Azure AD Graph Potential Enumeration (ROADrecon)
Description
Detects a burst of Azure AD Graph (graph.windows.net) directory enumeration by a single identity, keyed on the internal
API version that ROADrecon hardcodes (1.61-internal, with 1.6-internal as a related tooling value) plus a per-user
request burst. ROADrecon's gather command walks the directory via this internal API version using aiohttp.
This rule also detects the "evade" argument that routes every read through a single "/$batch" OData endpoint under a benign
"Microsoft ADO.NET Data Services" user-agent. A lower burst threshold applies when a scripting user-agent (aiohttp/python/fasthttp)
is present and a higher volume threshold applies otherwise.
Query · esql
from logs-azure.aadgraphactivitylogs-* metadata _id, _version, _index
| where data_stream.dataset == "azure.aadgraphactivitylogs"
and azure.aadgraphactivitylogs.properties.api_version in ("1.61-internal", "1.6-internal")
| eval Esql.ua_lower = to_lower(user_agent.original)
| eval Esql.scripting_user_agent = Esql.ua_lower like "*aiohttp*" or Esql.ua_lower like "python*" or Esql.ua_lower like "*fasthttp*"
| eval Esql.target_endpoint = case(
url.path like "*$batch*", "batch",
url.path like "*/eligibleRoleAssignments*", "eligibleRoleAssignments",
url.path like "*/roleAssignments*", "roleAssignments",
url.path like "*/users*", "users",
url.path like "*/groups*", "groups",
url.path like "*/servicePrincipals*", "servicePrincipals",
url.path like "*/applications*", "applications",
url.path like "*/devices*", "devices",
url.path like "*/directoryRoles*", "directoryRoles",
url.path like "*/roleDefinitions*", "roleDefinitions",
url.path like "*/administrativeUnits*", "administrativeUnits",
url.path like "*/contacts*", "contacts",
url.path like "*/oauth2PermissionGrants*", "oauth2PermissionGrants",
url.path like "*/authorizationPolicy*", "authorizationPolicy",
url.path like "*/settings*", "settings",
url.path like "*/policies*", "policies",
url.path like "*/tenantDetails*", "tenantDetails",
"other"
)
| eval Esql.time_window = date_trunc(1 minutes, @timestamp)
| stats
Esql.request_count = count(*),
Esql.distinct_endpoints = count_distinct(url.path),
Esql.collections = values(Esql.target_endpoint),
Esql.scripting_user_agent_seen = max(case(Esql.scripting_user_agent, 1, 0)),
Esql.api_versions = values(azure.aadgraphactivitylogs.properties.api_version),
Esql.app_ids = values(azure.aadgraphactivitylogs.properties.app_id),
Esql.user_agents = values(user_agent.original),
Esql.http_methods = values(http.request.method),
Esql.status_codes = values(http.response.status_code),
Esql.source_ips = values(source.ip),
Esql.source_asn_orgs = values(source.`as`.organization.name),
Esql.source_countries = values(source.geo.country_name),
Esql.actor_types = values(azure.aadgraphactivitylogs.properties.actor_type),
Esql.client_auth_methods = values(azure.aadgraphactivitylogs.properties.client_auth_method),
Esql.session_ids = values(azure.aadgraphactivitylogs.properties.session_id),
Esql.sign_in_activity_ids = values(azure.aadgraphactivitylogs.properties.sign_in_activity_id),
Esql.scopes = values(azure.aadgraphactivitylogs.properties.scopes),
Esql.first_seen = min(@timestamp),
Esql.last_seen = max(@timestamp)
by
user.id,
azure.tenant_id,
Esql.time_window
| eval Esql.enum_detected = case(
Esql.scripting_user_agent_seen == 1 and Esql.distinct_endpoints >= 5, true,
Esql.distinct_endpoints >= 15, true,
Esql.request_count >= 150, true,
false
)
| where Esql.enum_detected == true
| keep
user.id,
azure.tenant_id,
Esql.*
Investigation fields
Pivot points the source recommends for triage.
user.idazure.tenant_id
Implementation guide
Requires Azure AD Graph Activity Logs ingested into logs-azure.aadgraphactivitylogs-* via the Elastic Azure integration. Enable the AzureADGraphActivityLogs diagnostic-settings category on Entra ID.
Known false positives
- Legitimate first-party Microsoft components (for example the Azure Graph Client Library used by portal or Office experiences) occasionally call AAD Graph with the internal API version, but at single-digit to low-double-digit volume; the burst thresholds exclude them. Validate the calling `azure.aadgraphactivitylogs.properties.app_id` and user if a low-volume match appears.
