Crowdstrike Credential Dumping Tool


Description

Detects execution of credential dumping tools like Mimikatz, ProcDump, and Lazagne that extract passwords, hashes, and Kerberos tickets from memory and credential stores. These tools enable lateral movement, privilege escalation, and persistent access by allowing attackers to authenticate as legitimate users. This detection identifies a critical attack phase where adversaries transition from initial compromise to broader network access.

Query · python

from panther_crowdstrike_fdr_helpers import crowdstrike_detection_alert_context

CREDENTIAL_DUMPING_TOOLS = {
    "mimikatz.exe",
    "secretsdump.py",
    "pwdump.exe",
    "fgdump.exe",
    "gsecdump.exe",
    "samdump2.exe",
    "quarks-pwdump.exe",
    "cachedump.exe",
    "lsadump.exe",
    "procdump.exe",
    "mimipenguin.sh",
    "mimidogz.ps1",
    "logonpasswords.exe",
    "pypykatz.exe",
    "dsusers.py",
    "ntdsgrab.py",
    "lazagne.exe",
    "creddump7.exe",
    "keethief.ps1",
    "inveigh.exe",
    "sharpkatz.exe",
    "dumpert.exe",
    "hivedump.exe",
    "kerbrute.exe",
    "sessiongopher.ps1",
}


def rule(event):
    if event.get("fdr_event_type", "") == "ProcessRollup2":
        if event.get("event_platform", "") == "Win":
            process_name = (
                event.deep_get("event", "ImageFileName", default="").lower().split("\\")[-1]
            )
            if process_name in CREDENTIAL_DUMPING_TOOLS:
                return True
    return False


def title(event):
    tool = (
        event.deep_get("event", "ImageFileName", default="<TOOL_NOT_FOUND>").lower().split("\\")[-1]
    )
    host = event.get("ComputerName") or event.get("aid", "<AID_NOT_FOUND>")
    return f"Crowdstrike: Credential dumping tool [{tool}] detected on host [{host}]"


def alert_context(event):
    return crowdstrike_detection_alert_context(event)

