Suspicious Execution from a PDF Documents


Description

Identifies a suspicious execution from a PDF document with embedded objects. This behavior is consistent with the successful exploitation using spearphishing attachment.

Query · eql

process where event.action == "start" and
 (
  (process.parent.name : "AcroRd*.exe" and
   process.name : ("chrome.exe", "firefox.exe", "msedge.exe", "cscript.exe", "wscript.exe",
                   "mshta.exe", "powershell.exe", "hh.exe", "cmd.exe") and
   process.args : "?:\\Users\\*\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\acrord*_sbx\\*") or

  (process.parent.name : ("chrome.exe", "firefox.exe", "msedge.exe") and process.parent.args : "?:\\Users\\*\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\acrord*_sbx\\*" and
   not process.name : ("chrome.exe", "firefox.exe", "msedge.exe")) or

  (process.executable : "?:\\Users\\*\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\acrord*_sbx\\*" and
   not process.code_signature.status : ("trusted", "errorExpired", "errorCode_endpoint*"))
 )
Raw source Suspicious Execution from a PDF Documents · Elastic TOML
Esc
Published by elastic/protections-artifacts ↗, licensed under Elastic License 2.0 ↗. Reproduced here unmodified.
[rule]
description = """
Identifies a suspicious execution from a PDF document with embedded objects. This behavior is consistent with the
successful exploitation using spearphishing attachment.
"""
id = "4994b3af-632c-41b8-9bff-d96488b1af52"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Suspicious Execution from a PDF Documents"
os_list = ["windows"]
version = "1.0.8"

query = '''
process where event.action == "start" and
 (
  (process.parent.name : "AcroRd*.exe" and
   process.name : ("chrome.exe", "firefox.exe", "msedge.exe", "cscript.exe", "wscript.exe",
                   "mshta.exe", "powershell.exe", "hh.exe", "cmd.exe") and
   process.args : "?:\\Users\\*\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\acrord*_sbx\\*") or

  (process.parent.name : ("chrome.exe", "firefox.exe", "msedge.exe") and process.parent.args : "?:\\Users\\*\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\acrord*_sbx\\*" and
   not process.name : ("chrome.exe", "firefox.exe", "msedge.exe")) or

  (process.executable : "?:\\Users\\*\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\acrord*_sbx\\*" and
   not process.code_signature.status : ("trusted", "errorExpired", "errorCode_endpoint*"))
 )
'''

min_endpoint_version = "7.16.0"
optional_actions = []
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0

[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1566"
name = "Phishing"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/"
[[threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1566.001"
name = "Spearphishing Attachment"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001/"



[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0001"
name = "Initial Access"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001/"

[internal]
min_endpoint_version = "7.16.0"

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