Microsoft Graph Multi-Category Reconnaissance Burst

Description

Detects Microsoft Graph activity from delegated user tokens (public client, client_auth_method 0) where a single user session and source IP rapidly touches multiple high-value Graph paths indicative of reconnaissance. The query classifies requests into categories such as role discovery, cross-tenant relationship queries, mailbox paths, contact harvesting, and organization or licensing metadata. When three or more distinct categories appear within a short burst window, it suggests a broad enumeration playbook rather than normal application traffic.

Query · esql

from logs-azure.graphactivitylogs-* metadata _id, _version, _index

// Graph calls via delegated user tokens (any status, any method)
| where event.dataset == "azure.graphactivitylogs"
  and azure.graphactivitylogs.properties.c_idtyp == "user"
  and azure.graphactivitylogs.properties.client_auth_method == 0

// high-value recon endpoints by url.path
| eval Esql.is_role_enum = case(
    url.path like "*roleManagement/directory*"
      or url.path like "*memberOf/microsoft.graph.directoryRole*"
      or url.path like "*transitiveRoleAssignments*",
    true,
    false
  )
| eval Esql.is_cross_tenant_enum = case(
    url.path like "*tenantRelationships*"
      or url.path like "*getResourceTenants*",
    true,
    false
  )
| eval Esql.is_mailbox_recon = case(
    url.path like "*mailboxSettings*"
      or url.path like "*mailFolders*"
      or url.path like "*messages*"
      or url.path like "*inbox*",
    true,
    false
  )
| eval Esql.is_contact_harvest = case(
    url.path like "*contacts*"
      or url.path like "*contactFolders*",
    true,
    false
  )
| eval Esql.is_org_recon = case(
    url.path like "*subscribedSkus*"
      or url.path like "*appRoleAssign*"
      or (
          url.path like "*/organization*"
          and not url.path like "*branding*"
          and not url.path like "*localizations*"
        ),
    true,
    false
  )

// Combine: is this request hitting a high-value endpoint?
| eval Esql.is_high_value = case(
    Esql.is_role_enum or Esql.is_cross_tenant_enum or Esql.is_mailbox_recon
      or Esql.is_contact_harvest or Esql.is_org_recon,
    true,
    false
  )
| where Esql.is_high_value == true

// Classify each hit into a recon category
| eval Esql.recon_category = case(
    Esql.is_role_enum, "role_discovery",
    Esql.is_cross_tenant_enum, "cross_tenant_recon",
    Esql.is_mailbox_recon, "mailbox_recon",
    Esql.is_contact_harvest, "contact_harvesting",
    Esql.is_org_recon, "org_and_licensing_recon",
    "other"
  )

// Flag failed requests (recon that errored is still recon)
| eval Esql.is_failed_request = case(
    http.response.status_code >= 400, true, false
  )

// Aggregate per user + session + source IP
| stats
    Esql.total_high_value_calls = count(*),
    Esql.distinct_categories = count_distinct(Esql.recon_category),
    Esql.distinct_paths = count_distinct(url.path),
    Esql.failed_calls = sum(case(Esql.is_failed_request, 1, 0)),
    Esql.categories = values(Esql.recon_category),
    Esql.sample_paths = values(url.path),
    Esql.http_methods = values(http.request.method),
    Esql.status_codes = values(http.response.status_code),
    Esql.first_seen = min(@timestamp),
    Esql.last_seen = max(@timestamp),
    Esql.user_agents = values(user_agent.original),
    Esql.app_ids = values(azure.graphactivitylogs.properties.app_id)
  by
    azure.graphactivitylogs.properties.user_principal_object_id,
    source.ip,
    source.`as`.organization.name,
    source.`as`.number,
    azure.graphactivitylogs.properties.c_sid,
    azure.tenant_id

// Threshold: 3+ distinct recon categories 
| where Esql.distinct_categories >= 4 and Esql.total_high_value_calls >= 20

// Burst duration in seconds
| eval Esql.burst_duration_seconds = date_diff("seconds", Esql.first_seen, Esql.last_seen)
| where Esql.burst_duration_seconds <= 60

| keep
    azure.graphactivitylogs.properties.user_principal_object_id,
    azure.graphactivitylogs.properties.c_sid,
    azure.tenant_id,
    source.ip,
    source.`as`.organization.name,
    source.`as`.number,
    Esql.*

Implementation guide

Requires Microsoft Graph Activity Logs ingested into logs-azure.graphactivitylogs-* (for example via Azure Event Hub).

