Suspicious Python Script Execution and Network Connection


Description

Detects when Python is executed containing arguments containing suspicious file paths followed immediately by a Python network connection. We have observed malware samples that drop and execute a Python script within a suspicious directory in order to establish C2.

Query · eql

sequence by process.entity_id with maxspan=15s
[process where event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and process.name like~ "python*" and process.args like~ "python*" and 
  process.args like ("/Users/Shared/*", "/tmp/*", "/private/var/tmp/*", "/var/tmp/*") and process.args_count <= 3 and 
  not (process.parent.name in ("zsh", "bash", "sh", "fish", "tcsh") and
        process.parent.command_line in ("-bash", "-zsh", "-sh", "-fish", "-tcsh") and
        process.parent.executable : ("/bin/zsh", "/bin/bash", "/bin/sh", "/opt/homebrew/*", "/usr/local/*") and
        process.code_signature.trusted == true) and
  not process.Ext.effective_parent.executable like (
        "/Applications/Visual Studio Code.app/*",
        "/Applications/Cursor.app/*",
        "/Applications/PyCharm.app/*",
        "/Applications/PyCharm CE.app/*",
        "/Applications/Windsurf.app/*",
        "/Applications/Codex.app/*",
        "/Applications/Emacs.app/*",
        "/Applications/IntelliJ IDEA.app/*",
        "/Users/*/Applications/IntelliJ IDEA.app/*",
        "/Applications/Android Studio.app/*",
        "/Applications/cmux.app/*",
        "/Applications/ChatGPT.app/*",
        "/Users/*/Library/Application Support/Claude/*") and
  not (process.parent.name in ("zsh", "bash", "sh") and process.parent.command_line : (
    "*/.claude/shell-snapshots/*",
    "*/.codex/shell_snapshots/*",
    "*/.cursor/shell-snapshots/*"))]
[network where event.type == "start" and
   not destination.domain : ("dl.google.com", "*.cloud.es.io", "*.elastic-cloud.com", "elastic.co", "www.elastic.co") and
   not cidrmatch(destination.ip, 
       "240.0.0.0/4", "233.252.0.0/24", "224.0.0.0/4", "198.19.0.0/16", "192.18.0.0/15", 
       "192.0.0.0/24", "10.0.0.0/8", "127.0.0.0/8", "169.254.0.0/16", "172.16.0.0/12", 
       "192.0.2.0/24", "192.31.196.0/24", "192.52.193.0/24", "192.168.0.0/16", "192.88.99.0/24", 
       "100.64.0.0/10", "192.175.48.0/24", "198.18.0.0/15", "198.51.100.0/24", "203.0.113.0/24",
       "::1", "FE80::/10", "FF00::/8")]
Raw source Suspicious Python Script Execution and Network Connection · Elastic TOML
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Published by elastic/protections-artifacts ↗, licensed under Elastic License 2.0 ↗. Reproduced here unmodified.
[rule]
description = """
Detects when Python is executed containing arguments containing suspicious file paths followed immediately by a Python
network connection. We have observed malware samples that drop and execute a Python script within a suspicious directory
in order to establish C2.
"""
id = "cad8906b-156b-48c0-bda9-785ef3561442"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Suspicious Python Script Execution and Network Connection"
os_list = ["macos"]
version = "1.0.11"

query = '''
sequence by process.entity_id with maxspan=15s
[process where event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and process.name like~ "python*" and process.args like~ "python*" and 
  process.args like ("/Users/Shared/*", "/tmp/*", "/private/var/tmp/*", "/var/tmp/*") and process.args_count <= 3 and 
  not (process.parent.name in ("zsh", "bash", "sh", "fish", "tcsh") and
        process.parent.command_line in ("-bash", "-zsh", "-sh", "-fish", "-tcsh") and
        process.parent.executable : ("/bin/zsh", "/bin/bash", "/bin/sh", "/opt/homebrew/*", "/usr/local/*") and
        process.code_signature.trusted == true) and
  not process.Ext.effective_parent.executable like (
        "/Applications/Visual Studio Code.app/*",
        "/Applications/Cursor.app/*",
        "/Applications/PyCharm.app/*",
        "/Applications/PyCharm CE.app/*",
        "/Applications/Windsurf.app/*",
        "/Applications/Codex.app/*",
        "/Applications/Emacs.app/*",
        "/Applications/IntelliJ IDEA.app/*",
        "/Users/*/Applications/IntelliJ IDEA.app/*",
        "/Applications/Android Studio.app/*",
        "/Applications/cmux.app/*",
        "/Applications/ChatGPT.app/*",
        "/Users/*/Library/Application Support/Claude/*") and
  not (process.parent.name in ("zsh", "bash", "sh") and process.parent.command_line : (
    "*/.claude/shell-snapshots/*",
    "*/.codex/shell_snapshots/*",
    "*/.cursor/shell-snapshots/*"))]
[network where event.type == "start" and
   not destination.domain : ("dl.google.com", "*.cloud.es.io", "*.elastic-cloud.com", "elastic.co", "www.elastic.co") and
   not cidrmatch(destination.ip, 
       "240.0.0.0/4", "233.252.0.0/24", "224.0.0.0/4", "198.19.0.0/16", "192.18.0.0/15", 
       "192.0.0.0/24", "10.0.0.0/8", "127.0.0.0/8", "169.254.0.0/16", "172.16.0.0/12", 
       "192.0.2.0/24", "192.31.196.0/24", "192.52.193.0/24", "192.168.0.0/16", "192.88.99.0/24", 
       "100.64.0.0/10", "192.175.48.0/24", "198.18.0.0/15", "198.51.100.0/24", "203.0.113.0/24",
       "::1", "FE80::/10", "FF00::/8")]
'''

min_endpoint_version = "8.16.0"
optional_actions = []
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0

[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.parent.entity_id"
state = 0

[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1059"
name = "Command and Scripting Interpreter"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/"
[[threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1059.006"
name = "Python"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/006/"



[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0002"
name = "Execution"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/"
[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"

[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0011"
name = "Command and Control"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/"

[internal]
min_endpoint_version = "8.16.0"

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