Egress Network Connection from Default DPKG Directory


Description

This rule monitors for network connections from processes that are executed from the /var/lib/dpkg/info/ directory. This directory is used to store information about installed packages. Attackers can backdoor the installation scripts of packages to establish network connections during the installation process to maintain persistence or to establish command and control.

Query · eql

sequence with maxspan=3s
  [process where event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and
   process.parent.executable like "/var/lib/dpkg/info/*" and not (
     process.executable like ("/usr/sbin/runuser", "/opt/vivaldi/*", "/usr/bin/syslog-ng-update-virtualenv") or
     process.parent.executable == "/var/lib/dpkg/info/falco.postinst" or
     process.parent.executable like (
       "/var/lib/dpkg/info/percona-server-server-*.postinst", "/var/lib/dpkg/info/vivaldi*",
       "/var/lib/dpkg/info/percona-xtradb-cluster-server*", "/var/lib/dpkg/info/univention-updater*",
       "/var/lib/dpkg/info/microsoft-edge-beta.postinst"
     ) or
     process.parent.name in ("mdatp.postinst", "mdatp.postrm") or
     process.args like ("/var/lib/dpkg/info/percona-xtradb-cluster-server-*.postinst", "/etc/cron.daily/*")
   )
  ] by process.entity_id
  [network where event.type == "start" and event.action == "connection_attempted" and not (
   destination.ip == null or
   destination.ip == "0.0.0.0" or
   cidrmatch(
     destination.ip, "10.0.0.0/8", "127.0.0.0/8", "169.254.0.0/16", "172.16.0.0/12", "192.0.0.0/24", "192.0.0.0/29",
     "192.0.0.8/32", "192.0.0.9/32", "192.0.0.10/32", "192.0.0.170/32", "192.0.0.171/32", "192.0.2.0/24",
     "192.31.196.0/24", "192.52.193.0/24", "192.168.0.0/16", "192.88.99.0/24", "224.0.0.0/4", "100.64.0.0/10",
     "192.175.48.0/24","198.18.0.0/15", "198.51.100.0/24", "203.0.113.0/24", "240.0.0.0/4", "::1", "FE80::/10",
     "FF00::/8", "172.31.0.0/16"
     ) or
     process.executable in (
       "/usr/bin/apt-get", "/bin/apt-get", "/opt/cisco/amp/etc/ampinsthelper", "/opt/teleport/system/bin/tsh",
       "/usr/lib/apt/methods/https"
     )
   )] by process.parent.entity_id
Raw source Egress Network Connection from Default DPKG Directory · Elastic TOML
Esc
Published by elastic/protections-artifacts ↗, licensed under Elastic License 2.0 ↗. Reproduced here unmodified.
[rule]
description = """
This rule monitors for network connections from processes that are executed from the /var/lib/dpkg/info/ directory. This
directory is used to store information about installed packages. Attackers can backdoor the installation scripts of
packages to establish network connections during the installation process to maintain persistence or to establish
command and control.
"""
id = "947b70bb-8e01-4f1b-994d-5af9488556bb"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Egress Network Connection from Default DPKG Directory"
os_list = ["linux"]
reference = ["https://www.makeuseof.com/how-deb-packages-are-backdoored-how-to-detect-it/"]
version = "1.0.10"

query = '''
sequence with maxspan=3s
  [process where event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and
   process.parent.executable like "/var/lib/dpkg/info/*" and not (
     process.executable like ("/usr/sbin/runuser", "/opt/vivaldi/*", "/usr/bin/syslog-ng-update-virtualenv") or
     process.parent.executable == "/var/lib/dpkg/info/falco.postinst" or
     process.parent.executable like (
       "/var/lib/dpkg/info/percona-server-server-*.postinst", "/var/lib/dpkg/info/vivaldi*",
       "/var/lib/dpkg/info/percona-xtradb-cluster-server*", "/var/lib/dpkg/info/univention-updater*",
       "/var/lib/dpkg/info/microsoft-edge-beta.postinst"
     ) or
     process.parent.name in ("mdatp.postinst", "mdatp.postrm") or
     process.args like ("/var/lib/dpkg/info/percona-xtradb-cluster-server-*.postinst", "/etc/cron.daily/*")
   )
  ] by process.entity_id
  [network where event.type == "start" and event.action == "connection_attempted" and not (
   destination.ip == null or
   destination.ip == "0.0.0.0" or
   cidrmatch(
     destination.ip, "10.0.0.0/8", "127.0.0.0/8", "169.254.0.0/16", "172.16.0.0/12", "192.0.0.0/24", "192.0.0.0/29",
     "192.0.0.8/32", "192.0.0.9/32", "192.0.0.10/32", "192.0.0.170/32", "192.0.0.171/32", "192.0.2.0/24",
     "192.31.196.0/24", "192.52.193.0/24", "192.168.0.0/16", "192.88.99.0/24", "224.0.0.0/4", "100.64.0.0/10",
     "192.175.48.0/24","198.18.0.0/15", "198.51.100.0/24", "203.0.113.0/24", "240.0.0.0/4", "::1", "FE80::/10",
     "FF00::/8", "172.31.0.0/16"
     ) or
     process.executable in (
       "/usr/bin/apt-get", "/bin/apt-get", "/opt/cisco/amp/etc/ampinsthelper", "/opt/teleport/system/bin/tsh",
       "/usr/lib/apt/methods/https"
     )
   )] by process.parent.entity_id
'''

min_endpoint_version = "8.6.0"
optional_actions = []
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 1

[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1195"
name = "Supply Chain Compromise"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195/"
[[threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1195.002"
name = "Compromise Software Supply Chain"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195/002/"



[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0001"
name = "Initial Access"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001/"
[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1543"
name = "Create or Modify System Process"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/"

[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1546"
name = "Event Triggered Execution"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/"
[[threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1546.016"
name = "Installer Packages"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/016/"


[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1574"
name = "Hijack Execution Flow"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/"


[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0003"
name = "Persistence"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/"
[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1071"
name = "Application Layer Protocol"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/"


[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0011"
name = "Command and Control"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/"

[internal]
min_endpoint_version = "8.6.0"

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