Okta Identity Provider Sign-in

Description

A user has signed in using a 3rd party Identity Provider. Attackers have been observed configuring a second Identity Provider to act as an "impersonation app" to access applications within the compromised Org on behalf of other users. This second Identity Provider, also controlled by the attacker, would act as a “source” IdP in an inbound federation relationship (sometimes called “Org2Org”) with the target. From this “source” IdP, the threat actor manipulated the username parameter for targeted users in the second “source” Identity Provider to match a real user in the compromised “target” Identity Provider. This provided the ability to Single sign-on (SSO) into applications in the target IdP as the targeted user. Do not use this rule if your organization uses legitimate 3rd-party Identity Providers.

Query · python

from panther_okta_helpers import okta_alert_context


def rule(event):
    return event.get("eventType") == "user.authentication.auth_via_IDP"


def title(event):
    target = event.deep_walk(
        "target", "displayName", default="displayName-not-found", return_val="first"
    )
    return (
        f"{event.deep_get('actor', 'displayName', default='<displayName-not-found>')} "
        f"<{event.deep_get('actor', 'alternateId', default='alternateId-not-found')}> "
        f"signed in via 3rd party Identity Provider to {target}"
    )


def alert_context(event):
    return okta_alert_context(event)
Raw source Okta Identity Provider Sign-in · Panther Python
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Published by panther-labs/panther-analysis ↗, licensed under Apache 2.0 ↗. Reproduced here unmodified. 
AnalysisType: rule
Filename: okta_idp_signin.py
RuleID: "Okta.Identity.Provider.SignIn"
DisplayName: "Okta Identity Provider Sign-in"
Enabled: false
LogTypes:
  - Okta.SystemLog
Tags:
  - Configuration Required
Reports:
  MITRE ATT&CK:
    - TA0001:T1199 # Trusted Relationship
    - TA0003:T1098 # Account Manipulation
Severity: High
Description: >
  A user has signed in using a 3rd party Identity Provider.
  Attackers have been observed configuring a second Identity Provider to act as an "impersonation app"
  to access applications within the compromised Org on behalf of other users. This second Identity Provider,
  also controlled by the attacker, would act as a “source” IdP in an inbound federation relationship
  (sometimes called “Org2Org”) with the target.
  From this “source” IdP, the threat actor manipulated the username parameter for targeted users in the second
  “source” Identity Provider to match a real user in the compromised “target” Identity Provider.
  This provided the ability to Single sign-on (SSO) into applications in the target IdP as the targeted user.
  Do not use this rule if your organization uses legitimate 3rd-party Identity Providers.
Reference: >
  https://sec.okta.com/articles/2023/08/cross-tenant-impersonation-prevention-and-detection
DedupPeriodMinutes: 30
Threshold: 1
Tests:
  - ExpectedResult: false
    Log:
      actor:
        alternateId: homer.simpson@duff.com
        displayName: Homer Simpson
        id: 00abc123
        type: User
      authenticationcontext:
        authenticationStep: 0
        externalSessionId: 100-abc-9999
      client:
        device: Computer
        geographicalContext:
          city: Springfield
          country: United States
          geolocation:
            lat: 20
            lon: -25
          postalCode: "12345"
          state: Ohio
        ipAddress: 1.3.2.4
        userAgent:
          browser: CHROME
          os: Mac OS X
          rawUserAgent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/102.0.0.0 Safari/537.36
        zone: "null"
      debugcontext:
        debugData:
          requestId: AbCdEf12G
          requestUri: /api/v1/users/AbCdEfG/lifecycle/reset_factors
          url: /api/v1/users/AbCdEfG/lifecycle/reset_factors?
      displaymessage: Authentication of user via MFA
      eventtype: user.authentication.auth_via_mfa
      legacyeventtype: core.user.factor.attempt_fail
      outcome:
        reason: INVALID_CREDENTIALS
        result: FAILURE
      published: "2022-06-22 18:18:29.015"
      request:
        ipChain:
          - geographicalContext:
              city: Springfield
              country: United States
              geolocation:
                lat: 20
                lon: -25
              postalCode: "12345"
              state: Ohio
            ip: 1.3.2.4
            version: V4
      securitycontext:
        asNumber: 701
        asOrg: verizon
        domain: verizon.net
        isProxy: false
        isp: verizon
      severity: INFO
      target:
        - alternateId: peter.griffin@company.com
          displayName: Peter Griffin
          id: 0002222AAAA
          type: User
      transaction:
        detail: {}
        id: ABcDeFgG
        type: WEB
      uuid: AbC-123-XyZ
      version: "0"
    Name: Other Event
  - ExpectedResult: true
    Log:
      actor:
        alternateId: homer.simpson@duff.com
        displayName: Homer Simpson
        id: 00abc123
        type: User
      authenticationcontext:
        authenticationStep: 0
        externalSessionId: 100-abc-9999
      client:
        device: Computer
        geographicalContext:
          city: Springfield
          country: United States
          geolocation:
            lat: 20
            lon: -25
          postalCode: "12345"
          state: Ohio
        ipAddress: 1.3.2.4
        userAgent:
          browser: CHROME
          os: Mac OS X
          rawUserAgent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/102.0.0.0 Safari/537.36
        zone: "null"
      debugcontext:
        debugData:
          requestId: AbCdEf12G
          requestUri: /api/v1/users/AbCdEfG/lifecycle/reset_factors
          url: /api/v1/users/AbCdEfG/lifecycle/reset_factors?
      displaymessage: Authentication of user via MFA
      eventtype: user.authentication.auth_via_IDP
      legacyeventtype: core.user.factor.attempt_fail
      outcome:
        result: SUCCESS
      published: "2022-06-22 18:18:29.015"
      request:
        ipChain:
          - geographicalContext:
              city: Springfield
              country: United States
              geolocation:
                lat: 20
                lon: -25
              postalCode: "12345"
              state: Ohio
            ip: 1.3.2.4
            version: V4
      securitycontext:
        asNumber: 701
        asOrg: verizon
        domain: verizon.net
        isProxy: false
        isp: verizon
      severity: INFO
      target:
        - alternateId: peter.griffin@company.com
          displayName: Peter Griffin
          id: 0002222AAAA
          type: User
      transaction:
        detail: {}
        id: ABcDeFgG
        type: WEB
      uuid: AbC-123-XyZ
      version: "0"
    Name: FastPass Phishing Block Event


# ------ paired body: okta_idp_signin.py ------

from panther_okta_helpers import okta_alert_context


def rule(event):
    return event.get("eventType") == "user.authentication.auth_via_IDP"


def title(event):
    target = event.deep_walk(
        "target", "displayName", default="displayName-not-found", return_val="first"
    )
    return (
        f"{event.deep_get('actor', 'displayName', default='<displayName-not-found>')} "
        f"<{event.deep_get('actor', 'alternateId', default='alternateId-not-found')}> "
        f"signed in via 3rd party Identity Provider to {target}"
    )


def alert_context(event):
    return okta_alert_context(event)

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