AWS RDS Instance Modified to be Publicly Accessible


Description

Detects when an RDS instance or cluster is modified to become publicly accessible. This exposes the database to the internet and is used by attackers for persistence or data exfiltration. This detects the modification event in real-time, unlike static policy checks.

Query · python

from panther_aws_helpers import aws_rds_context


def rule(event):
    if event.get("eventSource") != "rds.amazonaws.com":
        return False
    modify_events = ["ModifyDBInstance", "ModifyDBCluster"]
    if event.get("eventName") not in modify_events:
        return False
    if event.deep_get("errorCode") is not None:
        return False
    publicly_accessible = event.deep_get("requestParameters", "publiclyAccessible", default=None)
    if publicly_accessible is True:
        return True
    return False


def title(event):
    event_name = event.get("eventName", "Unknown")
    db_identifier = event.deep_get("requestParameters", "dBInstanceIdentifier") or event.deep_get(
        "requestParameters", "dBClusterIdentifier", default="<UNKNOWN>"
    )
    user = event.deep_get("userIdentity", "userName") or event.deep_get(
        "userIdentity", "principalId", default="<UNKNOWN_USER>"
    )
    resource_type = "Instance" if event_name == "ModifyDBInstance" else "Cluster"
    return f"RDS {resource_type} Made Public: [{db_identifier}] by [{user}]"


def alert_context(event):
    context = aws_rds_context(event)
    context["publicly_accessible"] = event.deep_get(
        "requestParameters", "publiclyAccessible", default="N/A"
    )
    context["apply_immediately"] = event.deep_get(
        "requestParameters", "applyImmediately", default="N/A"
    )
    vpc_security_groups = event.deep_get("requestParameters", "vPCSecurityGroupIds", default=None)
    if vpc_security_groups:
        context["vpc_security_groups_modified"] = vpc_security_groups
    subnet_group = event.deep_get("requestParameters", "dBSubnetGroupName")
    if subnet_group:
        context["subnet_group_modified"] = subnet_group
    return context

Analyst notes

  1. Find all RDS modification events by the user ARN in the 24 hours before the alert
  2. Check if this database has been made public before by searching for ModifyDBInstance events with publiclyAccessible in the past 90 days
  3. Look for database connection attempts from external IPs in the 6 hours after this modification
  4. Find all API calls from the sourceIPAddress in the 6 hours before and after the alert to identify other suspicious modifications
  5. Immediately revert publiclyAccessible to false if unauthorized, then review VPC security groups for overly permissive rules (0.0.0.0/0)
  6. Check RDS database logs for any access attempts from external IPs in the time window after this modification
Raw source AWS RDS Instance Modified to be Publicly Accessible · Panther Python
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Published by panther-labs/panther-analysis ↗, licensed under Apache 2.0 ↗. Reproduced here unmodified.
AnalysisType: rule
Filename: aws_rds_instance_made_public.py
RuleID: "AWS.RDS.InstanceMadePublic"
DisplayName: "AWS RDS Instance Modified to be Publicly Accessible"
Enabled: true
LogTypes:
  - AWS.CloudTrail
Tags:
  - AWS
  - Persistence
  - Defense Evasion
  - Initial Access
  - Account Manipulation
  - Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall
  - External Remote Services
  - RDS
Severity: Critical
Description: >
  Detects when an RDS instance or cluster is modified to become publicly accessible. This exposes
  the database to the internet and is used by attackers for persistence or data exfiltration.
  This detects the modification event in real-time, unlike static policy checks.
Runbook: |
  1. Find all RDS modification events by the user ARN in the 24 hours before the alert
  2. Check if this database has been made public before by searching for ModifyDBInstance events with publiclyAccessible in the past 90 days
  3. Look for database connection attempts from external IPs in the 6 hours after this modification
  3. Find all API calls from the sourceIPAddress in the 6 hours before and after the alert to identify other suspicious modifications
  4. Immediately revert publiclyAccessible to false if unauthorized, then review VPC security groups for overly permissive rules (0.0.0.0/0)
  5. Check RDS database logs for any access attempts from external IPs in the time window after this modification
Reference: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonRDS/latest/UserGuide/USER_VPC.WorkingWithRDSInstanceinaVPC.html
Reports:
  MITRE ATT&CK:
    - TA0003:T1098  # Account Manipulation
    - TA0005:T1562.007  # Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall
    - TA0001:T1133  # External Remote Services
DedupPeriodMinutes: 60
SummaryAttributes:
  - eventName
  - userIdentity:principalId
  - requestParameters:dBInstanceIdentifier
  - requestParameters:dBClusterIdentifier
  - requestParameters:publiclyAccessible
  - p_any_aws_account_ids
Threshold: 1
Tests:
  - Name: RDS Instance Made Public
    ExpectedResult: true
    Log:
      eventVersion: "1.08"
      userIdentity:
        type: AssumedRole
        principalId: "AIDAI23HXS3EXAMPLE:developer"
        arn: "arn:aws:sts::123456789012:assumed-role/DeveloperRole/developer"
        accountId: "123456789012"
        accessKeyId: "ASIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE"
        sessionContext:
          sessionIssuer:
            type: Role
            principalId: "AIDAI23HXS3EXAMPLE"
            arn: "arn:aws:iam::123456789012:role/DeveloperRole"
            accountId: "123456789012"
            userName: DeveloperRole
      eventTime: "2024-01-15T16:45:00Z"
      eventSource: rds.amazonaws.com
      eventName: ModifyDBInstance
      awsRegion: us-east-1
      sourceIPAddress: "203.0.113.45"
      userAgent: "aws-cli/2.13.0"
      requestParameters:
        dBInstanceIdentifier: "production-db"
        publiclyAccessible: true
        applyImmediately: true
      responseElements:
        dBInstanceIdentifier: "production-db"
        dBInstanceStatus: "modifying"
        publiclyAccessible: true
        pendingModifiedValues:
          publiclyAccessible: true
      requestID: "a1b2c3d4-e5f6-7890-abcd-ef1234567890"
      eventID: "f1e2d3c4-b5a6-7890-1234-567890abcdef"
      readOnly: false
      eventType: AwsApiCall
      managementEvent: true
      recipientAccountId: "123456789012"
      eventCategory: Management

