Execution via Outlook Application COM Object


Description

Identifies the execution of commonly abused utilities to run DLLs or scripts via the Outlook.Application COM Object. This behavior may indicate adversarial activity to evade defenses on the system.

Query · eql

sequence with maxspan=1m
   /* Outlook started via DCOM */
 [process where event.action == "start" and
  process.name : "outlook.exe" and process. command_line : "*-Embedding*" and
  process.parent.name : "svchost.exe"] by process.entity_id
   /* Suspicious Outlook child processes */
 [process where event.action == "start" and
   process.pe.original_file_name :
               ("cscript.exe",
                "wscript.exe",
                "powershell.exe",
                "rundll32.exe",
                "cmd.exe",
                "mshta.exe",
                "msbuild.exe",
                "InstallUtil.exe",
                "Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe",
                "wmic.exe",
                "regsvr32.exe",
                "pwsh.exe",
                "ScriptRunner.exe") and not
   /* Issue #330 */
   (process.name:"rundll32.exe" and process.args : ("--eoim", "--enable-speech-input")) and

   not (process.name : "rundll32.exe" and process.args : "?:\\WINDOWS\\sys*\\spool\\DRIVERS\\x64\\3\\*.dll,MonitorPrintJobStatus")] by process.parent.entity_id
Raw source Execution via Outlook Application COM Object · Elastic TOML
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Published by elastic/protections-artifacts ↗, licensed under Elastic License 2.0 ↗. Reproduced here unmodified.
[rule]
description = """
Identifies the execution of commonly abused utilities to run DLLs or scripts via the Outlook.Application COM Object.
This behavior may indicate adversarial activity to evade defenses on the system.
"""
id = "17030515-5ed0-43c8-9602-f97cbebd43c0"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Execution via Outlook Application COM Object"
os_list = ["windows"]
reference = ["https://www.darkoperator.com/blog/2017/11/11/windows-defender-exploit-guard-asr-rules-for-office"]
version = "1.0.33"

query = '''
sequence with maxspan=1m
   /* Outlook started via DCOM */
 [process where event.action == "start" and
  process.name : "outlook.exe" and process. command_line : "*-Embedding*" and
  process.parent.name : "svchost.exe"] by process.entity_id
   /* Suspicious Outlook child processes */
 [process where event.action == "start" and
   process.pe.original_file_name :
               ("cscript.exe",
                "wscript.exe",
                "powershell.exe",
                "rundll32.exe",
                "cmd.exe",
                "mshta.exe",
                "msbuild.exe",
                "InstallUtil.exe",
                "Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe",
                "wmic.exe",
                "regsvr32.exe",
                "pwsh.exe",
                "ScriptRunner.exe") and not
   /* Issue #330 */
   (process.name:"rundll32.exe" and process.args : ("--eoim", "--enable-speech-input")) and

   not (process.name : "rundll32.exe" and process.args : "?:\\WINDOWS\\sys*\\spool\\DRIVERS\\x64\\3\\*.dll,MonitorPrintJobStatus")] by process.parent.entity_id
'''

min_endpoint_version = "7.15.0"
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 1

[[optional_actions]]
action = "rollback"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 1

[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1566"
name = "Phishing"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/"
[[threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1566.001"
name = "Spearphishing Attachment"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001/"



[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0001"
name = "Initial Access"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001/"
[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1059"
name = "Command and Scripting Interpreter"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/"
[[threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1059.001"
name = "PowerShell"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/"

[[threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1059.007"
name = "JavaScript"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/007/"



[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0002"
name = "Execution"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/"
[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1218"
name = "System Binary Proxy Execution"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/"
[[threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1218.005"
name = "Mshta"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/005/"

[[threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1218.010"
name = "Regsvr32"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010/"

[[threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1218.011"
name = "Rundll32"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/"



[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0005"
name = "Defense Evasion"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"

[internal]
min_endpoint_version = "7.15.0"

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