Implement application whitelisting to prevent unauthorized execution.
- Escalate the incident to the security operations center (SOC) or incident response team for further investigation and to assess the potential impact on the broader network."""
references = [
    "https://www.elastic.co/blog/shai-hulud-worm-npm-supply-chain-compromise",
    "https://socket.dev/blog/shai-hulud-strikes-again-v2",
    "https://www.wiz.io/blog/shai-hulud-2-0-ongoing-supply-chain-attack"
]
risk_score = 47
rule_id = "40c34c8a-b0bc-43bc-83aa-d2b76bf129e1"
severity = "medium"
tags = [
    "Domain: Cloud",
    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
    "Tactic: Initial Access",
    "Data Source: Github",
    "Data Source: GitHub Audit Logs",
    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
    "Noise: Low",
    "Performance: Fast",
    "Profile: Recommended",
    "Threat: Supply Chain",
    "Rule Type: ES|QL",
    "Platform: GitHub",
    "Domain: SaaS",
]
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "esql"

query = '''
FROM logs-github.audit-*
| WHERE event.dataset == "github.audit" AND event.category == "configuration"
  AND event.action IN ("repo.register_self_hosted_runner", "org.register_self_hosted_runner", "enterprise.register_self_hosted_runner")
  AND user.name IS NOT NULL AND github.actor_ip IS NOT NULL
| IP_LOCATION asn = github.actor_ip WITH { "database_file": "GeoLite2-ASN.mmdb", "properties": ["asn", "organization_name"] }
| IP_LOCATION geo = github.actor_ip WITH { "properties": ["country_iso_code"] }
| WHERE asn.asn IS NOT NULL
| STATS Esql.event_count = COUNT(*),
        Esql.first_seen = MIN(@timestamp),
        Esql.last_seen = MAX(@timestamp),
        Esql.ip_values = VALUES(github.actor_ip),
        Esql.event_action_values = VALUES(event.action),
        Esql.repo_values = VALUES(github.repo),
        Esql.org_values = VALUES(github.org),
        Esql.country_values = VALUES(geo.country_iso_code),
        Esql.user_agent_values = VALUES(github.user_agent)
  BY user.name, asn.asn, asn.organization_name
// The 5-day history is the rule look-back (from = now-7205m). A user/ASN pair is new when its first
// event falls inside the current interval; the 10m bound allows for the 5m interval plus scheduling drift.
| WHERE DATE_DIFF("minute", Esql.first_seen, NOW()) <= 10
| EVAL Esql.source_as_number = asn.asn, Esql.source_as_organization_name = asn.organization_name
| KEEP user.name, Esql.*
'''

[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"

[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1195"
name = "Supply Chain Compromise"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195/"

[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1195.001"
name = "Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195/001/"

[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1195.002"
name = "Compromise Software Supply Chain"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195/002/"

[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0001"
name = "Initial Access"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001/"

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