AWS EC2 EBS Snapshot Created by Rare User
Description
Identifies the first time, within a lookback window, an identity creates an EBS volume snapshot via the EC2 "CreateSnapshot" or "CreateSnapshots" APIs. Adversaries abuse snapshots to stage data for exfiltration (snapshot one or more volumes, then share or copy them to an attacker-controlled account) or to capture sensitive data from a compromised environment. This is a New Terms rule detecting a rare occurrence of the "cloud.account.id", "user.name", and "source.as.organization.name" tuple for this action.
Query · kuery
data_stream.dataset: "aws.cloudtrail"
and event.provider: "ec2.amazonaws.com"
and event.action: ("CreateSnapshot" or "CreateSnapshots")
and event.outcome: "success"
and source.ip: *
and not source.as.organization.name: (
"Google LLC" or "Amazon.com, Inc." or "Microsoft Corporation" or "GOOGLE-CLOUD-PLATFORM"
or "MICROSOFT-CORP-MSN-AS-BLOCK" or "AMAZON-AES" or "AMAZON-02"
)
and not aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.invoked_by: (
"backup.amazonaws.com" or "AWS Internal" or "dlm.amazonaws.com"
or "malware-protection.guardduty.amazonaws.com"
)
Investigation fields
Pivot points the source recommends for triage.
@timestampuser.nameuser_agent.originalsource.ipsource.as.organization.nameaws.cloudtrail.user_identity.arnaws.cloudtrail.user_identity.typeaws.cloudtrail.user_identity.access_key_idevent.actionevent.outcomeevent.providercloud.account.idcloud.regionaws.cloudtrail.request_parameters
Known false positives
- Backup, disaster-recovery, and data-lifecycle automation routinely creates snapshots. Service-invoked calls (AWS Backup, Data Lifecycle Manager) are excluded, but custom backup tooling or administrators taking ad hoc snapshots may generate first-seen matches that warrant review.
Analyst notes
Disclaimer: This investigation guide was created using generative AI technology and has been reviewed to improve its accuracy and relevance. While every effort has been made to ensure its quality, we recommend validating the content and adapting it to suit your specific environment and operational needs.
Investigating AWS EC2 EBS Snapshot Created by Rare User
EBS snapshots are point-in-time copies of volumes. Adversaries use CreateSnapshot (single volume) or CreateSnapshots (all volumes attached to an instance) to snapshot target volumes and then use ModifySnapshotAttribute to share them with, or CopySnapshot to move them into, an attacker-controlled account, enabling data theft without reading the source instance directly.
This rule uses New Terms to detect when an identity creates a snapshot from an account, principal, and network-origin combination not seen in the configured history window.
Possible investigation steps
- Confirm who
user.nameandaws.cloudtrail.user_identity.arnrepresent and whether snapshot creation (CreateSnapshotorCreateSnapshots) is expected for that principal. - Review
source.ip,source.as.organization.name, and geolocation, and whether the call aligns with normal egress for that principal. - Inspect
aws.cloudtrail.request_parametersfor the sourcevolumeId(CreateSnapshot) orinstanceSpecification(CreateSnapshots) and whether the targeted volume or instance holds sensitive data. - Correlate with follow-on
ModifySnapshotAttribute(shared with another account or made public),CopySnapshot, andDescribeSnapshotsin the same session.
False positive analysis
- Documented backup/DR roles or custom backup tooling taking snapshots; add exceptions by ARN if needed.
- One-off administrator snapshots before maintenance; confirm the change window and operator.
Response and remediation
- If unexpected, review any snapshot sharing or copy operations, revoke cross-account snapshot permissions, rotate credentials for the implicated principal, and tighten least privilege on EC2 snapshot APIs.