  - Name: RDS Cluster Made Public with Security Group Changes
    ExpectedResult: true
    Log:
      eventVersion: "1.08"
      userIdentity:
        type: IAMUser
        principalId: "AIDAI23HXS3EXAMPLE"
        arn: "arn:aws:iam::123456789012:user/contractor"
        accountId: "123456789012"
        accessKeyId: "AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE"
        userName: contractor
      eventTime: "2024-01-15T16:45:00Z"
      eventSource: rds.amazonaws.com
      eventName: ModifyDBCluster
      awsRegion: us-west-2
      sourceIPAddress: "198.51.100.10"
      userAgent: "Boto3/1.26.0"
      requestParameters:
        dBClusterIdentifier: "aurora-cluster"
        publiclyAccessible: true
        vPCSecurityGroupIds:
          - "sg-0123456789abcdef0"
        applyImmediately: true
      responseElements:
        dBClusterIdentifier: "aurora-cluster"
        status: "modifying"
        publiclyAccessible: true
      requestID: "b2c3d4e5-f6a7-8901-bcde-f1234567890a"
      eventID: "g2f3e4d5-c6b7-8901-2345-678901bcdefg"
      readOnly: false
      eventType: AwsApiCall
      managementEvent: true
      recipientAccountId: "123456789012"
      eventCategory: Management

  - Name: RDS Instance Made Private - No Alert
    ExpectedResult: false
    Log:
      eventVersion: "1.08"
      userIdentity:
        type: AssumedRole
        principalId: "AIDAI23HXS3EXAMPLE:admin"
        arn: "arn:aws:sts::123456789012:assumed-role/AdminRole/admin"
        accountId: "123456789012"
        accessKeyId: "ASIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE"
      eventTime: "2024-01-15T16:45:00Z"
      eventSource: rds.amazonaws.com
      eventName: ModifyDBInstance
      awsRegion: us-east-1
      sourceIPAddress: "10.0.1.100"
      userAgent: "console.amazonaws.com"
      requestParameters:
        dBInstanceIdentifier: "production-db"
        publiclyAccessible: false
        applyImmediately: true
      responseElements:
        dBInstanceIdentifier: "production-db"
        dBInstanceStatus: "modifying"
        publiclyAccessible: false
      requestID: "c3d4e5f6-a7b8-9012-cdef-1234567890ab"
      eventID: "h3g4f5e6-d7c8-9012-3456-789012cdefgh"
      readOnly: false
      eventType: AwsApiCall
      managementEvent: true
      recipientAccountId: "123456789012"
      eventCategory: Management

