AWS EKS Rapid Secret GET Activity Against Multiple Objects
Description
This rule detects an unusual volume of Kubernetes API get requests against multiple distinct Secret objects from the same client fingerprint (user, source IP, and user agent) within a defined lookback window. This can indicate credential access or in-cluster reconnaissance, where a user or token is used to enumerate and retrieve sensitive data such as service account tokens, registry credentials, TLS material, or application configuration. Failed get requests are also included, as they may reveal RBAC boundaries, confirm the existence of targeted secrets, or reflect automated probing activity.
Query · esql
from logs-aws.eks_audit-* metadata _id, _index, _version
| where data_stream.dataset == "aws.eks_audit"
and event.action == "get"
and aws.eks.audit.objectRef.resource == "secrets"
and source.ip is not null and user.name is not null
and not to_string(source.ip) in ("127.0.0.1", "::1")
and not user.name in ("system:kube-controller-manager", "system:kube-scheduler")
and not aws.eks.audit.objectRef.name like "sh.helm.release.*"
and not aws.eks.audit.user.username in (
"system:serviceaccount:flux-system:kustomize-controller",
"system:serviceaccount:flux-system:helm-controller",
"system:serviceaccount:flux-system:source-controller",
"system:serviceaccount:security:trivy-operator"
)
| stats
Esql.unique_credentials = count_distinct(aws.eks.audit.objectRef.name),
Esql.secrets_names = values(aws.eks.audit.objectRef.name),
Esql.namespaces = values(aws.eks.audit.objectRef.namespace),
Esql.event_outcome_values = values(event.outcome),
Esql.outcome = values(`aws.eks.audit.annotations.authorization_k8s_io/decision`)
by user.name, aws.eks.audit.user.username, source.ip, user_agent.original
| where Esql.unique_credentials >= 3
| KEEP user.name, aws.eks.audit.user.username, source.ip, user_agent.original, Esql.*
Implementation guide
This rule reads EKS control-plane audit logs collected by the AWS integration
into logs-aws.eks_audit-*, where the AWS EKS audit ingest
pipelines normalize each audit record under aws.eks.audit.*.
Enable the audit control-plane log type on the EKS cluster, send its
CloudWatch log group through the AWS integration, and confirm events carry
data_stream.dataset: aws.eks_audit and
cloud.provider: aws before enabling this rule.
Analyst notes
Investigating AWS EKS Rapid Secret GET Activity Against Multiple Objects
This rule surfaces clusters of get operations on the secrets API where the same identity and client path
(user.name, source.ip, user_agent.original) touch several different secret names within the rule lookback window.
Allowed and denied outcomes are included: successful reads may indicate harvesting; repeated forbidden or
unauthorized responses can still signal reconnaissance, RBAC probing, or scripted spray against secret names that
exist in the cluster.
Possible investigation steps
- Inspect
Esql.outcomefor a mix of allow vs deny and whether failures cluster on sensitive namespaces. - Map the identity to RBAC and namespace scope; review
Esql.secrets_namesandEsql.namespacesfor high-value targets (tokens, registry credentials, TLS bundles, application secrets). - Pivot on the same
source.ipand user for follow-on API activity (exec, pod create, role changes, broadliston secrets). - Validate against expected automation (CI, GitOps, backup, in-cluster controllers) before treating as malicious.
False positive analysis
- Startup, Helm, or controllers may legitimately touch many secrets in one window; tune by user, namespace, or IP allowlists when baselined.
Response and remediation
- If the activity is unauthorized, revoke the token or credentials used, rotate every secret that was read, and reduce the identity's RBAC to least privilege.
- Review the same identity and source IP for pod exec, token creation, or RBAC changes in the surrounding time window.