Windows Cmd Command Line With Encoded Character Sequences


Description

The following analytic detects cmd.exe command lines that contain long sequences of encoded characters, such as decimal values (12;70;18;...), hexadecimal values (0x41,0x42,...), HTML entities, or Unicode and octal escapes. This activity is significant because loaders, including ClickFix payloads that retrieve commands through finger, hide their next stage as an index list that cmd.exe decodes at runtime using delayed variable expansion before launching PowerShell. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to execution of a hidden payload, such as a download cradle with an AMSI bypass.

Query · spl

| tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
  count min(_time) as firstTime
        max(_time) as lastTime

FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE

(
    Processes.process_name=cmd.exe
    OR
    Processes.original_file_name=Cmd.Exe
)
NOT Processes.process = "*nmap*"
NOT Processes.process = "* tsx *"

by Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
   Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
   Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
   Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid Processes.process_hash
   Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.process_name Processes.process_path
   Processes.user Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product

| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`

| regex process="(?i)(?:\\d{1,3}[;\\s,]){12,}|(?:0x[A-Fa-f0-9]{2}[;\\s,]?){12,}|(?:&#x?[A-Za-z0-9]{2,3}[;\\s,]?){12,}|(?:\\\\u[A-Fa-f0-9]{4}[;\\s,]?){12,}|(?:\\\\u\\{[A-Fa-f0-9]+\\}[;\\s,]?){12,}|(?:\\\\\\d{3}[;\\s,]?){12,}"

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_cmd_command_line_with_encoded_character_sequences_filter`

Implementation guide

The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the Processes node of the Endpoint data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.

Known false positives

  • Scripts that legitimately pass long lists of numbers, byte values or escaped characters to cmd.exe (for example network scanners, build tooling or data processing batch files) may be returned. Filter by parent process or command line as needed.

Analyst notes

Known false positives: Scripts that legitimately pass long lists of numbers, byte values or escaped characters to cmd.exe (for example network scanners, build tooling or data processing batch files) may be returned. Filter by parent process or command line as needed.

Raw source Windows Cmd Command Line With Encoded Character Sequences · SPL
Esc
Published by splunk/security_content ↗, licensed under Apache 2.0 ↗. Reproduced here unmodified.
name: Windows Cmd Command Line With Encoded Character Sequences
id: 155020ba-3fd8-4109-a83d-091aeb966dba
version: 1
creation_date: '2026-11-12'
modification_date: '2026-11-12'
author: Onur Mustafa Erdogan, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: |
    The following analytic detects cmd.exe command lines that contain long sequences of encoded characters, such as decimal values (12;70;18;...), hexadecimal values (0x41,0x42,...), HTML entities, or Unicode and octal escapes.
    This activity is significant because loaders, including ClickFix payloads that retrieve commands through finger, hide their next stage as an index list that cmd.exe decodes at runtime using delayed variable expansion before launching PowerShell.
    If confirmed malicious, this could lead to execution of a hidden payload, such as a download cradle with an AMSI bypass.
data_source:
    - Sysmon EventID 1
    - Windows Event Log Security 4688
    - CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
search: |
    | tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
      count min(_time) as firstTime
            max(_time) as lastTime

    FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE

    (
        Processes.process_name=cmd.exe
        OR
        Processes.original_file_name=Cmd.Exe
    )
    NOT Processes.process = "*nmap*"
    NOT Processes.process = "* tsx *"

    by Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
       Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
       Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
       Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid Processes.process_hash
       Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.process_name Processes.process_path
       Processes.user Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product

    | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`

    | regex process="(?i)(?:\\d{1,3}[;\\s,]){12,}|(?:0x[A-Fa-f0-9]{2}[;\\s,]?){12,}|(?:&#x?[A-Za-z0-9]{2,3}[;\\s,]?){12,}|(?:\\\\u[A-Fa-f0-9]{4}[;\\s,]?){12,}|(?:\\\\u\\{[A-Fa-f0-9]+\\}[;\\s,]?){12,}|(?:\\\\\\d{3}[;\\s,]?){12,}"

    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
    | `windows_cmd_command_line_with_encoded_character_sequences_filter`
how_to_implement: |
    The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed.
    To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process.
    Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions.
    These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product.
    The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model.
    Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field
    names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: |
    Scripts that legitimately pass long lists of numbers, byte values or escaped characters to cmd.exe (for example network scanners, build tooling or data processing batch files) may be returned. Filter by parent process or command line as needed.
references:
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/010/
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140/
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003/
    - https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/security-brief-clickfix-social-engineering-technique-floods-threat-landscape
drilldown_searches:
    - name: View the detection results for - "$dest$"
      search: '%original_detection_search% | search  dest = "$dest$"'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
    - name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$dest$"
      search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$dest$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
      earliest_offset: 7d
      latest_offset: "0"
finding:
    title: An Encoded command line [$process$] was executed by [$parent_process_name$] on endpoint [$dest$] by user [$user$].
    entity:
        field: dest
        type: system
        score: 50
threat_objects:
    - field: process
      type: process
    - field: parent_process_name
      type: parent_process_name
analytic_story:
    - Fake CAPTCHA Campaigns
    - Deobfuscate-Decode Files or Information
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1027.010
    - T1140
    - T1059.003
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1027.010/windows_cmd_encoded_chars/windows_cmd_encoded_chars.log
          source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
          sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
      test_type: unit

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