ET ACTIVEX Microsoft DirectX 9 ActiveX Control Format String Function Call

Query · suricata

flow:to_client,established;
content:"ActiveXObject"; nocase;
content:"MSVidCtlLib.MSVidVMR9"; nocase; distance:0;
content:".CustomCompositorClass"; nocase;
Raw source ET ACTIVEX Microsoft DirectX 9 ActiveX Control Format String Function Call · Suricata
Esc
Published by Emerging Threats Open ↗, licensed under BSD 3-Clause ↗. Line breaks added for readability; the rule is otherwise unchanged. 
alert http $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET any (
    msg:"ET ACTIVEX Microsoft DirectX 9 ActiveX Control Format String Function Call";
    flow:to_client,established;
    content:"ActiveXObject"; nocase;
    content:"MSVidCtlLib.MSVidVMR9"; nocase; distance:0;
    content:".CustomCompositorClass"; nocase;
    reference:url,packetstorm.linuxsecurity.com/1009-exploits/msvidctl-activex.txt;
    classtype:attempted-user;
    sid:2011590; rev:4;
    metadata:affected_product Windows_XP_Vista_7_8_10_Server_32_64_Bit, attack_target Client_Endpoint, created_at 2010_10_02, deployment Perimeter, confidence Medium, signature_severity Major, tag ActiveX, updated_at 2019_09_27;
)

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