Known false positives

  • Legitimate first-party or line-of-business applications that use delegated permissions and enumerate several Graph resources during onboarding or sync may match. Baseline known app IDs and tune thresholds or path lists for your tenant.

Analyst notes

Investigating Microsoft Graph Multi-Category Reconnaissance Burst

This rule uses an aggregation-based ES|QL query. Alert documents contain summarized fields; pivot to raw Graph activity logs using user principal object ID, session ID (c_sid), source IP, tenant ID, and timestamps from the alert.

Possible investigation steps

  • Review Esql.categories and Esql.sample_paths to see which Graph endpoints were touched and whether they align with the app purpose.
  • Validate azure.graphactivitylogs.properties.app_id and user_agent.original against approved applications.
  • Correlate with Entra ID sign-in logs for the same user and session for MFA, conditional access, and token issuance context.
  • Check whether failed_calls indicates probing or permission errors versus successful enumeration.

Response and remediation

  • If malicious, revoke refresh tokens for the user, disable or restrict the application consent, and reset credentials per policy.
  • Add conditional access or block rules for high-risk Graph patterns where appropriate.
Raw source Microsoft Graph Multi-Category Reconnaissance Burst · Elastic TOML
Esc
Published by elastic/detection-rules ↗, licensed under Elastic License 2.0 ↗. Reproduced here unmodified. 
[metadata]
creation_date = "2026/05/14"
integration = ["azure"]
maturity = "production"
updated_date = "2026/05/14"

[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
description = """
Detects Microsoft Graph activity from delegated user tokens (public client, client_auth_method 0) where a single user
session and source IP rapidly touches multiple high-value Graph paths indicative of reconnaissance. The query classifies
requests into categories such as role discovery, cross-tenant relationship queries, mailbox paths, contact harvesting,
and organization or licensing metadata. When three or more distinct categories appear within a short burst window, it
suggests a broad enumeration playbook rather than normal application traffic.
"""
false_positives = [
    """
    Legitimate first-party or line-of-business applications that use delegated permissions and enumerate several Graph
    resources during onboarding or sync may match. Baseline known app IDs and tune thresholds or path lists for your
    tenant.
    """,
]
from = "now-6m"
language = "esql"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Microsoft Graph Multi-Category Reconnaissance Burst"
note = """## Triage and analysis

### Investigating Microsoft Graph Multi-Category Reconnaissance Burst

This rule uses an aggregation-based ES|QL query. Alert documents contain summarized fields; pivot to raw Graph activity
logs using user principal object ID, session ID (c_sid), source IP, tenant ID, and timestamps from the alert.

### Possible investigation steps

- Review Esql.categories and Esql.sample_paths to see which Graph endpoints were touched and whether they align with the app purpose.
- Validate azure.graphactivitylogs.properties.app_id and user_agent.original against approved applications.
- Correlate with Entra ID sign-in logs for the same user and session for MFA, conditional access, and token issuance context.
- Check whether failed_calls indicates probing or permission errors versus successful enumeration.

### Response and remediation

- If malicious, revoke refresh tokens for the user, disable or restrict the application consent, and reset credentials per policy.
- Add conditional access or block rules for high-risk Graph patterns where appropriate.
"""
risk_score = 47
rule_id = "8e66c55f-8db6-4e3e-bf4f-3a3e242bdf66"
setup = """#### Microsoft Graph Activity Logs
Requires Microsoft Graph Activity Logs ingested into `logs-azure.graphactivitylogs-*` (for example via Azure Event Hub).
"""
severity = "medium"
tags = [
    "Domain: Cloud",
    "Domain: Identity",
    "Domain: API",
    "Data Source: Azure",
    "Data Source: Microsoft Entra ID",
    "Data Source: Microsoft Graph",
    "Data Source: Microsoft Graph Activity Logs",
    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
    "Tactic: Discovery",
    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
]
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "esql"

query = '''
from logs-azure.graphactivitylogs-* metadata _id, _version, _index

// Graph calls via delegated user tokens (any status, any method)
| where event.dataset == "azure.graphactivitylogs"
  and azure.graphactivitylogs.properties.c_idtyp == "user"
  and azure.graphactivitylogs.properties.client_auth_method == 0

