Windows Local Administrator Credential Stuffing

Description

The following analytic detects attempts to authenticate using the built-in local Administrator account across more than 30 endpoints within a 5-minute window. It leverages Windows Event Logs, specifically events 4625 and 4624, to identify this behavior. This activity is significant as it may indicate an adversary attempting to validate stolen local credentials across multiple hosts, potentially leading to privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, this could allow the attacker to gain widespread access and control over numerous systems within the network, posing a severe security risk.

Query · spl

`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4625 OR EventCode=4624 Logon_Type=3 TargetUserName=Administrator
  | bucket span=5m _time
  | stats dc(Computer) AS unique_targets values(Computer) as host_targets values(dest) as dest values(src) as src values(user) as user
    BY _time, IpAddress, TargetUserName,
       EventCode, action, app,
       authentication_method, signature, signature_id
  | where unique_targets > 30
  | `windows_local_administrator_credential_stuffing_filter`

Implementation guide

To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Event Logs from domain controllers as well as member servers and workstations. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting Audit Logon within Logon/Logoff needs to be enabled.

Known false positives

  • Vulnerability scanners or system administration tools may also trigger this detection. Filter as needed.

Analyst notes

Known false positives: Vulnerability scanners or system administration tools may also trigger this detection. Filter as needed.

Raw source Windows Local Administrator Credential Stuffing · SPL
Esc
Published by splunk/security_content ↗, licensed under Apache 2.0 ↗. Reproduced here unmodified. 
name: Windows Local Administrator Credential Stuffing
id: 09555511-aca6-484a-b6ab-72cd03d73c34
version: 13
creation_date: '2023-03-22'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Mauricio Velazco, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic detects attempts to authenticate using the built-in local Administrator account across more than 30 endpoints within a 5-minute window. It leverages Windows Event Logs, specifically events 4625 and 4624, to identify this behavior. This activity is significant as it may indicate an adversary attempting to validate stolen local credentials across multiple hosts, potentially leading to privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, this could allow the attacker to gain widespread access and control over numerous systems within the network, posing a severe security risk.
data_source:
    - Windows Event Log Security 4624
    - Windows Event Log Security 4625
search: |-
    `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4625 OR EventCode=4624 Logon_Type=3 TargetUserName=Administrator
      | bucket span=5m _time
      | stats dc(Computer) AS unique_targets values(Computer) as host_targets values(dest) as dest values(src) as src values(user) as user
        BY _time, IpAddress, TargetUserName,
           EventCode, action, app,
           authentication_method, signature, signature_id
      | where unique_targets > 30
      | `windows_local_administrator_credential_stuffing_filter`
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Event Logs from domain controllers as well as member servers and workstations. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Logon` within `Logon/Logoff` needs to be enabled.
known_false_positives: Vulnerability scanners or system administration tools may also trigger this detection. Filter as needed.
references:
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/004/
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/
    - https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/wide-spread-local-admin-testing/
    - https://www.pentestpartners.com/security-blog/admin-password-re-use-dont-do-it/
    - https://www.praetorian.com/blog/microsofts-local-administrator-password-solution-laps/
    - https://wiki.porchetta.industries/smb-protocol/password-spraying
drilldown_searches:
    - name: View the detection results for - "$host_targets$"
      search: '%original_detection_search% | search  host_targets = "$host_targets$"'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
    - name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$host_targets$"
      search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$host_targets$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
      earliest_offset: 7d
      latest_offset: "0"
finding:
    title: Local Administrator credential stuffing attack coming from $IpAddress$
    entity:
        field: host_targets
        type: system
        score: 50
threat_objects:
    - field: IpAddress
      type: ip_address
analytic_story:
    - Active Directory Privilege Escalation
    - Active Directory Lateral Movement
    - Scattered Lapsus$ Hunters
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1110.004
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110.004/local_administrator_cred_stuffing/windows-security.log
          source: XmlWinEventLog:Security
          sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
      test_type: unit

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