Entra ID OAuth Device Code Sign-in to Azure AD Graph Enumeration

[metadata]
creation_date = "2026/05/22"
integration = ["azure"]
maturity = "production"
updated_date = "2026/05/22"

[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
description = """
Correlates a successful Entra ID device-code sign-in to the legacy Azure AD Graph audience
(00000002-0000-0000-c000-000000000000) from an unmanaged device with directory enumeration against graph.windows.net by
the same user within a short window. Device-code phishing is the dominant OAuth phishing variant against Microsoft
tenants: the adversary initiates the flow, relays the user-facing code to the victim, and on redemption walks away with
an access or refresh token bound to the targeted resource without ever handling the user's password or MFA factor. When
the redeemed audience is AAD Graph and the redeeming device is unmanaged, the follow-on Graph traffic is the compromised
cloud account being used by the attacker, not by the user. This rule fires when that token is immediately turned around
against the directory under the same identity to read user, group, service principal, application, role assignment,
directory object, policy, OAuth permission grant, or tenant detail collections.
"""
false_positives = [
    """
    Authorized red team or audit activity (ROADrecon, ROADtools, AADInternals, roadtx). Document the engagement window
    and add exceptions on the calling user.
    """,
    """
    A developer or operator legitimately running first-party tooling under the device-code flow that then enumerates
    directory objects during onboarding or troubleshooting. Validate the calling app and source IP and exclude as
    appropriate.
    """,
]
from = "now-9m"
index = ["logs-azure.signinlogs-*", "logs-azure.aadgraphactivitylogs-*"]
language = "eql"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Entra ID OAuth Device Code Sign-in to Azure AD Graph Enumeration"
note = """## Triage and analysis

### Investigating Entra ID OAuth Device Code Sign-in to Azure AD Graph Enumeration

Device-code phishing redeems an OAuth access token directly into the adversary's hands without
ever touching the victim's password or MFA factor. When the redemption targets the legacy AAD
Graph audience from an unmanaged device, the resulting token is overwhelmingly used to drive
directory recon under the compromised identity. ROADrecon / ROADtools, AADInternals
(`Get-AADIntTenantDetails`, `Get-AADIntUsers`), and manual `roadtx` flows all match this shape.

### Possible investigation steps

- Confirm the sign-in shape.
    - `azure.signinlogs.properties.authentication_protocol` is `deviceCode`.
    - `azure.signinlogs.properties.resource_id` is `00000002-0000-0000-c000-000000000000` (legacy AAD Graph audience).
    - `azure.signinlogs.properties.device_detail.is_managed` is `false`.
- Identify the calling client used to drive the device-code grant.
    - `azure.signinlogs.properties.app_id`, `azure.signinlogs.properties.app_display_name`.
    - FOCI / pre-consented Microsoft clients (Teams, Office, Azure CLI, Azure PowerShell) are the canonical ride-along clients for device-code phishing because they bypass app consent.
- Review source posture for the redemption and the Graph follow-on independently.
    - `source.ip`, `source.as.organization.name`, `source.geo.country_name`. Residential / VPS / anonymising-network egress raises priority.
    - A code redeemed from one IP and Graph driven from another is a strong adversary-in-the-middle signal: the user clicked, the attacker is now driving the session.
- Review what was queried on the Graph side.
    - `url.path` on the second event. `applicationRefs`, `eligibleRoleAssignments`, and `directoryObjects` casts (`$/Microsoft.DirectoryServices.ServicePrincipal`) are the textbook ROADrecon signature; `tenantDetails` from an `AADInternals` user-agent is the AADInternals signature.
- Check the API version on the Graph call.
    - `azure.aadgraphactivitylogs.properties.api_version`. `1.61-internal` is a strong tooling indicator and returns data the public surface withholds (Conditional Access policies, MFA configuration on user objects).
- Pivot to surrounding sign-ins for the same user. Other device-code redemptions to Microsoft Graph, Azure Resource Manager, or Exchange in the same window suggest the attacker is multi-homing the token harvest.
- Confirm the activity is not attributable to authorized testing before treating as malicious.

