GitHub Repo Created


Description

Identifies the creation of a GitHub repository by a non-bot actor. Unexpected repository creation can indicate unauthorized infrastructure setup, data staging, or misuse of a compromised GitHub account.

Query · kuery

data_stream.dataset:"github.audit" and event.category:"configuration" and event.action:"repo.create" and
not github.actor_is_bot:true

Investigation fields

Pivot points the source recommends for triage.

  • @timestamp
  • event.action
  • user.name
  • github.org
  • github.repo
  • github.repository_public
  • github.actor_ip
  • github.user_agent
  • github.programmatic_access_type
  • github.actor_is_bot

Known false positives

  • Authorized users may create repositories for development, testing, documentation, or migration. Confirm the actor, organization, repository visibility, and business purpose before escalating.

Analyst notes

Investigating GitHub Repo Created

This rule detects repository creation by an actor that GitHub does not identify as a bot. Repository creation is common in normal development, but it can also support unauthorized code hosting, data staging, persistence, or resource development after an account is compromised.

Possible investigation steps

  • Review user.name, github.org, github.repo, and github.actor_ip to identify the actor and repository.
  • Confirm the repository name, visibility, ownership, and creation purpose with the actor or organization owner.
  • Review nearby audit events for permission changes, collaborator additions, deploy keys, webhooks, secrets, workflow creation, pushes, transfers, or visibility changes.
  • Check whether the source IP, user agent, and authentication method are expected for the actor.
  • Determine whether sensitive code, credentials, or organization data were subsequently added to the repository.

False positive analysis

  • Developers and administrators routinely create repositories for approved projects, testing, migrations, and documentation.
  • Internal automation not identified by GitHub as a bot can still trigger this rule. Scope exceptions to a verified actor and organization when that behavior is expected.

Response and remediation

  • If unauthorized, restrict or remove the repository, revoke suspicious sessions or tokens, and review the actor's recent GitHub activity.
  • Remove unauthorized collaborators, deploy keys, webhooks, workflows, and secrets.
  • Preserve relevant audit events and repository contents before deletion when incident-response evidence is required.
Raw source GitHub Repo Created · Elastic TOML
Esc
Published by elastic/detection-rules ↗, licensed under Elastic License 2.0 ↗. Reproduced here unmodified.
[metadata]
creation_date = "2023/10/11"
integration = ["github"]
maturity = "production"
updated_date = "2026/11/17"

[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
description = """
Identifies the creation of a GitHub repository by a non-bot actor. Unexpected repository creation can indicate
unauthorized infrastructure setup, data staging, or misuse of a compromised GitHub account.
"""
false_positives = [
    """
    Authorized users may create repositories for development, testing, documentation, or migration. Confirm the actor,
    organization, repository visibility, and business purpose before escalating.
    """,
]
from = "now-9m"
index = ["logs-github.audit-*"]
language = "kuery"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "GitHub Repo Created"
note = """## Triage and analysis

### Investigating GitHub Repo Created

This rule detects repository creation by an actor that GitHub does not identify as a bot. Repository creation is common
in normal development, but it can also support unauthorized code hosting, data staging, persistence, or resource
development after an account is compromised.

### Possible investigation steps

- Review `user.name`, `github.org`, `github.repo`, and `github.actor_ip` to identify the actor and repository.
- Confirm the repository name, visibility, ownership, and creation purpose with the actor or organization owner.
- Review nearby audit events for permission changes, collaborator additions, deploy keys, webhooks, secrets, workflow
  creation, pushes, transfers, or visibility changes.
- Check whether the source IP, user agent, and authentication method are expected for the actor.
- Determine whether sensitive code, credentials, or organization data were subsequently added to the repository.

### False positive analysis

- Developers and administrators routinely create repositories for approved projects, testing, migrations, and
  documentation.
- Internal automation not identified by GitHub as a bot can still trigger this rule. Scope exceptions to a verified
  actor and organization when that behavior is expected.

### Response and remediation

- If unauthorized, restrict or remove the repository, revoke suspicious sessions or tokens, and review the actor's
  recent GitHub activity.
- Remove unauthorized collaborators, deploy keys, webhooks, workflows, and secrets.
- Preserve relevant audit events and repository contents before deletion when incident-response evidence is required.
"""
references = [
    "https://docs.github.com/en/organizations/keeping-your-organization-secure/managing-security-settings-for-your-organization/audit-log-events-for-your-organization",
]
risk_score = 21
rule_id = "6cea88e4-6ce2-4238-9981-a54c140d6336"
severity = "low"
tags = [
    "Domain: Cloud",
    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
    "Use Case: UEBA",
    "Tactic: Execution",
    "Tactic: Resource Development",
    "Data Source: Github",
    "Data Source: GitHub Audit Logs",
    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
    "Noise: Medium",
    "Performance: Fast",
    "Rule Type: Custom Query (KQL)",
    "Platform: GitHub",
    "Domain: SaaS",
]
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "query"

query = '''
data_stream.dataset:"github.audit" and event.category:"configuration" and event.action:"repo.create" and
not github.actor_is_bot:true
'''


[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"

[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1648"
name = "Serverless Execution"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1648/"

[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0002"
name = "Execution"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/"

[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"

[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1583"
name = "Acquire Infrastructure"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/"

[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1583.006"
name = "Web Services"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/006/"

[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0042"
name = "Resource Development"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0042/"

[rule.investigation_fields]
field_names = [
    "@timestamp",
    "event.action",
    "user.name",
    "github.org",
    "github.repo",
    "github.repository_public",
    "github.actor_ip",
    "github.user_agent",
    "github.programmatic_access_type",
    "github.actor_is_bot",
]

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