Potential Command and Control via Windows Scripts


Description

Identifies the execution of a Windows script interpreter followed by a network connection or DNS loookup request after 5 minutes of the process start. This may indicate long term network activity from a Windows script which is common pattern of a command and control backdoor via malicious scripts.

Query · eql

sequence by process.entity_id
 [process where event.action == "start" and
  process.pe.original_file_name : ("wscript.exe", "AutoIt*.exe") and
  not process.Ext.token.integrity_level_name == "system" and not process.args : "\\\\*\\netlogon\\*.vbs"]
 [network where
  event.action == "connection_attempted" and network.direction == "egress" and network.transport == "tcp" and
   process.uptime >= 300 and source.port >= 49152 and
   not cidrmatch(destination.ip, "10.0.0.0/8", "127.0.0.0/8", "169.254.0.0/16", "172.16.0.0/12", "192.0.0.0/24",
       "192.0.0.0/29", "192.0.0.8/32", "192.0.0.9/32", "192.0.0.10/32", "192.0.0.170/32", "192.0.0.171/32",
       "192.0.2.0/24", "192.31.196.0/24", "192.52.193.0/24", "192.88.99.0/24", "224.0.0.0/4",
       "100.64.0.0/10", "192.175.48.0/24","198.18.0.0/15", "198.51.100.0/24", "203.0.113.0/24", "240.0.0.0/4", "::1",
       "FE80::/10", "FF00::/8", "100.64.0.0/10", "192.168.0.0/16", "192.88.99.0/24")]
  until [process where event.action:"end"]
Raw source Potential Command and Control via Windows Scripts · Elastic TOML
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Published by elastic/protections-artifacts ↗, licensed under Elastic License 2.0 ↗. Reproduced here unmodified.
[rule]
description = """
Identifies the execution of a Windows script interpreter followed by a network connection or DNS loookup request after 5
minutes of the process start. This may indicate long term network activity from a Windows script which is common pattern
of a command and control backdoor via malicious scripts.
"""
id = "3121956f-8c0b-40ef-b98d-7b7b0ab02d2e"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Potential Command and Control via Windows Scripts"
os_list = ["windows"]
version = "1.0.11"

query = '''
sequence by process.entity_id
 [process where event.action == "start" and
  process.pe.original_file_name : ("wscript.exe", "AutoIt*.exe") and
  not process.Ext.token.integrity_level_name == "system" and not process.args : "\\\\*\\netlogon\\*.vbs"]
 [network where
  event.action == "connection_attempted" and network.direction == "egress" and network.transport == "tcp" and
   process.uptime >= 300 and source.port >= 49152 and
   not cidrmatch(destination.ip, "10.0.0.0/8", "127.0.0.0/8", "169.254.0.0/16", "172.16.0.0/12", "192.0.0.0/24",
       "192.0.0.0/29", "192.0.0.8/32", "192.0.0.9/32", "192.0.0.10/32", "192.0.0.170/32", "192.0.0.171/32",
       "192.0.2.0/24", "192.31.196.0/24", "192.52.193.0/24", "192.88.99.0/24", "224.0.0.0/4",
       "100.64.0.0/10", "192.175.48.0/24","198.18.0.0/15", "198.51.100.0/24", "203.0.113.0/24", "240.0.0.0/4", "::1",
       "FE80::/10", "FF00::/8", "100.64.0.0/10", "192.168.0.0/16", "192.88.99.0/24")]
  until [process where event.action:"end"]
'''

min_endpoint_version = "8.8.0"
optional_actions = []
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0

[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1059"
name = "Command and Scripting Interpreter"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/"
[[threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1059.007"
name = "JavaScript"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/007/"



[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0002"
name = "Execution"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/"
[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1071"
name = "Application Layer Protocol"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/"

[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1573"
name = "Encrypted Channel"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/"


[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0011"
name = "Command and Control"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/"

[internal]
min_endpoint_version = "8.8.0"

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