  - Name: RDS Modification Without Public Access Change
    ExpectedResult: false
    Log:
      eventVersion: "1.08"
      userIdentity:
        type: AssumedRole
        principalId: "AIDAI23HXS3EXAMPLE:user"
        arn: "arn:aws:sts::123456789012:assumed-role/DBARole/user"
        accountId: "123456789012"
        accessKeyId: "ASIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE"
      eventTime: "2024-01-15T16:45:00Z"
      eventSource: rds.amazonaws.com
      eventName: ModifyDBInstance
      awsRegion: us-east-1
      sourceIPAddress: "10.0.1.50"
      userAgent: "aws-cli/2.13.0"
      requestParameters:
        dBInstanceIdentifier: "production-db"
        allocatedStorage: 200
        applyImmediately: false
      responseElements:
        dBInstanceIdentifier: "production-db"
        dBInstanceStatus: "modifying"
        allocatedStorage: 200
      requestID: "d4e5f6a7-b8c9-0123-def0-1234567890bc"
      eventID: "i4h5g6f7-e8d9-0123-4567-890123defghi"
      readOnly: false
      eventType: AwsApiCall
      managementEvent: true
      recipientAccountId: "123456789012"
      eventCategory: Management

  - Name: RDS Modification Failed
    ExpectedResult: false
    Log:
      eventVersion: "1.08"
      userIdentity:
        type: IAMUser
        principalId: "AIDAI23HXS3EXAMPLE"
        arn: "arn:aws:iam::123456789012:user/developer"
        accountId: "123456789012"
        accessKeyId: "AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE"
        userName: developer
      eventTime: "2024-01-15T16:45:00Z"
      eventSource: rds.amazonaws.com
      eventName: ModifyDBInstance
      awsRegion: us-east-1
      sourceIPAddress: "10.0.2.100"
      userAgent: "aws-cli/2.13.0"
      requestParameters:
        dBInstanceIdentifier: "production-db"
        publiclyAccessible: true
      errorCode: AccessDenied
      errorMessage: "User is not authorized to perform: rds:ModifyDBInstance"
      requestID: "e5f6a7b8-c9d0-1234-ef01-234567890bcd"
      eventID: "j5i6h7g8-f9e0-1234-5678-901234efghij"
      readOnly: false
      eventType: AwsApiCall
      managementEvent: true
      recipientAccountId: "123456789012"
      eventCategory: Management


# ------ paired body: aws_rds_instance_made_public.py ------

from panther_aws_helpers import aws_rds_context


def rule(event):
    if event.get("eventSource") != "rds.amazonaws.com":
        return False
    modify_events = ["ModifyDBInstance", "ModifyDBCluster"]
    if event.get("eventName") not in modify_events:
        return False
    if event.deep_get("errorCode") is not None:
        return False
    publicly_accessible = event.deep_get("requestParameters", "publiclyAccessible", default=None)
    if publicly_accessible is True:
        return True
    return False


def title(event):
    event_name = event.get("eventName", "Unknown")
    db_identifier = event.deep_get("requestParameters", "dBInstanceIdentifier") or event.deep_get(
        "requestParameters", "dBClusterIdentifier", default="<UNKNOWN>"
    )
    user = event.deep_get("userIdentity", "userName") or event.deep_get(
        "userIdentity", "principalId", default="<UNKNOWN_USER>"
    )
    resource_type = "Instance" if event_name == "ModifyDBInstance" else "Cluster"
    return f"RDS {resource_type} Made Public: [{db_identifier}] by [{user}]"


def alert_context(event):
    context = aws_rds_context(event)
    context["publicly_accessible"] = event.deep_get(
        "requestParameters", "publiclyAccessible", default="N/A"
    )
    context["apply_immediately"] = event.deep_get(
        "requestParameters", "applyImmediately", default="N/A"
    )
    vpc_security_groups = event.deep_get("requestParameters", "vPCSecurityGroupIds", default=None)
    if vpc_security_groups:
        context["vpc_security_groups_modified"] = vpc_security_groups
    subnet_group = event.deep_get("requestParameters", "dBSubnetGroupName")
    if subnet_group:
        context["subnet_group_modified"] = subnet_group
    return context

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