Windows Cmd Command Line With Encoded Character Sequences
Description
The following analytic detects cmd.exe command lines that contain long sequences of encoded characters, such as decimal values (12;70;18;...), hexadecimal values (0x41,0x42,...), HTML entities, or Unicode and octal escapes. This activity is significant because loaders, including ClickFix payloads that retrieve commands through finger, hide their next stage as an index list that cmd.exe decodes at runtime using delayed variable expansion before launching PowerShell. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to execution of a hidden payload, such as a download cradle with an AMSI bypass.
Query · spl
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
count min(_time) as firstTime
max(_time) as lastTime
FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE
(
Processes.process_name=cmd.exe
OR
Processes.original_file_name=Cmd.Exe
)
NOT Processes.process = "*nmap*"
NOT Processes.process = "* tsx *"
by Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid Processes.process_hash
Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.process_name Processes.process_path
Processes.user Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| regex process="(?i)(?:\\d{1,3}[;\\s,]){12,}|(?:0x[A-Fa-f0-9]{2}[;\\s,]?){12,}|(?:&#x?[A-Za-z0-9]{2,3}[;\\s,]?){12,}|(?:\\\\u[A-Fa-f0-9]{4}[;\\s,]?){12,}|(?:\\\\u\\{[A-Fa-f0-9]+\\}[;\\s,]?){12,}|(?:\\\\\\d{3}[;\\s,]?){12,}"
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_cmd_command_line_with_encoded_character_sequences_filter`
Implementation guide
The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed.
To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process.
Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions.
These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product.
The logs must also be mapped to the Processes node of the Endpoint data model.
Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field
names and speed up the data modeling process.
Known false positives
- Scripts that legitimately pass long lists of numbers, byte values or escaped characters to cmd.exe (for example network scanners, build tooling or data processing batch files) may be returned. Filter by parent process or command line as needed.
Analyst notes
Known false positives: Scripts that legitimately pass long lists of numbers, byte values or escaped characters to cmd.exe (for example network scanners, build tooling or data processing batch files) may be returned. Filter by parent process or command line as needed.