AWS EC2 EBS Snapshot Created by Rare User


Description

Identifies the first time, within a lookback window, an identity creates an EBS volume snapshot via the EC2 "CreateSnapshot" or "CreateSnapshots" APIs. Adversaries abuse snapshots to stage data for exfiltration (snapshot one or more volumes, then share or copy them to an attacker-controlled account) or to capture sensitive data from a compromised environment. This is a New Terms rule detecting a rare occurrence of the "cloud.account.id", "user.name", and "source.as.organization.name" tuple for this action.

Query · kuery

data_stream.dataset: "aws.cloudtrail"
    and event.provider: "ec2.amazonaws.com"
    and event.action: ("CreateSnapshot" or "CreateSnapshots")
    and event.outcome: "success"
    and source.ip: *
    and not source.as.organization.name: (
        "Google LLC" or "Amazon.com, Inc." or "Microsoft Corporation" or "GOOGLE-CLOUD-PLATFORM"
        or "MICROSOFT-CORP-MSN-AS-BLOCK" or "AMAZON-AES" or "AMAZON-02"
    )
    and not aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.invoked_by: (
        "backup.amazonaws.com" or "AWS Internal" or "dlm.amazonaws.com"
        or "malware-protection.guardduty.amazonaws.com"
    )

Investigation fields

Pivot points the source recommends for triage.

  • @timestamp
  • user.name
  • user_agent.original
  • source.ip
  • source.as.organization.name
  • aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.arn
  • aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.type
  • aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.access_key_id
  • event.action
  • event.outcome
  • event.provider
  • cloud.account.id
  • cloud.region
  • aws.cloudtrail.request_parameters

Known false positives

  • Backup, disaster-recovery, and data-lifecycle automation routinely creates snapshots. Service-invoked calls (AWS Backup, Data Lifecycle Manager) are excluded, but custom backup tooling or administrators taking ad hoc snapshots may generate first-seen matches that warrant review.

Analyst notes

Disclaimer: This investigation guide was created using generative AI technology and has been reviewed to improve its accuracy and relevance. While every effort has been made to ensure its quality, we recommend validating the content and adapting it to suit your specific environment and operational needs.

Investigating AWS EC2 EBS Snapshot Created by Rare User

EBS snapshots are point-in-time copies of volumes. Adversaries use CreateSnapshot (single volume) or CreateSnapshots (all volumes attached to an instance) to snapshot target volumes and then use ModifySnapshotAttribute to share them with, or CopySnapshot to move them into, an attacker-controlled account, enabling data theft without reading the source instance directly.

This rule uses New Terms to detect when an identity creates a snapshot from an account, principal, and network-origin combination not seen in the configured history window.

Possible investigation steps

  • Confirm who user.name and aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.arn represent and whether snapshot creation (CreateSnapshot or CreateSnapshots) is expected for that principal.
  • Review source.ip, source.as.organization.name, and geolocation, and whether the call aligns with normal egress for that principal.
  • Inspect aws.cloudtrail.request_parameters for the source volumeId (CreateSnapshot) or instanceSpecification (CreateSnapshots) and whether the targeted volume or instance holds sensitive data.
  • Correlate with follow-on ModifySnapshotAttribute (shared with another account or made public), CopySnapshot, and DescribeSnapshots in the same session.

False positive analysis

  • Documented backup/DR roles or custom backup tooling taking snapshots; add exceptions by ARN if needed.
  • One-off administrator snapshots before maintenance; confirm the change window and operator.

Response and remediation

  • If unexpected, review any snapshot sharing or copy operations, revoke cross-account snapshot permissions, rotate credentials for the implicated principal, and tighten least privilege on EC2 snapshot APIs.

Additional information

Raw source AWS EC2 EBS Snapshot Created by Rare User · Elastic TOML
Esc
Published by elastic/detection-rules ↗, licensed under Elastic License 2.0 ↗. Reproduced here unmodified.
[metadata]
creation_date = "2026/11/11"
integration = ["aws"]
maturity = "production"
updated_date = "2026/11/11"

[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
description = """
Identifies the first time, within a lookback window, an identity creates an EBS volume snapshot via the EC2
"CreateSnapshot" or "CreateSnapshots" APIs. Adversaries abuse snapshots to stage data for exfiltration (snapshot one or
more volumes, then share or copy them to an attacker-controlled account) or to capture sensitive data from a compromised
environment. This is a New Terms rule detecting a rare occurrence of the "cloud.account.id", "user.name", and
"source.as.organization.name" tuple for this action.
"""
false_positives = [
    """
    Backup, disaster-recovery, and data-lifecycle automation routinely creates snapshots. Service-invoked calls (AWS
    Backup, Data Lifecycle Manager) are excluded, but custom backup tooling or administrators taking ad hoc snapshots
    may generate first-seen matches that warrant review.
    """,
]
from = "now-6m"
index = ["logs-aws.cloudtrail-*"]
language = "kuery"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "AWS EC2 EBS Snapshot Created by Rare User"
note = """## Triage and analysis

> **Disclaimer**:
> This investigation guide was created using generative AI technology and has been reviewed to improve its accuracy and relevance. While every effort has been made to ensure its quality, we recommend validating the content and adapting it to suit your specific environment and operational needs.

