HTTP Base64 Activity With JVM Errors


Description

The analytic associates each Zeek request containing a malformed Base64 value or a scripted decoder trigger with a nearby Base64-related HotSpot argument exception on the same server and Java PID. Sysmon child process, file creation, or process termination events from that PID add context and can raise confidence.

Query · spl

(
    `zeek_http_request_headers`
    header_name IN (
        "AUTHORIZATION",
        "HTTP2-SETTINGS",
        "CONTENT-TYPE",
        "CONTENT-DISPOSITION",
        "PRIORITY",
        "X-CONSOLEANNOTATOR",
        "X-CONNECT-AUTHORIZATION",
        "X-CSRF-TOKEN"
    )
    header_value="*=*"
    truncated=false
)
OR
(
    `zeek_http_post_body`
    body="*=*"
    truncated=false
)
OR
(
    `zeek_http_uri`
    uri IN ("*=*","*%3D*","*%3d*")
)
OR
(
    `java_hotspot_exceptions`
    (
        "*Input byte array has wrong*"
        OR
        "*IllegalArgumentException*"
        OR
        "*Base64$Decoder*"
        OR
        "*java/util/Base64*"
    )
)
OR
(
    `sysmon_linux`
    (
        (EventID=1 ParentImage="*/java")
        OR
        (EventID=5 Image="*/java")
        OR
        (
            EventID=11
            Image="*/java"
            NOT TargetFilename IN ("*/_state/*","*/indices/*")
        )
    )
)

| rex field=_raw "^\[(?<jvm_event_time_raw>[^\]]+)\]\[(?<jvm_pid_raw>\d+)\]\[(?<jvm_level_raw>[^\]]+)\]\[(?<jvm_tags_raw>[^\]]+)\]\s*(?<jvm_message_raw>.*)"

| eval jvm_pid=coalesce(jvm_pid_raw,jvm_pid),
       jvm_tags=coalesce(jvm_tags_raw,jvm_tags),
       jvm_message=coalesce(jvm_message_raw,jvm_message)


| eval event_time=_time,
       is_network=if(isnotnull('id.resp_h'),1,0)

| eval observed_target=if(is_network=1,'id.resp_h',coalesce(dest,host,dest_ip))

| eval request_value=case(
      isnotnull(header_name),header_value,
      isnotnull(body),body,
      is_network=1,urldecode(uri)
  ),
  carrier=case(
      isnotnull(header_name),header_name,
      isnotnull(body),"POST body",
      is_network=1,"URI"
  )

| where is_network=0 OR len(request_value)>=65

| eval malformed_b64=if(
      is_network=1
      AND match(request_value,"(?<![A-Za-z0-9+/_-])(?:(?:[A-Za-z0-9+/]{64})+(?:[A-Za-z0-9+/]{0,2}=|[A-Za-z0-9+/]?==)|(?:[A-Za-z0-9_-]{64})+(?:[A-Za-z0-9_-]{0,2}=|[A-Za-z0-9_-]?==))(?![A-Za-z0-9+/_=-])"),
      1,0
  ),
  scripted_b64=if(
      is_network=1 AND isnotnull(body)
      AND like(body,"%Base64.getDecoder()%")
      AND like(body,"%new byte[65]%")
      AND like(body,"%[64] = (byte)61%"),
      1,0
  )

| eval event_kind=case(
      is_network=1 AND (malformed_b64=1 OR scripted_b64=1),"request",
      isnotnull(jvm_pid) AND like(jvm_tags,"%exceptions%"),"jvm",
      EventID=1 OR EventID=5 OR EventID=11,"sysmon"
  )

| eval java_pid=case(
      event_kind="request","network",
      event_kind="jvm",tostring(jvm_pid),
      EventID=1,tostring(ParentProcessId),
      EventID=5 OR EventID=11,tostring(ProcessId)
  ),
  request_uid=if(event_kind="request",uid,"-")

| where isnotnull(event_kind)
        AND isnotnull(observed_target)
        AND isnotnull(java_pid)
        AND isnotnull(request_uid)

