AWS EKS Multi-Resource Discovery
Description
Adversaries who land credentials in a cluster or abuse an over-privileged token, often map the environment before exfiltration or privilege escalation. Rapid get/list traffic across distinct API resource kinds that answer those questions (namespaces, workloads, roles, cluster-wide roles) is a common setup and orientation pattern for both interactive attackers and automated recon scripts. This rule detects cross-resource bursts from a single client fingerprint within a one-minute bucket which may represent reconnaissance.
Query · esql
from logs-aws.eks_audit-* metadata _id, _index, _version
| eval Esql.time_interval = date_trunc(1 minute, @timestamp)
| where data_stream.dataset == "aws.eks_audit"
and event.action in ("get", "list")
and aws.eks.audit.objectRef.resource in ("namespaces", "nodes", "pods", "roles", "configmaps", "serviceaccounts", "clusterroles", "clusterrolebindings", "rolebindings")
and source.ip is not null and user.name IS NOT NULL
and not to_string(source.ip) in ("127.0.0.1", "::1")
and not user.name rlike """(system:serviceaccount:kube-system:|eks:|system:kube-|arn:aws:sts::.*:assumed-role/AWSServiceRoleForAmazonEKS/).*"""
and not aws.eks.audit.user.username in ("system:serviceaccount:flux-system:kustomize-controller", "system:serviceaccount:flux-system:helm-controller", "system:serviceaccount:flux-system:source-controller", "system:serviceaccount:security:trivy-operator")
| stats
Esql.unique_resources = count_distinct(aws.eks.audit.objectRef.resource),
Esql.enumerated_resources = values(aws.eks.audit.objectRef.resource),
Esql.enumerated_namespaces = values(aws.eks.audit.objectRef.namespace),
Esql.decisions = values(`aws.eks.audit.annotations.authorization_k8s_io/decision`)
by user.name, aws.eks.audit.user.username, source.ip, user_agent.original, Esql.time_interval
| where Esql.unique_resources >= 3
| keep Esql.*, aws.eks.audit.user.username, user.name, source.ip, user_agent.original
Implementation guide
This rule reads EKS control-plane audit logs collected by the AWS integration
into logs-aws.eks_audit-*, where the AWS EKS audit ingest
pipelines normalize each audit record under aws.eks.audit.*.
Enable the audit control-plane log type on the EKS cluster, send its
CloudWatch log group through the AWS integration, and confirm events carry
data_stream.dataset: aws.eks_audit and
cloud.provider: aws before enabling this rule.
Analyst notes
Investigating AWS EKS Multi-Resource Discovery
The rule groups Kubernetes audit get/list events on namespaces, pods, roles, and clusterroles into one-minute windows
per user.name, source.ip, user_agent.original, and flags windows where three or more distinct resource types appear.
That combination is consistent with someone sketching cluster layout and privilege structure rather than touching a single
resource type. Allowed and denied authorizations are both included: failures still signal probing and validate which
object types the caller attempted to reach.
Possible investigation steps
- Pivot on
Esql.time_intervaland the same identity or IP in raw audit logs to see ordering (e.g. namespaces first, then roles, then pods) and whether calls succeeded. - Review
Esql.decisionsand namespaces touched; correlate with RBAC for that identity to see if scope matches a known job or breaks least-privilege expectations. - Hunt for follow-on activity: secret/configmap reads, rolebinding changes, pod exec, anonymous or unusual user agents.
- Baseline automation: CI, GitOps, and some monitoring agents can read several resource types during sync; exclude known service accounts or source networks if noisy.
False positive analysis
- Platform operators or runbooks that reconcile RBAC and workload state may legitimately span these resource types in a short window; tune by user, IP allowlist, or user agent when documented.
- Some installers briefly query namespaces, pods, and roles during upgrades—correlate with change windows.
Response and remediation
- If malicious, revoke or rotate the implicated credentials, review and tighten RBAC, and inspect for data access or persistence established after the burst.