APT_NK_MAL_M_Hunting_VEILEDSIGNAL_2


Description

Detects VEILEDSIGNAL malware

Query · yara

strings:
      $sb1 = { C1 E0 05 4D 8? [2] 33 D0 45 69 C0 7D 50 BF 12 8B C2 41 FF C2 C1 E8 07 33 D0 8B C2 C1 E0 16 41 81 C0 87 D6 12 00 }
      $si1 = "CryptBinaryToStringA" fullword
      $si2 = "BCryptGenerateSymmetricKey" fullword
      $si3 = "CreateThread" fullword
      $ss1 = "ChainingModeGCM" wide
      $ss2 = "__tutma" fullword
   condition:
      (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D) and (uint32(uint32(0x3C)) == 0x00004550) and (uint16(uint32(0x3C)+0x18) == 0x020B) and all of them
Raw source APT_NK_MAL_M_Hunting_VEILEDSIGNAL_2 · YARA
Esc
Published by Neo23x0/signature-base ↗, licensed under Detection Rule License 1.1 ↗. Reproduced here unmodified.
rule APT_NK_MAL_M_Hunting_VEILEDSIGNAL_2 {
   meta:
      description = "Detects VEILEDSIGNAL malware"
      author = "Mandiant"
      score = 75
      disclaimer = "This rule is meant for hunting and is not tested to run in a production environment"
      hash1 = "404b09def6054a281b41d309d809a428"
      reference = "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/3cx-software-supply-chain-compromise"
      date = "2023-04-20"
      id = "1b96c2f0-1c57-593e-9630-a72d43eb857e"
   strings:
      $sb1 = { C1 E0 05 4D 8? [2] 33 D0 45 69 C0 7D 50 BF 12 8B C2 41 FF C2 C1 E8 07 33 D0 8B C2 C1 E0 16 41 81 C0 87 D6 12 00 }
      $si1 = "CryptBinaryToStringA" fullword
      $si2 = "BCryptGenerateSymmetricKey" fullword
      $si3 = "CreateThread" fullword
      $ss1 = "ChainingModeGCM" wide
      $ss2 = "__tutma" fullword
   condition:
      (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D) and (uint32(uint32(0x3C)) == 0x00004550) and (uint16(uint32(0x3C)+0x18) == 0x020B) and all of them
}

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