// high-value recon endpoints by url.path
| eval Esql.is_role_enum = case(
    url.path like "*roleManagement/directory*"
      or url.path like "*memberOf/microsoft.graph.directoryRole*"
      or url.path like "*transitiveRoleAssignments*",
    true,
    false
  )
| eval Esql.is_cross_tenant_enum = case(
    url.path like "*tenantRelationships*"
      or url.path like "*getResourceTenants*",
    true,
    false
  )
| eval Esql.is_mailbox_recon = case(
    url.path like "*mailboxSettings*"
      or url.path like "*mailFolders*"
      or url.path like "*messages*"
      or url.path like "*inbox*",
    true,
    false
  )
| eval Esql.is_contact_harvest = case(
    url.path like "*contacts*"
      or url.path like "*contactFolders*",
    true,
    false
  )
| eval Esql.is_org_recon = case(
    url.path like "*subscribedSkus*"
      or url.path like "*appRoleAssign*"
      or (
          url.path like "*/organization*"
          and not url.path like "*branding*"
          and not url.path like "*localizations*"
        ),
    true,
    false
  )

// Combine: is this request hitting a high-value endpoint?
| eval Esql.is_high_value = case(
    Esql.is_role_enum or Esql.is_cross_tenant_enum or Esql.is_mailbox_recon
      or Esql.is_contact_harvest or Esql.is_org_recon,
    true,
    false
  )
| where Esql.is_high_value == true

// Classify each hit into a recon category
| eval Esql.recon_category = case(
    Esql.is_role_enum, "role_discovery",
    Esql.is_cross_tenant_enum, "cross_tenant_recon",
    Esql.is_mailbox_recon, "mailbox_recon",
    Esql.is_contact_harvest, "contact_harvesting",
    Esql.is_org_recon, "org_and_licensing_recon",
    "other"
  )

// Flag failed requests (recon that errored is still recon)
| eval Esql.is_failed_request = case(
    http.response.status_code >= 400, true, false
  )

// Aggregate per user + session + source IP
| stats
    Esql.total_high_value_calls = count(*),
    Esql.distinct_categories = count_distinct(Esql.recon_category),
    Esql.distinct_paths = count_distinct(url.path),
    Esql.failed_calls = sum(case(Esql.is_failed_request, 1, 0)),
    Esql.categories = values(Esql.recon_category),
    Esql.sample_paths = values(url.path),
    Esql.http_methods = values(http.request.method),
    Esql.status_codes = values(http.response.status_code),
    Esql.first_seen = min(@timestamp),
    Esql.last_seen = max(@timestamp),
    Esql.user_agents = values(user_agent.original),
    Esql.app_ids = values(azure.graphactivitylogs.properties.app_id)
  by
    azure.graphactivitylogs.properties.user_principal_object_id,
    source.ip,
    source.`as`.organization.name,
    source.`as`.number,
    azure.graphactivitylogs.properties.c_sid,
    azure.tenant_id

// Threshold: 3+ distinct recon categories 
| where Esql.distinct_categories >= 4 and Esql.total_high_value_calls >= 20

// Burst duration in seconds
| eval Esql.burst_duration_seconds = date_diff("seconds", Esql.first_seen, Esql.last_seen)
| where Esql.burst_duration_seconds <= 60

| keep
    azure.graphactivitylogs.properties.user_principal_object_id,
    azure.graphactivitylogs.properties.c_sid,
    azure.tenant_id,
    source.ip,
    source.`as`.organization.name,
    source.`as`.number,
    Esql.*
'''

[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"

[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1526"
name = "Cloud Service Discovery"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1526/"

[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1087"
name = "Account Discovery"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/"

[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0007"
name = "Discovery"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007/"

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