UAC Bypass via ICMLuaUtil Elevated COM Interface


Description

Identifies User Account Control (UAC) bypass attempts via the ICMLuaUtil elevated COM interface. Attackers may attempt to bypass UAC to stealthily execute code with elevated permissions.

Query · eql

process where event.action == "start" and
 process.parent.name : "dllhost.exe" and
 process.Ext.token.integrity_level_name == "high" and
 process.parent.command_line : ("*3E5FC7F9-9A51-4367-9063-A120244FBEC7*", "*D2E7041B-2927-42FB-8E9F-7CE93B6DC937*") and
 not process.executable :
             ("?:\\Windows\\System32\\WerFault.exe",
              "?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\WerFault.exe",
              "?:\\Windows\\System32\\wermgr.exe",
              "?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\wermgr.exe",
              "?:\\Windows\\System32\\dccw.exe") and
 /* Issue #364 */
 not (process.code_signature.subject_name == "WireGuard LLC" and process.code_signature.trusted == true)
Raw source UAC Bypass via ICMLuaUtil Elevated COM Interface · Elastic TOML
Esc
Published by elastic/protections-artifacts ↗, licensed under Elastic License 2.0 ↗. Reproduced here unmodified.
[rule]
description = """
Identifies User Account Control (UAC) bypass attempts via the ICMLuaUtil elevated COM interface. Attackers may attempt
to bypass UAC to stealthily execute code with elevated permissions.
"""
id = "13fab475-06e4-4ac9-87fc-2105c7441244"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "UAC Bypass via ICMLuaUtil Elevated COM Interface"
os_list = ["windows"]
reference = [
    "https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME",
    "https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/dissecting-remcos-rat-part-four",
]
version = "1.0.32"

query = '''
process where event.action == "start" and
 process.parent.name : "dllhost.exe" and
 process.Ext.token.integrity_level_name == "high" and
 process.parent.command_line : ("*3E5FC7F9-9A51-4367-9063-A120244FBEC7*", "*D2E7041B-2927-42FB-8E9F-7CE93B6DC937*") and
 not process.executable :
             ("?:\\Windows\\System32\\WerFault.exe",
              "?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\WerFault.exe",
              "?:\\Windows\\System32\\wermgr.exe",
              "?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\wermgr.exe",
              "?:\\Windows\\System32\\dccw.exe") and
 /* Issue #364 */
 not (process.code_signature.subject_name == "WireGuard LLC" and process.code_signature.trusted == true)
'''

min_endpoint_version = "7.15.0"
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0

[[optional_actions]]
action = "rollback"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0

[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1548"
name = "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/"
[[threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1548.002"
name = "Bypass User Account Control"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002/"



[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0004"
name = "Privilege Escalation"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"

[internal]
min_endpoint_version = "7.15.0"

Detection rules belong to the projects that publish them and remain under their own licenses. This site indexes and links to them; it claims no rights in them.