ET PHISHING Successful LinkedIn Phish 2015-09-17

Query · suricata

flow:to_server,established;
http.method;
content:"POST";
http.uri;
content:".php"; endswith;
http.request_body;
content:"a="; depth:2; nocase;
content:"&Action.CorpUser.Signon="; fast_pattern; nocase; distance:0;
content:"&CorporateSignonAccessChannel="; nocase; distance:0;
content:"&UserType="; nocase; distance:0;
Raw source ET PHISHING Successful LinkedIn Phish 2015-09-17 · Suricata
Esc
Published by Emerging Threats Open ↗, licensed under BSD 3-Clause ↗. Line breaks added for readability; the rule is otherwise unchanged. 
alert http $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET any (
    msg:"ET PHISHING Successful LinkedIn Phish 2015-09-17";
    flow:to_server,established;
    http.method;
    content:"POST";
    http.uri;
    content:".php"; endswith;
    http.request_body;
    content:"a="; depth:2; nocase;
    content:"&Action.CorpUser.Signon="; fast_pattern; nocase; distance:0;
    content:"&CorporateSignonAccessChannel="; nocase; distance:0;
    content:"&UserType="; nocase; distance:0;
    classtype:credential-theft;
    sid:2031831; rev:5;
    metadata:attack_target Client_Endpoint, created_at 2015_09_16, deployment Perimeter, confidence Medium, signature_severity Critical, tag Phishing, updated_at 2020_09_17, mitre_tactic_id TA0001, mitre_tactic_name Initial_Access, mitre_technique_id T1566, mitre_technique_name Phishing;
)

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