| eval argument_error=if(event_kind="jvm"
      AND match(jvm_message,"(?i)IllegalArgumentException|Input byte array has wrong"),1,0),
  decoder_evidence=if(event_kind="jvm"
      AND match(jvm_message,"Base64[$]Decoder|java/util/Base64|Input byte array has wrong"),1,0),
  shell_child=if(EventID=1
      AND match(Image,"/(ash|bash|csh|dash|eshell|fish|ion|ksh|mksh|rbash|sh|tcsh|zsh)$"),1,0),
  child_process=if(EventID=1,1,0),
  file_created=if(EventID=11,1,0),
  java_terminated=if(EventID=5,1,0),
  suspicious_file=if(EventID=11
      AND match(TargetFilename,"(?i)(?:[.](?:jsp|sh|so)$|/(?:tmp|var/tmp|dev/shm|webapps)/)"),1,0)

| eval request_marker=case(
      event_kind="request" AND scripted_b64=1,"scripted_decoder_trigger",
      event_kind="request" AND malformed_b64=1,"malformed_base64_request"
  ),
  src_ip=if(event_kind="request",'id.orig_h',null()),
  request_uri=if(event_kind="request",uri,null()),
  http_method=if(event_kind="request",method,null()),
  child_image=if(EventID=1,Image,null()),
  created_file=if(EventID=11,TargetFilename,null())

| bin _time span=1s

| stats min(event_time) AS first_seen
        max(event_time) AS last_seen
        max(argument_error) AS argument_error
        max(decoder_evidence) AS decoder_evidence
        max(shell_child) AS shell_child
        max(child_process) AS child_process
        max(file_created) AS file_created
        max(java_terminated) AS java_terminated
        max(suspicious_file) AS suspicious_file
        values(src_ip) AS src_ips
        values(request_uri) AS uris
        values(http_method) AS methods
        values(carrier) AS carriers
        values(request_marker) AS request_markers
        values(child_image) AS child_images
        values(created_file) AS created_files
        BY _time observed_target java_pid request_uid event_kind

| rename observed_target AS dest

| `get_asset(dest)`

| eval target=coalesce(dest_asset_id,dest),
       bucket=floor(first_seen/15)

| eval request_json=if(
      event_kind="request",
      json_object(
          "uid",request_uid,
          "time",first_seen,
          "src",mvindex(src_ips,0),
          "dest",dest,
          "uri",mvindex(uris,0),
          "method",mvindex(methods,0),
          "carrier",mvjoin(carriers,","),
          "marker",mvjoin(request_markers,",")
      ),
      null()
  ),
  bucket=if(
      event_kind="request",
      mvappend(tostring(bucket-1),tostring(bucket),tostring(bucket+1),tostring(bucket+2)),
      bucket
  )

| mvexpand bucket

| eventstats values(request_json) AS candidate_requests BY target bucket

| where event_kind!="request" AND isnotnull(candidate_requests)

| mvexpand candidate_requests

| eval request_uid=spath(candidate_requests,"uid"),
       request_time=tonumber(spath(candidate_requests,"time")),
       src=spath(candidate_requests,"src"),
       request_dest=spath(candidate_requests,"dest"),
       uri=spath(candidate_requests,"uri"),
       method=spath(candidate_requests,"method"),
       carrier=spath(candidate_requests,"carrier"),
       request_marker=spath(candidate_requests,"marker")

| where (event_kind="jvm"
         AND last_seen>=request_time-3
         AND first_seen<=request_time+15)
        OR
        (event_kind="sysmon"
         AND last_seen>=request_time-3
         AND first_seen<=request_time+30)

| stats min(request_time) AS request_time
        min(eval(if(argument_error=1,first_seen,null()))) AS exception_time
        max(last_seen) AS last_seen
        max(argument_error) AS argument_error
        max(decoder_evidence) AS decoder_evidence
        max(shell_child) AS shell_child
        max(child_process) AS child_process
        max(file_created) AS file_created
        max(java_terminated) AS java_terminated
        max(suspicious_file) AS suspicious_file
        values(src) AS src
        values(request_dest) AS dest_ips
        values(uri) AS uri
        values(method) AS method
        values(carrier) AS carrier
        values(request_marker) AS request_markers
        values(child_images) AS child_images
        values(created_files) AS created_files
        BY target request_uid java_pid

