Egress Network Connection Followed by Command Execution


Description

Detects network connections originating from a binary located in a potentially suspicious location, followed by command execution. This behavior is consistent with C2 agents such as Poseidon and Athena, connecting to a C2 framework such as Mythic. The agent polls the C2 for commands through a web request, after which the command gets executed.

Query · eql

sequence with maxspan=5s
  [network where event.type == "start" and event.action == "connection_attempted" and
   process.executable like ("./*", "/boot/*", "/dev/shm/*", "/run/*", "/var/run/*", "/tmp/*", "/var/tmp/*") and
   not (
      process.executable like "/tmp/*/*" or
      destination.ip == null or
      destination.ip == "0.0.0.0" or 
      cidrmatch(
        destination.ip, "10.0.0.0/8", "127.0.0.0/8", "169.254.0.0/16", "172.16.0.0/12",
        "192.0.0.0/24", "192.0.0.0/29","192.0.0.8/32", "192.0.0.9/32", "192.0.0.10/32",
        "192.0.0.170/32", "192.0.0.171/32", "192.0.2.0/24", "192.31.196.0/24", "192.52.193.0/24",
        "192.168.0.0/16", "192.88.99.0/24", "224.0.0.0/4", "100.64.0.0/10", "192.175.48.0/24",
        "198.18.0.0/15", "198.51.100.0/24", "203.0.113.0/24", "240.0.0.0/4", "::1", "FE80::/10",
        "FF00::/8"
      )
    )
  ] by process.entity_id
  [process where event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and
   process.parent.executable like ("./*", "/boot/*", "/dev/shm/*", "/run/*", "/var/run/*", "/tmp/*", "/var/tmp/*") and
   process.args like (
     "ip*", "whoami*", "id*", "hostname*", "touch*", "curl*", "wget*", "chmod*", "busybox*", "chattr*", "echo*",
     "php*", "perl*", "ruby*", "lua*", "openssl*", "nc*", "netcat*", "ncat*"
   ) and
   not (
     process.parent.executable in (
       "/srv/nessus_agent/sbin/nessus-agent-module", "/var/log/amazon/ssm/patch-baseline-operations", "./app",
       "./config.json/usr/local/bin/py.test", "./runc"
     ) or
     process.parent.name in ("nseserv", "nexserv", "pycharm") or
     process.parent.command_line == "/usr/bin/php ./boot-watcher.php" or
     process.working_directory == "/usr/lib/adlumin" or
     process.parent.executable like ("/run/k3s/containerd/*", "/run/user/*/.bubblewrap/opt/chef/bin/chef-client", "/run/containerd/*")
   )
  ] by process.parent.entity_id
Raw source Egress Network Connection Followed by Command Execution · Elastic TOML
Esc
Published by elastic/protections-artifacts ↗, licensed under Elastic License 2.0 ↗. Reproduced here unmodified.
[rule]
description = """
Detects network connections originating from a binary located in a potentially suspicious location, followed by command
execution. This behavior is consistent with C2 agents such as Poseidon and Athena, connecting to a C2 framework such as
Mythic. The agent polls the C2 for commands through a web request, after which the command gets executed.
"""
id = "8c2977dd-07ce-4a8e-8ccd-5e4183138675"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Egress Network Connection Followed by Command Execution"
os_list = ["linux"]
version = "1.0.14"

query = '''
sequence with maxspan=5s
  [network where event.type == "start" and event.action == "connection_attempted" and
   process.executable like ("./*", "/boot/*", "/dev/shm/*", "/run/*", "/var/run/*", "/tmp/*", "/var/tmp/*") and
   not (
      process.executable like "/tmp/*/*" or
      destination.ip == null or
      destination.ip == "0.0.0.0" or 
      cidrmatch(
        destination.ip, "10.0.0.0/8", "127.0.0.0/8", "169.254.0.0/16", "172.16.0.0/12",
        "192.0.0.0/24", "192.0.0.0/29","192.0.0.8/32", "192.0.0.9/32", "192.0.0.10/32",
        "192.0.0.170/32", "192.0.0.171/32", "192.0.2.0/24", "192.31.196.0/24", "192.52.193.0/24",
        "192.168.0.0/16", "192.88.99.0/24", "224.0.0.0/4", "100.64.0.0/10", "192.175.48.0/24",
        "198.18.0.0/15", "198.51.100.0/24", "203.0.113.0/24", "240.0.0.0/4", "::1", "FE80::/10",
        "FF00::/8"
      )
    )
  ] by process.entity_id
  [process where event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and
   process.parent.executable like ("./*", "/boot/*", "/dev/shm/*", "/run/*", "/var/run/*", "/tmp/*", "/var/tmp/*") and
   process.args like (
     "ip*", "whoami*", "id*", "hostname*", "touch*", "curl*", "wget*", "chmod*", "busybox*", "chattr*", "echo*",
     "php*", "perl*", "ruby*", "lua*", "openssl*", "nc*", "netcat*", "ncat*"
   ) and
   not (
     process.parent.executable in (
       "/srv/nessus_agent/sbin/nessus-agent-module", "/var/log/amazon/ssm/patch-baseline-operations", "./app",
       "./config.json/usr/local/bin/py.test", "./runc"
     ) or
     process.parent.name in ("nseserv", "nexserv", "pycharm") or
     process.parent.command_line == "/usr/bin/php ./boot-watcher.php" or
     process.working_directory == "/usr/lib/adlumin" or
     process.parent.executable like ("/run/k3s/containerd/*", "/run/user/*/.bubblewrap/opt/chef/bin/chef-client", "/run/containerd/*")
   )
  ] by process.parent.entity_id
'''

min_endpoint_version = "7.15.0"
optional_actions = []
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0

[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1059"
name = "Command and Scripting Interpreter"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/"
[[threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1059.004"
name = "Unix Shell"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004/"



[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0002"
name = "Execution"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/"
[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1071"
name = "Application Layer Protocol"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/"
[[threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1071.001"
name = "Web Protocols"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001/"



[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0011"
name = "Command and Control"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/"

[internal]
min_endpoint_version = "7.15.0"

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