Suspicious Execution via DotNet Remoting


Description

Identifies suspicious execution via DotNet system runtime remoting to execute malicious assembly via named pipes. This may indicate an attempt to bypass application control via trusted windows binaries.

Query · eql

process where event.action == "start" and process.parent.name : "?*" and
  (process.name : "AddInProcess.exe" or process.pe.original_file_name == "AddInProcess.exe") and

   /* guid point to the pipe name used to pass the malicious assembly and pid point to a running process to wait for before exit */
   process.args : "/guid*" and process.args : "/pid*" and 

   not process.parent.executable : ("?:\\Program Files\\Autodesk\\*.exe",  "?:\\Program Files\\KAPPA\\Workstation *\\Launcher\\KAPPA.exe") and

   not (process.parent.code_signature.subject_name : ("Autodesk, Inc.", "KAPPA Engineering") and process.parent.code_signature.trusted == true)
Raw source Suspicious Execution via DotNet Remoting · Elastic TOML
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Published by elastic/protections-artifacts ↗, licensed under Elastic License 2.0 ↗. Reproduced here unmodified.
[rule]
description = """
Identifies suspicious execution via DotNet system runtime remoting to execute malicious assembly via named pipes. This
may indicate an attempt to bypass application control via trusted windows binaries.
"""
id = "5bc7a8f8-4de8-4af4-bea4-cba538e54a5c"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Suspicious Execution via DotNet Remoting"
os_list = ["windows"]
reference = [
    "https://github.com/nettitude/Aladdin",
    "https://www.tiraniddo.dev/2017/07/dg-on-windows-10-s-executing-arbitrary.html",
    "https://www.netspi.com/blog/technical/adversary-simulation/re-animating-activitysurrogateselector/",
]
version = "1.0.21"

query = '''
process where event.action == "start" and process.parent.name : "?*" and
  (process.name : "AddInProcess.exe" or process.pe.original_file_name == "AddInProcess.exe") and

   /* guid point to the pipe name used to pass the malicious assembly and pid point to a running process to wait for before exit */
   process.args : "/guid*" and process.args : "/pid*" and 

   not process.parent.executable : ("?:\\Program Files\\Autodesk\\*.exe",  "?:\\Program Files\\KAPPA\\Workstation *\\Launcher\\KAPPA.exe") and

   not (process.parent.code_signature.subject_name : ("Autodesk, Inc.", "KAPPA Engineering") and process.parent.code_signature.trusted == true)
'''

min_endpoint_version = "8.10.0"
optional_actions = []
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0

[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1218"
name = "System Binary Proxy Execution"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/"


[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0005"
name = "Defense Evasion"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"

[internal]
min_endpoint_version = "8.10.0"

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