| where argument_error=1 AND decoder_evidence=1

| eval dest=mvindex(dest_ips,0),
       exception_delay=round(exception_time-request_time,3),
       confidence=case(
           shell_child>0 OR suspicious_file>0,"high",
           child_process>0 OR file_created>0 OR java_terminated>0,"medium",
           true(),"low"
       ),
       asset_id=target,
       firstTime=request_time,
       lastTime=last_seen

| fields - argument_error decoder_evidence shell_child child_process file_created java_terminated suspicious_file dest_ips

| sort 0 - firstTime

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `http_base64_activity_with_jvm_errors_filter`

Implementation guide

Configure zeek_http_uri, zeek_http_request_headers, zeek_http_post_body, and java_hotspot_exceptions for the indexes and sourcetypes in your environment. Configure sysmon_linux if you collect that optional source. Install the TA for Zeek for standard HTTP logs. To collect the optional header and POST-body streams, install the custom scripts from https://gist.github.com/nasbench/8581572459af92b7c30599f1068c791f (request headers) and https://gist.github.com/nasbench/4cd18a938056cbfbc8a9832edb26f4c4 (POST bodies), following the corresponding data source instructions. These scripts are not included with ESCU or the TA for Zeek. Ensure uid, uri, id.orig_h, id.resp_h, header_name, header_value, body, and truncated are extracted as applicable. The sensor must see request plaintext.

HotSpot exception diagnostics are not written to a standard file by default. Tomcat normally writes JULI logs under CATALINA_BASE/logs (and, on Unix with its startup scripts, console output to catalina.out); Spring Boot writes application logs to the console by default; and Elasticsearch application logs use /var/log/elasticsearch for Debian/RPM packages, ES_HOME/logs for tar/zip installs, or container stdout. Elasticsearch enables GC logs by default, but these are separate from the exception stream required here. Add this JVM startup option with a writable path chosen for the deployment: -Xlog:exceptions=debug:file=/var/log/myapp/exceptions-%p.log:utctime,pid,level,tags:filecount=8,filesize=16m For Tomcat scripts, place it in CATALINA_OPTS via CATALINA_BASE/bin/setenv.sh or setenv.bat; for a Windows Tomcat service, configure its Java options. For Spring Boot, add it to the Java service or container launch command. For Elasticsearch, add a .options file in config/jvm.options.d or /etc/elasticsearch/jvm.options.d, according to the installation method, and preserve existing JVM logging settings. Spring Boot logging.file.name and Tomcat logging.properties control application or container logs, not HotSpot unified logging. Forward the configured file and rotations as java:hotspot:exceptions. On the Splunk parsing tier, configure single-line event breaking and timestamps for utctime. Search-time extraction in props.conf is optional: use EXTRACT-jvm_unified (or a shared REPORT transform) for reusable jvm_pid, jvm_tags, and jvm_message fields, or leave those fields unconfigured and let this search parse the decorated _raw line with rex. The search coalesces raw and pre-extracted values, including jvm_tags, before correlating the Java PID. The Java HotSpot Exceptions data source gives the input and optional extraction pattern. Verify the raw format, host identity, file permissions, and retention before enabling the search. Exception logging can be high volume, and an exception event is not guaranteed during exploitation.

Optionally ingest Sysmon for Linux EventID 1, 5, and 11 with ParentImage, ParentProcessId, Image, ProcessId, and TargetFilename. Process creation joins on ParentProcessId; file creation and process termination join on ProcessId.

Configure Enterprise Security Assets and Identities so the Zeek destination IP and the JVM or Sysmon hostname resolve to the same dest_asset_id through get_asset(dest). Synchronize the sensor and server clocks. The search permits JVM events from 3 seconds before to 15 seconds after each request marker, and optional Sysmon events up to 30 seconds after it. Tune these windows to measured collection delays.

