ET HUNTING Javascript Sandbox Escape via Global Object (process)

Query · suricata

flow:established,to_server;
http.request_body;
content:"process|2e|mainModule|2e|require|28|"; fast_pattern;
content:"|2e|exec"; distance:0;
pcre:"/^(?:Sync)?\x28[\x22\x27]/R";
target:dest_ip;
Raw source ET HUNTING Javascript Sandbox Escape via Global Object (process) · Suricata
Esc
Published by Emerging Threats Open ↗, licensed under BSD 3-Clause ↗. Line breaks added for readability; the rule is otherwise unchanged. 
alert http any any -> [$HOME_NET,$HTTP_SERVERS] any (
    msg:"ET HUNTING Javascript Sandbox Escape via Global Object (process)";
    flow:established,to_server;
    http.request_body;
    content:"process|2e|mainModule|2e|require|28|"; fast_pattern;
    content:"|2e|exec"; distance:0;
    pcre:"/^(?:Sync)?\x28[\x22\x27]/R";
    reference:url,www.endorlabs.com/learn/happier-doms-the-perils-of-running-untrusted-javascript-code-outside-of-a-web-browser;
    classtype:unknown;
    sid:2066030; rev:1;
    metadata:attack_target Server, tls_state TLSDecrypt, created_at 2025_12_05, deployment Perimeter, deployment Internal, deployment SSLDecrypt, confidence Medium, signature_severity Major, updated_at 2025_12_05;
    target:dest_ip;
)

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