- Developer activity using aiohttp or python HTTP libraries against AAD Graph for prototyping. Rare in production tenants and typically low-volume.
- Authorized red team activity exercising ROADrecon. Document the engagement window and add exceptions on the source IP or calling user.
Analyst notes
Investigating Azure AD Graph Potential Enumeration (ROADrecon)
This is an ES|QL aggregation rule. Alert documents contain summarized fields per burst window: the calling identity, the tenant, and a one-minute bucket. The alert itself is the signal that something resembling ROADrecon's gather walk happened against AAD Graph; the actual investigation happens against the raw logs-azure.aadgraphactivitylogs-* events for the same identity and window.
The rule anchors on the hardcoded internal API version and a per-user burst rather than the user-agent alone, so it catches all three gather transports:
- Default:
aiohttpuser-agent across ~16 directory collections. --evade: a single/$batchOData endpoint under aMicrosoft ADO.NET Data Servicesuser-agent (defeats user-agent and distinct-endpoint based matching).-ua <value>: an arbitrary browser user-agent.
Possible investigation steps
- Confirm the burst by filtering raw AAD Graph activity for the alerting user, tenant, and time window.
- Filter
logs-azure.aadgraphactivitylogs-*on the alerting user, tenant, and burst window. - A default
gatherwalks ~16 collections (many distincturl.path);--evadeconcentrates volume on/$batch(highrequest_count, one path).
- Filter
- Tool fingerprint: the internal API version is the primary anchor.
api_version = 1.61-internal(hardcoded ingather.py, returns internal-only fields likestrongAuthenticationDetail). No first-party Microsoft component pins this at volume.user_agent.originalis a secondary tell:aiohttp/python(overt),Microsoft ADO.NET Data Serviceswith/$batch(the--evadesignature), or a browser string (-ua).
- Calling client + auth method: the typical device-code-flow ROADrecon entrypoint.
- ROADrecon is usually pointed at the Azure CLI client (
04b07795-…) via the-cflag. - Uses a public-client auth method (no client secret or certificate).
- ROADrecon is usually pointed at the Azure CLI client (
- HTTP shape distinguishes enumeration from operator follow-on.
gatherreads only, so GETs dominate (the--evade/$batchrequests are POSTs to the batch endpoint).- A 403/404 tail indicates the identity probing endpoints it lacks permission for.
- PATCH / POST / DELETE against directory objects in the same burst means the operator did more than enumerate.
- Source posture: residential ISP, generic VPS, or anonymising-network egress raises triage priority.
- Pivot to sign-in logs (
logs-azure.signinlogs-*) via the sign-in correlation ID on each AAD Graph event to land on the originating token-mint. - Pivot to audit logs (
logs-azure.auditlogs-*) for any directory writes by the same user near the burst that suggest persistence or modification activity. - Confirm the activity is not attributable to authorized testing before treating as malicious.
- Check for red team engagement, penetration test, or internal tooling validation.
- Validate against the engagement window and the operator's known source range.
Response and remediation
- Enumerate device registrations created by the user during or around the burst window.
GET /v1.0/users/{id}/registeredDevicesandGET /v1.0/users/{id}/ownedDevices.- De-register anything not attributable to a known endpoint via
DELETE /v1.0/devices/{deviceObjectId}. - Do this BEFORE session revocation: device-bound PRTs survive
revokeSignInSessions.
- Revoke refresh tokens and active sessions for the calling user.
POST /v1.0/users/{id}/revokeSignInSessions.
- Temporarily disable the user if the alert is high-confidence or you need to halt further activity while investigation continues.
PATCH /v1.0/users/{id}with body{"accountEnabled": false}.
- Audit OAuth grants and app role assignments the user holds; revoke anything minted from a kit-egress or otherwise suspicious source.
GET /v1.0/oauth2PermissionGrants?$filter=principalId eq '{id}', revoke viaDELETE /v1.0/oauth2PermissionGrants/{grantId}.GET /v1.0/users/{id}/appRoleAssignments, revoke viaDELETE /v1.0/servicePrincipals/{spId}/appRoleAssignedTo/{assignmentId}.
- Reset the user's password and audit authentication methods added during the window.
GET /v1.0/users/{id}/authentication/methodsto list.- Remove anything unexpected via the method-type-specific endpoint.
- Audit directory writes by the user near the burst and roll back unauthorized changes.
- Query
logs-azure.auditlogs-*forRegister device,Update user,User registered security info, role assignment activity by the same user in the window.
- Query
- If the calling application has no legitimate AAD Graph dependency, block further use by that app.
PATCH /beta/applications/{id}with body{"authenticationBehaviors": {"blockAzureADGraphAccess": true}}.- This property lives on the Graph beta endpoint, not v1.0.