Known false positives

  • One JVM can handle concurrent requests, so an exception may fall within 15 seconds of more than one malformed request. HotSpot logs do not carry the Zeek uid, and this search establishes time proximity rather than causation. Ordinary Java child processes and file writes can coincide with the request. Review the URI, Zeek uid, exception delay, Java PID, child image, and created path. Clock skew, PID reuse, and incorrect host/IP mapping can misassociate events. Sysmon evidence is supporting context and is not required for a result.

Analyst notes

Known false positives: One JVM can handle concurrent requests, so an exception may fall within 15 seconds of more than one malformed request. HotSpot logs do not carry the Zeek uid, and this search establishes time proximity rather than causation. Ordinary Java child processes and file writes can coincide with the request. Review the URI, Zeek uid, exception delay, Java PID, child image, and created path. Clock skew, PID reuse, and incorrect host/IP mapping can misassociate events. Sysmon evidence is supporting context and is not required for a result.

Raw source HTTP Base64 Activity With JVM Errors · SPL
Esc
Published by splunk/security_content ↗, licensed under Apache 2.0 ↗. Reproduced here unmodified.
name: HTTP Base64 Activity With JVM Errors
id: 26f87d5e-671f-402c-9cb7-7e57816ef22e
version: 1
creation_date: '2026-11-17'
modification_date: '2026-11-18'
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali, Onur Mustafa Erdogan, Splunk
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: |
    The analytic associates each Zeek request containing a malformed Base64 value or a scripted decoder trigger with a nearby Base64-related HotSpot argument exception on the same server and Java PID.
    Sysmon child process, file creation, or process termination events from that PID add context and can raise confidence.
data_source:
    - Zeek HTTP
    - Zeek HTTP Request Headers
    - Zeek HTTP POST Body
    - Java HotSpot Exceptions
    - Sysmon for Linux EventID 1
    - Sysmon for Linux EventID 5
    - Sysmon for Linux EventID 11
search: |
    (
        `zeek_http_request_headers`
        header_name IN (
            "AUTHORIZATION",
            "HTTP2-SETTINGS",
            "CONTENT-TYPE",
            "CONTENT-DISPOSITION",
            "PRIORITY",
            "X-CONSOLEANNOTATOR",
            "X-CONNECT-AUTHORIZATION",
            "X-CSRF-TOKEN"
        )
        header_value="*=*"
        truncated=false
    )
    OR
    (
        `zeek_http_post_body`
        body="*=*"
        truncated=false
    )
    OR
    (
        `zeek_http_uri`
        uri IN ("*=*","*%3D*","*%3d*")
    )
    OR
    (
        `java_hotspot_exceptions`
        (
            "*Input byte array has wrong*"
            OR
            "*IllegalArgumentException*"
            OR
            "*Base64$Decoder*"
            OR
            "*java/util/Base64*"
        )
    )
    OR
    (
        `sysmon_linux`
        (
            (EventID=1 ParentImage="*/java")
            OR
            (EventID=5 Image="*/java")
            OR
            (
                EventID=11
                Image="*/java"
                NOT TargetFilename IN ("*/_state/*","*/indices/*")
            )
        )
    )

    | rex field=_raw "^\[(?<jvm_event_time_raw>[^\]]+)\]\[(?<jvm_pid_raw>\d+)\]\[(?<jvm_level_raw>[^\]]+)\]\[(?<jvm_tags_raw>[^\]]+)\]\s*(?<jvm_message_raw>.*)"

    | eval jvm_pid=coalesce(jvm_pid_raw,jvm_pid),
           jvm_tags=coalesce(jvm_tags_raw,jvm_tags),
           jvm_message=coalesce(jvm_message_raw,jvm_message)


    | eval event_time=_time,
           is_network=if(isnotnull('id.resp_h'),1,0)

    | eval observed_target=if(is_network=1,'id.resp_h',coalesce(dest,host,dest_ip))

    | eval request_value=case(
          isnotnull(header_name),header_value,
          isnotnull(body),body,
          is_network=1,urldecode(uri)
      ),
      carrier=case(
          isnotnull(header_name),header_name,
          isnotnull(body),"POST body",
          is_network=1,"URI"
      )