Analyst notes

  1. Review the process tree in CrowdStrike for event:ParentBaseFileName and event:SourceProcessId to determine what launched the credential dumping tool and identify if this was manual execution or automated malware
  2. Search CrowdStrike logs and Windows Event Logs for all users who logged into the affected host (aid and aip) in the 7 days before this alert, then hunt for lateral movement attempts from those user accounts to other systems
  3. Query CrowdStrike for the event:SHA256HashData across all endpoints to identify if the same credential dumping tool was executed on other hosts in the environment
Raw source Crowdstrike Credential Dumping Tool · Panther Python
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Published by panther-labs/panther-analysis ↗, licensed under Apache 2.0 ↗. Reproduced here unmodified.
AnalysisType: rule
Description: >
  Detects execution of credential dumping tools like Mimikatz, ProcDump, and Lazagne that extract passwords, hashes, and Kerberos tickets from memory and credential stores. These tools enable lateral movement, privilege escalation, and persistent access by allowing attackers to authenticate as legitimate users. This detection identifies a critical attack phase where adversaries transition from initial compromise to broader network access.
DisplayName: "Crowdstrike Credential Dumping Tool"
Enabled: true
Filename: crowdstrike_credential_dumping_tool.py
Reference: https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/adversary-credential-theft/
Severity: Critical
Tags:
  - CrowdStrike
  - Windows
  - Credential Access
  - Post-Exploitation
  - Lateral Movement
  - Endpoint Detection
Runbook: |
  1. Review the process tree in CrowdStrike for event:ParentBaseFileName and event:SourceProcessId to determine what launched the credential dumping tool and identify if this was manual execution or automated malware
  2. Search CrowdStrike logs and Windows Event Logs for all users who logged into the affected host (aid and aip) in the 7 days before this alert, then hunt for lateral movement attempts from those user accounts to other systems
  3. Query CrowdStrike for the event:SHA256HashData across all endpoints to identify if the same credential dumping tool was executed on other hosts in the environment
Reports:
  MITRE ATT&CK:
    - TA0006:T1003
    - TA0006:T1003.001
Tests:
  - ExpectedResult: true
    Log:
      aid: 1234567890abcdefg654321
      aip: 11.10.9.8
      cid: abcdefghijklmnop123467890
      configbuild: 1007.3.0016606.11
      configstatehash: "3799024366"
      entitlements: "15"
      event:
        AuthenticationId: "293628"
        AuthenticodeHashData: 5540c470218d209b7c3eca3d12e190580814d566
        CommandLine: C:\Windows\System32\mimikatz.exe
        ConfigBuild: 1007.3.0016606.11
        ConfigStateHash: "3799024366"
        EffectiveTransmissionClass: "2"
        Entitlements: "15"
        ImageFileName: \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Windows\System32\mimikatz.exe
        ImageSubsystem: "3"
        IntegrityLevel: "12288"
        MD5HashData: 5fd22b915c232378e567160d641cc9f2
        ParentAuthenticationId: "293628"
        ParentBaseFileName: pwsh.exe
        ParentProcessId: "4370948876"
        ProcessCreateFlags: "0"
        ProcessEndTime: ""
        ProcessParameterFlags: "24577"
        ProcessStartTime: "1682106752.006"
        ProcessSxsFlags: "64"
        RawProcessId: "1468"
        SHA1HashData: "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
        SHA256HashData: 488e74e2026d03f21b33f470c23b3de2f466643186c2e06ae7b4883cc2e59377
        SessionId: "2"
        SignInfoFlags: "8683538"
        SourceProcessId: "4370948876"
        SourceThreadId: "6364981533"
        Tags: 25, 27, 40, 151, 874, 924, 12094627905582, 12094627906234, 237494511599633
        TargetProcessId: "4390327988"
        TokenType: "1"
        TreeId: "4295752857"
        UserSid: S-1-5-21-239183934-720705223-383019856-500
        aid: 1234567890abcdefg654321
        aip: 11.10.9.8
        cid: abcdefghijklmnop123467890
        event_platform: Win
        event_simpleName: ProcessRollup2
        id: 081d64d7-17fb-40c0-8767-48ff1e2ee2dd
        name: ProcessRollup2V19
        timestamp: "1682106752722"
      event_platform: Win
      event_simplename: ProcessRollup2
      fdr_event_type: ProcessRollup2
      id: 081d64d7-17fb-40c0-8767-48ff1e2ee2dd
      name: ProcessRollup2V19
      p_any_ip_addresses:
        - 11.10.9.8
      p_any_md5_hashes:
        - 5fd22b915c232378e567160d641cc9f2
        - 1234567890abcdefg654321
        - abcdefghijklmnop123467890
      p_any_sha1_hashes:
        - "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
      p_any_sha256_hashes:
        - 488e74e2026d03f21b33f470c23b3de2f466643186c2e06ae7b4883cc2e59377
      p_any_trace_ids:
        - "4295752857"
        - 1234567890abcdefg654321
        - abcdefghijklmnop123467890
      p_event_time: "2023-04-21 19:52:32.722"
      p_log_type: Crowdstrike.FDREvent
      p_parse_time: "2023-04-21 20:05:52.94"
      p_row_id: 7ac82dbb43a99bfec196bdda178c8101
      p_schema_version: 0
      p_source_id: 1f33f64c-124d-413c-a9e3-d51ccedd8e77
      p_source_label: Crowdstrike-FDR-Dev
      timestamp: "2023-04-21 19:52:32.722"
      treeid: "4295752857"
    Name: mimikatz
  - ExpectedResult: false
    Log:
      aid: 1234567890abcdefg654321
      aip: 11.10.9.8
      cid: abcdefghijklmnop123467890
      configbuild: 1007.3.0016606.11
      configstatehash: "3799024366"
      entitlements: "15"
      event:
        AuthenticationId: "293628"
        AuthenticodeHashData: 5540c470218d209b7c3eca3d12e190580814d566
        CommandLine: '"C:\Windows\System32\at.exe" at 09:00 /interactive /every:m,t,w,th,f,s,su'
        ConfigBuild: 1007.3.0016606.11
        ConfigStateHash: "3799024366"
        EffectiveTransmissionClass: "2"
        Entitlements: "15"
        ImageFileName: \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Windows\System32\at.exe
        ImageSubsystem: "3"
        IntegrityLevel: "12288"
        MD5HashData: 5fd22b915c232378e567160d641cc9f2
        ParentAuthenticationId: "293628"
        ParentBaseFileName: pwsh.exe
        ParentProcessId: "4370948876"
        ProcessCreateFlags: "0"
        ProcessEndTime: ""
        ProcessParameterFlags: "24577"
        ProcessStartTime: "1682106752.006"
        ProcessSxsFlags: "64"
        RawProcessId: "1468"
        SHA1HashData: "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
        SHA256HashData: 488e74e2026d03f21b33f470c23b3de2f466643186c2e06ae7b4883cc2e59377
        SessionId: "2"
        SignInfoFlags: "8683538"
        SourceProcessId: "4370948876"
        SourceThreadId: "6364981533"
        Tags: 25, 27, 40, 151, 874, 924, 12094627905582, 12094627906234, 237494511599633
        TargetProcessId: "4390327988"
        TokenType: "1"
        TreeId: "4295752857"
        UserSid: S-1-5-21-239183934-720705223-383019856-500
        aid: 1234567890abcdefg654321
        aip: 11.10.9.8
        cid: abcdefghijklmnop123467890
        event_platform: Win
        event_simpleName: ProcessRollup2
        id: 081d64d7-17fb-40c0-8767-48ff1e2ee2dd
        name: ProcessRollup2V19
        timestamp: "1682106752722"
      event_platform: Win
      event_simplename: ProcessRollup2
      fdr_event_type: ProcessRollup2
      id: 081d64d7-17fb-40c0-8767-48ff1e2ee2dd
      name: ProcessRollup2V19
      p_any_ip_addresses:
        - 11.10.9.8
      p_any_md5_hashes:
        - 5fd22b915c232378e567160d641cc9f2
        - 1234567890abcdefg654321
        - abcdefghijklmnop123467890
      p_any_sha1_hashes:
        - "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
      p_any_sha256_hashes:
        - 488e74e2026d03f21b33f470c23b3de2f466643186c2e06ae7b4883cc2e59377
      p_any_trace_ids:
        - "4295752857"
        - 1234567890abcdefg654321
        - abcdefghijklmnop123467890
      p_event_time: "2023-04-21 19:52:32.722"
      p_log_type: Crowdstrike.FDREvent
      p_parse_time: "2023-04-21 20:05:52.94"
      p_row_id: 7ac82dbb43a99bfec196bdda178c8101
      p_schema_version: 0
      p_source_id: 1f33f64c-124d-413c-a9e3-d51ccedd8e77
      p_source_label: Crowdstrike-FDR-Dev
      timestamp: "2023-04-21 19:52:32.722"
      treeid: "4295752857"
    Name: Other Event
DedupPeriodMinutes: 60
LogTypes:
  - Crowdstrike.FDREvent
RuleID: "Crowdstrike.Credential.Dumping.Tool"
Threshold: 1


