Sensitive Hive Access via Registry Backup


Description

Identifies access attempts to sensitive registry hives like the Security Account Manager (SAM) database file from the registry backdup folder. Adversaries may use this option to evade detections looking for registry hive direct access.

Query · eql

file where event.action == "open" and event.outcome == "success" and
 file.path :
      ("?:\\Windows\\System32\\config\\RegBack\\SAM",
       "?:\\Windows\\System32\\config\\RegBack\\SECURITY",
       "?:\\Windows\\System32\\config\\RegBack\\SYSTEM") and
 user.id != null and process.executable : "?:\\*" and process.pid != 4 and
 not process.executable :
             ("?:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost.exe",
              "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\*",
              "?:\\Program Files\\*",
              "?:\\Windows\\System32\\wuauclt.exe",
              "?:\\$WINDOWS.~BT\\Sources\\SetupHost.exe",
              "?:\\Windows\\System32\\vmwp.exe",
              "?:\\Windows\\System32\\Dism.exe",
              "?:\\Windows\\System32\\wbengine.exe",
              "?:\\Windows\\System32\\mmc.exe",
              "?:\\ProgramData\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Platform\\*.exe",
              "?:\\Windows\\System32\\sppsvc.exe",
              "?:\\Windows\\System32\\backgroundTaskHost.exe",
              "?:\\Windows\\System32\\lsass.exe",
              "?:\\Windows\\System32\\taskhostw.exe",
              "?:\\Windows\\System32\\taskhost.exe",
              "?:\\Windows\\System32\\SearchProtocolHost.exe",
              "?:\\ProgramData\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Platform\\*.exe",
              "?:\\ProgramData\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection\\Platform\\*.exe",
              "?:\\Program Files\\Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection\\*.exe",
              "?:\\Program Files\\Microsoft Monitoring Agent\\Agent\\*.exe",
              "?:\\Windows\\System32\\SrTasks.exe",
              "?:\\Windows\\System32\\rstrui.exe",
              "?:\\Windows\\System32\\MRT.exe",
              "?:\\Windows\\System32\\conhost.exe") and

 not (process.code_signature.trusted == true and
      process.code_signature.subject_name :
         ("ESET, spol. s r.o.", "Commvault Systems, Inc.", "Eric R. Zimmerman", "EFOLDER, INC.", "Absolute Software Corp.",
          "Refraction Point, Inc"))
Raw source Sensitive Hive Access via Registry Backup · Elastic TOML
Esc
Published by elastic/protections-artifacts ↗, licensed under Elastic License 2.0 ↗. Reproduced here unmodified.
[rule]
description = """
Identifies access attempts to sensitive registry hives like the Security Account Manager (SAM) database file from the
registry backdup folder. Adversaries may use this option to evade detections looking for registry hive direct access.
"""
id = "87a465e3-b8a2-4df7-9590-86782aa0546c"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Sensitive Hive Access via Registry Backup"
os_list = ["windows"]
version = "1.0.3"

query = '''
file where event.action == "open" and event.outcome == "success" and
 file.path :
      ("?:\\Windows\\System32\\config\\RegBack\\SAM",
       "?:\\Windows\\System32\\config\\RegBack\\SECURITY",
       "?:\\Windows\\System32\\config\\RegBack\\SYSTEM") and
 user.id != null and process.executable : "?:\\*" and process.pid != 4 and
 not process.executable :
             ("?:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost.exe",
              "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\*",
              "?:\\Program Files\\*",
              "?:\\Windows\\System32\\wuauclt.exe",
              "?:\\$WINDOWS.~BT\\Sources\\SetupHost.exe",
              "?:\\Windows\\System32\\vmwp.exe",
              "?:\\Windows\\System32\\Dism.exe",
              "?:\\Windows\\System32\\wbengine.exe",
              "?:\\Windows\\System32\\mmc.exe",
              "?:\\ProgramData\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Platform\\*.exe",
              "?:\\Windows\\System32\\sppsvc.exe",
              "?:\\Windows\\System32\\backgroundTaskHost.exe",
              "?:\\Windows\\System32\\lsass.exe",
              "?:\\Windows\\System32\\taskhostw.exe",
              "?:\\Windows\\System32\\taskhost.exe",
              "?:\\Windows\\System32\\SearchProtocolHost.exe",
              "?:\\ProgramData\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Platform\\*.exe",
              "?:\\ProgramData\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection\\Platform\\*.exe",
              "?:\\Program Files\\Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection\\*.exe",
              "?:\\Program Files\\Microsoft Monitoring Agent\\Agent\\*.exe",
              "?:\\Windows\\System32\\SrTasks.exe",
              "?:\\Windows\\System32\\rstrui.exe",
              "?:\\Windows\\System32\\MRT.exe",
              "?:\\Windows\\System32\\conhost.exe") and

 not (process.code_signature.trusted == true and
      process.code_signature.subject_name :
         ("ESET, spol. s r.o.", "Commvault Systems, Inc.", "Eric R. Zimmerman", "EFOLDER, INC.", "Absolute Software Corp.",
          "Refraction Point, Inc"))
'''

min_endpoint_version = "8.0.0"
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0

[[optional_actions]]
action = "rollback"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0

[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1003"
name = "OS Credential Dumping"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/"
[[threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1003.002"
name = "Security Account Manager"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/002/"



[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0006"
name = "Credential Access"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/"

[internal]
min_endpoint_version = "8.0.0"

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