AWS EKS Secrets List Across Cluster or Sensitive Namespaces
Description
Detects list operations on Kubernetes Secrets from a non-loopback client when the request URI targets cluster-wide secrets or list operations under kube-system or default. Useful for spotting broad secret enumeration from remote clients.
Query · kuery
data_stream.dataset:"aws.eks_audit" and event.action:list and
aws.eks.audit.objectRef.resource:secrets and
aws.eks.audit.requestURI :(/api/v1/secrets or /api/v1/secrets?limit* or /api/v1/namespaces/kube-system/secrets or /api/v1/namespaces/kube-system/secrets?limit* or /api/v1/namespaces/default/secrets or /api/v1/namespaces/default/secrets?limit*) and
source.ip:(* and not ("::1" or "127.0.0.1")) and
not user.name: (system\:kube-controller-manager or eks\:cloud-controller-manager or eks\:kms-storage-migrator or
"system:serviceaccount:argocd:argocd-application-controller" or
"system:serviceaccount:elastic:kube-state-metrics" or
"system:serviceaccount:cert-manager:cert-manager-cainjector" or
"system:serviceaccount:elastic-system:elastic-agent" or
"system:serviceaccount:longhorn-system:longhorn-service-account") and
not aws.eks.audit.user.groups:("system:serviceaccounts:ibm-csi" or "system:serviceaccounts:argocd" or "system:serviceaccounts:elastic")
Implementation guide
This rule reads EKS control-plane audit logs collected by the AWS integration
into logs-aws.eks_audit-*, where the AWS EKS audit ingest
pipelines normalize each audit record under aws.eks.audit.*.
Enable the audit control-plane log type on the EKS cluster, send its
CloudWatch log group through the AWS integration, and confirm events carry
data_stream.dataset: aws.eks_audit and
cloud.provider: aws before enabling this rule.
Analyst notes
Investigating AWS EKS Secrets List Across Cluster or Sensitive Namespaces
Audit events for list on the secrets resource against /api/v1/secrets, paginated cluster lists, or namespace-scoped
lists under kube-system or default, from a source IP that is not localhost.
Possible investigation steps
- Confirm the actor (
user.name, groups) and whether the client is expected (CI, admin bastion, controller). - Review
aws.eks.audit.requestURI,user_agent.original, and follow-on API activity from the same source. - Assess exposure: cluster-wide secret listing can surface many credentials.
False positive analysis
- Legitimate controllers or operators listing secrets in
kube-system/defaultfrom cluster nodes may match; tune by source IP, user agent, or service account as needed.
Response and remediation
- If the listing is unauthorized, revoke the credentials used, rotate the secrets that were exposed, and tighten RBAC so that only the required service accounts can list secrets in those namespaces.
- Review follow-on activity from the same identity and source IP for secret reads, pod exec, or RBAC changes.