AWS EC2 CreateKeyPair by New Principal from Non-Cloud AS Organization

[metadata]
creation_date = "2026/04/08"
integration = ["aws"]
maturity = "production"
updated_date = "2026/07/08"

[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
description = """
Identifies the first time a given IAM principal successfully creates an EC2 key pair when the request is sourced from a
network whose autonomous system organization is not attributed to common cloud or hyperscaler providers in your GeoIP
data. Adversaries may call CreateKeyPair to stage SSH access material before launching or accessing instances. A new
terms baseline on `user_identity.arn` suppresses repeated noise from the same principal while still surfacing the initial
suspicious creation from an unusual egress label.
"""
false_positives = [
    """
    Engineers creating key pairs from home ISP, corporate VPN, or colocation AS names will match until baselined.
    GeoIP databases vary by vendor; organization labels may differ slightly from the excluded strings (for example
    alternate Amazon or Google legal names). Tune exclusions on `source.as.organization.name` or principal ARN after
    validation.
    """,
]
from = "now-6m"
index = ["filebeat-*", "logs-aws.cloudtrail-*"]
language = "kuery"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "AWS EC2 CreateKeyPair by New Principal from Non-Cloud AS Organization"
note = """## Triage and analysis

### Investigating AWS EC2 CreateKeyPair by New Principal from Non-Cloud AS Organization

`CreateKeyPair` creates an Amazon EC2 SSH key pair in the account; the private key material is returned to the caller
once. This is useful for persistence or preparation for instance access.

This **new terms** rule alerts the **first** time `aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.arn` matches the query within the
configured history window. Subsequent key-pair creations by the same principal (still matching the query) are
suppressed until the term ages out of the window.

#### Possible investigation steps

- Review `aws.cloudtrail.request_parameters` / `response_elements` for `keyName` and whether the key aligns with change
  management.
- Correlate `source.ip`, `source.geo`, and `user_agent.original` with the principal’s normal admin paths.
- Hunt for `RunInstances`, `ImportKeyPair`, or Instance Connect activity involving the same key name or actor.

### False positive analysis

- First-time legitimate admin activity from a new office or VPN provider.
- Missing `source.as.organization.name` enrichment would **not** match the query’s positive wildcard; confirm fields are
  populated if you expect coverage.

### Response and remediation

- If unauthorized: delete the key pair (`DeleteKeyPair`), review IAM for `ec2:CreateKeyPair`, and rotate any credentials
  used by the actor.

### Additional information

- [CreateKeyPair](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/APIReference/API_CreateKeyPair.html)
"""
references = [
    "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/APIReference/API_CreateKeyPair.html",
]
risk_score = 73
rule_id = "c8e4f1a2-9b3d-4c5e-a6f7-8b9c0d1e2f3a"
severity = "high"
tags = [
    "Domain: Cloud",
    "Domain: Identity",
    "Data Source: AWS",
    "Data Source: Amazon Web Services",
    "Data Source: Amazon EC2",
    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
    "Tactic: Persistence",
    "Tactic: Credential Access",
    "Tactic: Lateral Movement",
    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
]
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "new_terms"

query = '''
event.dataset: "aws.cloudtrail"
    and event.provider: "ec2.amazonaws.com"
    and event.action: "CreateKeyPair"
    and event.outcome: "success"
    and source.as.organization.name: (
        * and not (
            "Amazon.com, Inc." or AMAZ* or "Google LLC" or "Microsoft Corporation"
        )
    )
'''

[rule.investigation_fields]
field_names = [
    "@timestamp",
    "user.name",
    "user_agent.original",
    "source.ip",
    "source.as.organization.name",
    "aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.arn",
    "aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.type",
    "aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.access_key_id",
    "event.action",
    "event.outcome",
    "cloud.account.id",
    "cloud.region",
    "aws.cloudtrail.request_parameters",
    "aws.cloudtrail.response_elements",
]

[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"

[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1098"
name = "Account Manipulation"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/"

[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0003"
name = "Persistence"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/"

[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"

[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1552"
name = "Unsecured Credentials"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/"

[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1552.004"
name = "Private Keys"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/004/"

[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0006"
name = "Credential Access"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/"

[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"

[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1021"
name = "Remote Services"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/"

[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1021.004"
name = "SSH"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004/"

[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0008"
name = "Lateral Movement"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008/"

[rule.new_terms]
field = "new_terms_fields"
value = ["user.name", "cloud.account.id"]
[[rule.new_terms.history_window_start]]
field = "history_window_start"
value = "now-10d"