### Investigating AWS EC2 EBS Snapshot Created by Rare User

EBS snapshots are point-in-time copies of volumes. Adversaries use `CreateSnapshot` (single volume) or `CreateSnapshots` (all volumes attached to an instance) to snapshot target volumes and then use `ModifySnapshotAttribute` to share them with, or `CopySnapshot` to move them into, an attacker-controlled account, enabling data theft without reading the source instance directly.

This rule uses [New Terms](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/rules-ui-create.html#create-new-terms-rule) to detect when an identity creates a snapshot from an account, principal, and network-origin combination not seen in the configured history window.

### Possible investigation steps

- Confirm who `user.name` and `aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.arn` represent and whether snapshot creation (`CreateSnapshot` or `CreateSnapshots`) is expected for that principal.
- Review `source.ip`, `source.as.organization.name`, and geolocation, and whether the call aligns with normal egress for that principal.
- Inspect `aws.cloudtrail.request_parameters` for the source `volumeId` (`CreateSnapshot`) or `instanceSpecification` (`CreateSnapshots`) and whether the targeted volume or instance holds sensitive data.
- Correlate with follow-on `ModifySnapshotAttribute` (shared with another account or made public), `CopySnapshot`, and `DescribeSnapshots` in the same session.

### False positive analysis

- Documented backup/DR roles or custom backup tooling taking snapshots; add exceptions by ARN if needed.
- One-off administrator snapshots before maintenance; confirm the change window and operator.

### Response and remediation

- If unexpected, review any snapshot sharing or copy operations, revoke cross-account snapshot permissions, rotate credentials for the implicated principal, and tighten least privilege on EC2 snapshot APIs.

### Additional information

- **[AWS IR Playbooks](https://github.com/aws-samples/aws-incident-response-playbooks)**
"""
references = [
    "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/APIReference/API_CreateSnapshot.html",
    "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/APIReference/API_CreateSnapshots.html",
    "https://hackingthe.cloud/aws/post_exploitation/copy_ebs_snapshot/",
    "https://www.atomicredteam.io/docs/atomics/T1578.001",
]
risk_score = 21
rule_id = "80d7c681-e7e1-43f3-acd9-750796806cf1"
severity = "low"
tags = [
    "Domain: Cloud",
    "Data Source: AWS",
    "Data Source: Amazon Web Services",
    "Platform: AWS",
    "Data Source: AWS CloudTrail",
    "Service: AWS EC2",
    "Tactic: Defense Evasion",
    "Rule Type: New Terms",
    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
]
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "new_terms"

query = '''
data_stream.dataset: "aws.cloudtrail"
    and event.provider: "ec2.amazonaws.com"
    and event.action: ("CreateSnapshot" or "CreateSnapshots")
    and event.outcome: "success"
    and source.ip: *
    and not source.as.organization.name: (
        "Google LLC" or "Amazon.com, Inc." or "Microsoft Corporation" or "GOOGLE-CLOUD-PLATFORM"
        or "MICROSOFT-CORP-MSN-AS-BLOCK" or "AMAZON-AES" or "AMAZON-02"
    )
    and not aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.invoked_by: (
        "backup.amazonaws.com" or "AWS Internal" or "dlm.amazonaws.com"
        or "malware-protection.guardduty.amazonaws.com"
    )
'''


[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1578"
name = "Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/"
[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1578.001"
name = "Create Snapshot"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/001/"



[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0005"
name = "Defense Evasion"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"

[rule.investigation_fields]
field_names = [
    "@timestamp",
    "user.name",
    "user_agent.original",
    "source.ip",
    "source.as.organization.name",
    "aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.arn",
    "aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.type",
    "aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.access_key_id",
    "event.action",
    "event.outcome",
    "event.provider",
    "cloud.account.id",
    "cloud.region",
    "aws.cloudtrail.request_parameters",
]

[rule.new_terms]
field = "new_terms_fields"
value = ["cloud.account.id", "user.name", "source.as.organization.name"]
[[rule.new_terms.history_window_start]]
field = "history_window_start"
value = "now-7d"


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