GCP Compute Snapshot Created by Rare User


Description

Identifies the first time, within a lookback window, a principal creates a snapshot of a Compute Engine persistent disk ("*.compute.disks.createSnapshot", "*.compute.regionDisks.createSnapshot", or "*.compute.snapshots.insert"). Adversaries create disk snapshots to stage data for exfiltration, copying or sharing the snapshot to an attacker-controlled project without reading the source VM directly. This is a New Terms rule keyed on the project and acting principal, excluding known cloud-provider egress networks.

Query · kuery

data_stream.dataset: "gcp.audit"
    and event.action: (
        *.compute.disks.createSnapshot or *.compute.regionDisks.createSnapshot or *.compute.snapshots.insert
    )
    and not event.outcome: "failure"
    and cloud.project.id: *
    and user.email: *
    and not source.as.organization.name: (
        "Google LLC" or "Amazon.com, Inc." or "Microsoft Corporation" or "GOOGLE-CLOUD-PLATFORM"
        or "MICROSOFT-CORP-MSN-AS-BLOCK" or "AMAZON-AES" or "AMAZON-02"
    )

Investigation fields

Pivot points the source recommends for triage.

  • @timestamp
  • user.email
  • source.ip
  • source.as.organization.name
  • gcp.audit.resource_name
  • event.action
  • event.outcome
  • cloud.project.id

Known false positives

  • Backup, disaster-recovery, and image-automation service accounts create snapshots routinely. Baseline known automation principals by user.email and add exceptions; interactive or first-seen snapshot creation warrants review.

Analyst notes

Disclaimer: This investigation guide was created using generative AI technology and has been reviewed to improve its accuracy and relevance. While every effort has been made to ensure its quality, we recommend validating the content and adapting it to suit your specific environment and operational needs.

Investigating GCP Compute Snapshot Created by Rare User

GCP persistent-disk snapshots are point-in-time copies of a zonal or regional disk created via *.compute.disks.createSnapshot, *.compute.regionDisks.createSnapshot, or *.compute.snapshots.insert. Adversaries snapshot a target disk and then copy or share it to an attacker-controlled project, enabling data theft without touching the source instance.

Possible investigation steps

  • Identify the acting principal (user.email) and whether snapshot creation (event.action) is expected for it.
  • Review the target resource (gcp.audit.resource_name) and request parameters to identify the source disk and whether it holds sensitive data.
  • Review source.ip and source.as.organization.name; confirm the operation aligns with normal egress.
  • Correlate with follow-on snapshot copy/share or image creation in the same project or across projects.

False positive analysis

  • Backup/DR and image-bake automation; baseline those service-account principals and add exceptions by user.email.

Response and remediation

  • If unexpected, review any snapshot copy/share, revoke cross-project access, rotate the implicated principal's credentials, and tighten least privilege on compute.disks.createSnapshot and compute.snapshots.create.
Raw source GCP Compute Snapshot Created by Rare User · Elastic TOML
Esc
Published by elastic/detection-rules ↗, licensed under Elastic License 2.0 ↗. Reproduced here unmodified.
[metadata]
creation_date = "2026/11/12"
integration = ["gcp"]
maturity = "production"
updated_date = "2026/11/12"

[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
description = """
Identifies the first time, within a lookback window, a principal creates a snapshot of a Compute Engine persistent disk
("*.compute.disks.createSnapshot", "*.compute.regionDisks.createSnapshot", or "*.compute.snapshots.insert"). Adversaries
create disk snapshots to stage data for exfiltration, copying or sharing the snapshot to an attacker-controlled project
without reading the source VM directly. This is a New Terms rule keyed on the project and acting principal, excluding
known cloud-provider egress networks.
"""
false_positives = [
    """
    Backup, disaster-recovery, and image-automation service accounts create snapshots routinely. Baseline known
    automation principals by user.email and add exceptions; interactive or first-seen snapshot creation warrants review.
    """,
]
from = "now-6m"
index = ["logs-gcp.audit-*"]
language = "kuery"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "GCP Compute Snapshot Created by Rare User"
note = """## Triage and analysis

> **Disclaimer**:
> This investigation guide was created using generative AI technology and has been reviewed to improve its accuracy and relevance. While every effort has been made to ensure its quality, we recommend validating the content and adapting it to suit your specific environment and operational needs.

### Investigating GCP Compute Snapshot Created by Rare User

GCP persistent-disk snapshots are point-in-time copies of a zonal or regional disk created via `*.compute.disks.createSnapshot`, `*.compute.regionDisks.createSnapshot`, or `*.compute.snapshots.insert`. Adversaries snapshot a target disk and then copy or share it to an attacker-controlled project, enabling data theft without touching the source instance.

### Possible investigation steps

- Identify the acting principal (`user.email`) and whether snapshot creation (`event.action`) is expected for it.
- Review the target resource (`gcp.audit.resource_name`) and request parameters to identify the source disk and whether it holds sensitive data.
- Review `source.ip` and `source.as.organization.name`; confirm the operation aligns with normal egress.
- Correlate with follow-on snapshot copy/share or image creation in the same project or across projects.

### False positive analysis

- Backup/DR and image-bake automation; baseline those service-account principals and add exceptions by `user.email`.

### Response and remediation

- If unexpected, review any snapshot copy/share, revoke cross-project access, rotate the implicated principal's credentials, and tighten least privilege on `compute.disks.createSnapshot` and `compute.snapshots.create`.
"""
references = [
    "https://cloud.google.com/compute/docs/disks/create-snapshots",
    "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1578.001/T1578.001.md",
]
risk_score = 21
rule_id = "ddf5265a-9b04-4d5c-9d28-12cbfed37136"
severity = "low"
tags = [
    "Domain: Cloud",
    "Platform: GCP",
    "Data Source: GCP",
    "Data Source: Google Cloud Platform",
    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
    "Tactic: Defense Evasion",
    "Rule Type: New Terms",
    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
]
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "new_terms"

query = '''
data_stream.dataset: "gcp.audit"
    and event.action: (
        *.compute.disks.createSnapshot or *.compute.regionDisks.createSnapshot or *.compute.snapshots.insert
    )
    and not event.outcome: "failure"
    and cloud.project.id: *
    and user.email: *
    and not source.as.organization.name: (
        "Google LLC" or "Amazon.com, Inc." or "Microsoft Corporation" or "GOOGLE-CLOUD-PLATFORM"
        or "MICROSOFT-CORP-MSN-AS-BLOCK" or "AMAZON-AES" or "AMAZON-02"
    )
'''


[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1578"
name = "Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/"
[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1578.001"
name = "Create Snapshot"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/001/"



[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0005"
name = "Defense Evasion"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"

[rule.investigation_fields]
field_names = [
    "@timestamp",
    "user.email",
    "source.ip",
    "source.as.organization.name",
    "gcp.audit.resource_name",
    "event.action",
    "event.outcome",
    "cloud.project.id",
]

[rule.new_terms]
field = "new_terms_fields"
value = ["cloud.project.id", "user.email"]
[[rule.new_terms.history_window_start]]
field = "history_window_start"
value = "now-10d"


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