# ------ paired body: crowdstrike_credential_dumping_tool.py ------

from panther_crowdstrike_fdr_helpers import crowdstrike_detection_alert_context

CREDENTIAL_DUMPING_TOOLS = {
    "mimikatz.exe",
    "secretsdump.py",
    "pwdump.exe",
    "fgdump.exe",
    "gsecdump.exe",
    "samdump2.exe",
    "quarks-pwdump.exe",
    "cachedump.exe",
    "lsadump.exe",
    "procdump.exe",
    "mimipenguin.sh",
    "mimidogz.ps1",
    "logonpasswords.exe",
    "pypykatz.exe",
    "dsusers.py",
    "ntdsgrab.py",
    "lazagne.exe",
    "creddump7.exe",
    "keethief.ps1",
    "inveigh.exe",
    "sharpkatz.exe",
    "dumpert.exe",
    "hivedump.exe",
    "kerbrute.exe",
    "sessiongopher.ps1",
}


def rule(event):
    if event.get("fdr_event_type", "") == "ProcessRollup2":
        if event.get("event_platform", "") == "Win":
            process_name = (
                event.deep_get("event", "ImageFileName", default="").lower().split("\\")[-1]
            )
            if process_name in CREDENTIAL_DUMPING_TOOLS:
                return True
    return False


def title(event):
    tool = (
        event.deep_get("event", "ImageFileName", default="<TOOL_NOT_FOUND>").lower().split("\\")[-1]
    )
    host = event.get("ComputerName") or event.get("aid", "<AID_NOT_FOUND>")
    return f"Crowdstrike: Credential dumping tool [{tool}] detected on host [{host}]"


def alert_context(event):
    return crowdstrike_detection_alert_context(event)

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