Suspicious ImageLoad from an ISO Mounted Device


Description

Identifies instances of RunDLL32, Regsvr32 or Odbcconf loading a DLL from a mounted ISO device. Adversaries may deliver a malicious payload via an ISO file and execute it via rundll32.exe, regsvr32 or Odbcconf.

Query · eql

sequence by process.entity_id with maxspan=1m
 [process where event.action == "start" and
  process.name : ("rundll32.exe", "regsvr32.exe", "odbcconf.exe", "certoc.exe") and
  process.parent.name : ("cmd.exe", "explorer.exe", "powershell.exe", "winrar.exe", "7zFM.exe")]
 [library where process.name : ("rundll32.exe", "regsvr32.exe", "odbcconf.exe", "certoc.exe") and
  not dll.code_signature.trusted == true and not user.id : ("S-1-5-18", "S-1-5-19", "S-1-5-20") and

  /* loading dll from a mounted device */
  (dll.path : "\\Device\\CdRom*" or dll.path regex """[d-zD-Z]:\\[0-9a-zA-Z\.]+""")]
Raw source Suspicious ImageLoad from an ISO Mounted Device · Elastic TOML
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Published by elastic/protections-artifacts ↗, licensed under Elastic License 2.0 ↗. Reproduced here unmodified.
[rule]
description = """
Identifies instances of RunDLL32, Regsvr32 or Odbcconf loading a DLL from a mounted ISO device. Adversaries may deliver
a malicious payload via an ISO file and execute it via rundll32.exe, regsvr32 or Odbcconf.
"""
id = "779b9502-7912-4773-95a1-51cd702a71c8"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Suspicious ImageLoad from an ISO Mounted Device"
os_list = ["windows"]
reference = [
    "https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/Hunting-for-Suspicious-Windows-Libraries-for-Execution-and-Evasion",
]
version = "1.0.29"

query = '''
sequence by process.entity_id with maxspan=1m
 [process where event.action == "start" and
  process.name : ("rundll32.exe", "regsvr32.exe", "odbcconf.exe", "certoc.exe") and
  process.parent.name : ("cmd.exe", "explorer.exe", "powershell.exe", "winrar.exe", "7zFM.exe")]
 [library where process.name : ("rundll32.exe", "regsvr32.exe", "odbcconf.exe", "certoc.exe") and
  not dll.code_signature.trusted == true and not user.id : ("S-1-5-18", "S-1-5-19", "S-1-5-20") and

  /* loading dll from a mounted device */
  (dll.path : "\\Device\\CdRom*" or dll.path regex """[d-zD-Z]:\\[0-9a-zA-Z\.]+""")]
'''

min_endpoint_version = "7.16.0"
optional_actions = []
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0

[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1218"
name = "System Binary Proxy Execution"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/"
[[threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1218.010"
name = "Regsvr32"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010/"

[[threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1218.011"
name = "Rundll32"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/"



[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0005"
name = "Defense Evasion"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"

[internal]
min_endpoint_version = "7.16.0"

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