### Response and remediation

- Revoke refresh tokens and active sessions for the compromised user.
    - `POST /v1.0/users/{id}/revokeSignInSessions`.
- Temporarily disable the user if the alert is high-confidence or you need to halt further activity while investigation continues.
    - `PATCH /v1.0/users/{id}` with body `{"accountEnabled": false}`.
- Check for device registrations created by the user during or around the burst window and remove rogue devices.
    - `GET /v1.0/users/{id}/registeredDevices` and `GET /v1.0/users/{id}/ownedDevices`, then `DELETE /v1.0/devices/{deviceObjectId}`.
    - Do this BEFORE session revocation: device-bound PRTs survive `revokeSignInSessions`.
- If the calling application has no legitimate AAD Graph dependency, block further use by that app.
    - `PATCH /beta/applications/{id}` with body `{"authenticationBehaviors": {"blockAzureADGraphAccess": true}}`.
    - This property lives on the Graph beta endpoint, not v1.0.
- Apply Conditional Access targeting the device-code grant: require a managed / compliant device or block the device-code grant outside of explicitly approved app + user populations.
"""
references = [
    "https://github.com/dirkjanm/ROADtools",
    "https://github.com/Gerenios/AADInternals",
    "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/graph/migrate-azure-ad-graph-overview",
]
risk_score = 73
rule_id = "aa04377a-19b5-4940-952f-aad173790d23"
setup = """#### Microsoft Entra ID Sign-in Logs and Azure AD Graph Activity Logs
Requires both data streams ingested via the Elastic Azure integration:
- Microsoft Entra ID sign-in logs into `logs-azure.signinlogs-*` (enable the `SignInLogs` diagnostic-settings category on Entra ID).
- Azure AD Graph Activity Logs into `logs-azure.aadgraphactivitylogs-*` (enable the `AzureADGraphActivityLogs` diagnostic-settings category on Entra ID).
"""
severity = "high"
tags = [
    "Domain: Cloud",
    "Domain: Identity",
    "Data Source: Azure",
    "Data Source: Microsoft Entra ID",
    "Data Source: Microsoft Entra ID Sign-in Logs",
    "Data Source: Azure AD Graph",
    "Data Source: Azure AD Graph Activity Logs",
    "Use Case: Identity and Access Audit",
    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
    "Tactic: Credential Access",
    "Tactic: Initial Access",
    "Tactic: Discovery",
    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
]
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "eql"

query = '''
sequence by user.id, azure.tenant_id with maxspan=5m
[authentication where
    data_stream.dataset == "azure.signinlogs" and
    event.outcome == "success" and
    azure.signinlogs.properties.authentication_protocol == "deviceCode" and
    azure.signinlogs.properties.device_detail.is_managed == false and
    azure.signinlogs.properties.resource_id == "00000002-0000-0000-c000-000000000000"]
[web where
    data_stream.dataset == "azure.aadgraphactivitylogs" and
    url.path : (
        "*/users*",
        "*/groups*",
        "*/servicePrincipals*",
        "*/applications*",
        "*/applicationRefs*",
        "*/devices*",
        "*/directoryRoles*",
        "*/roleAssignments*",
        "*/eligibleRoleAssignments*",
        "*/roleDefinitions*",
        "*/directoryObjects*",
        "*/policies*",
        "*/oauth2PermissionGrants*",
        "*/administrativeUnits*",
        "*/tenantDetails*",
        "*/directorySettingTemplates*",
        "*/me*"
    )]
'''


[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1528"
name = "Steal Application Access Token"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528/"


[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0006"
name = "Credential Access"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/"
[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1078"
name = "Valid Accounts"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/"
[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1078.004"
name = "Cloud Accounts"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004/"



[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0001"
name = "Initial Access"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001/"
[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1069"
name = "Permission Groups Discovery"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/"
[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1069.003"
name = "Cloud Groups"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/003/"


[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1087"
name = "Account Discovery"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/"
[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1087.004"
name = "Cloud Account"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/004/"


[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1526"
name = "Cloud Service Discovery"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1526/"


[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0007"
name = "Discovery"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007/"

[rule.investigation_fields]
field_names = [
    "user.id",
    "azure.tenant_id",
    "azure.signinlogs.properties.user_principal_name",
    "azure.signinlogs.properties.app_id",
    "azure.signinlogs.properties.app_display_name",
    "azure.signinlogs.properties.resource_id",
    "azure.signinlogs.properties.authentication_protocol",
    "azure.signinlogs.properties.device_detail.is_managed",
    "azure.aadgraphactivitylogs.properties.app_id",
    "azure.aadgraphactivitylogs.properties.api_version",
    "url.path",
    "user_agent.original",
    "source.ip",
    "source.as.organization.name",
    "source.geo.country_name",
]