ET EXPLOIT Linksys WRT54GL Router DNS Change POST Request

Query · suricata

flow:to_server,established;
urilen:10;
http.method;
content:"POST";
http.uri;
content:"/apply.cgi"; endswith;
http.request_body;
content:"submit_button=index"; depth:19;
content:"&action=Apply"; distance:0; nocase;
content:"&lan_dns0="; distance:0; fast_pattern;
Raw source ET EXPLOIT Linksys WRT54GL Router DNS Change POST Request · Suricata
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Published by Emerging Threats Open ↗, licensed under BSD 3-Clause ↗. Line breaks added for readability; the rule is otherwise unchanged. 
alert http any any -> $HOME_NET any (
    msg:"ET EXPLOIT Linksys WRT54GL Router DNS Change POST Request";
    flow:to_server,established;
    urilen:10;
    http.method;
    content:"POST";
    http.uri;
    content:"/apply.cgi"; endswith;
    http.request_body;
    content:"submit_button=index"; depth:19;
    content:"&action=Apply"; distance:0; nocase;
    content:"&lan_dns0="; distance:0; fast_pattern;
    reference:url,www.s3cur1ty.de/node/640;
    classtype:attempted-admin;
    sid:2020858; rev:4;
    metadata:created_at 2015_04_08, signature_severity Major, tag Description_Generated_By_Proofpoint_Nexus, updated_at 2020_11_02;
)

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