    | where is_network=0 OR len(request_value)>=65

    | eval malformed_b64=if(
          is_network=1
          AND match(request_value,"(?<![A-Za-z0-9+/_-])(?:(?:[A-Za-z0-9+/]{64})+(?:[A-Za-z0-9+/]{0,2}=|[A-Za-z0-9+/]?==)|(?:[A-Za-z0-9_-]{64})+(?:[A-Za-z0-9_-]{0,2}=|[A-Za-z0-9_-]?==))(?![A-Za-z0-9+/_=-])"),
          1,0
      ),
      scripted_b64=if(
          is_network=1 AND isnotnull(body)
          AND like(body,"%Base64.getDecoder()%")
          AND like(body,"%new byte[65]%")
          AND like(body,"%[64] = (byte)61%"),
          1,0
      )

    | eval event_kind=case(
          is_network=1 AND (malformed_b64=1 OR scripted_b64=1),"request",
          isnotnull(jvm_pid) AND like(jvm_tags,"%exceptions%"),"jvm",
          EventID=1 OR EventID=5 OR EventID=11,"sysmon"
      )

    | eval java_pid=case(
          event_kind="request","network",
          event_kind="jvm",tostring(jvm_pid),
          EventID=1,tostring(ParentProcessId),
          EventID=5 OR EventID=11,tostring(ProcessId)
      ),
      request_uid=if(event_kind="request",uid,"-")

    | where isnotnull(event_kind)
            AND isnotnull(observed_target)
            AND isnotnull(java_pid)
            AND isnotnull(request_uid)

    | eval argument_error=if(event_kind="jvm"
          AND match(jvm_message,"(?i)IllegalArgumentException|Input byte array has wrong"),1,0),
      decoder_evidence=if(event_kind="jvm"
          AND match(jvm_message,"Base64[$]Decoder|java/util/Base64|Input byte array has wrong"),1,0),
      shell_child=if(EventID=1
          AND match(Image,"/(ash|bash|csh|dash|eshell|fish|ion|ksh|mksh|rbash|sh|tcsh|zsh)$"),1,0),
      child_process=if(EventID=1,1,0),
      file_created=if(EventID=11,1,0),
      java_terminated=if(EventID=5,1,0),
      suspicious_file=if(EventID=11
          AND match(TargetFilename,"(?i)(?:[.](?:jsp|sh|so)$|/(?:tmp|var/tmp|dev/shm|webapps)/)"),1,0)

    | eval request_marker=case(
          event_kind="request" AND scripted_b64=1,"scripted_decoder_trigger",
          event_kind="request" AND malformed_b64=1,"malformed_base64_request"
      ),
      src_ip=if(event_kind="request",'id.orig_h',null()),
      request_uri=if(event_kind="request",uri,null()),
      http_method=if(event_kind="request",method,null()),
      child_image=if(EventID=1,Image,null()),
      created_file=if(EventID=11,TargetFilename,null())

    | bin _time span=1s

    | stats min(event_time) AS first_seen
            max(event_time) AS last_seen
            max(argument_error) AS argument_error
            max(decoder_evidence) AS decoder_evidence
            max(shell_child) AS shell_child
            max(child_process) AS child_process
            max(file_created) AS file_created
            max(java_terminated) AS java_terminated
            max(suspicious_file) AS suspicious_file
            values(src_ip) AS src_ips
            values(request_uri) AS uris
            values(http_method) AS methods
            values(carrier) AS carriers
            values(request_marker) AS request_markers
            values(child_image) AS child_images
            values(created_file) AS created_files
            BY _time observed_target java_pid request_uid event_kind

    | rename observed_target AS dest

    | `get_asset(dest)`

    | eval target=coalesce(dest_asset_id,dest),
           bucket=floor(first_seen/15)

    | eval request_json=if(
          event_kind="request",
          json_object(
              "uid",request_uid,
              "time",first_seen,
              "src",mvindex(src_ips,0),
              "dest",dest,
              "uri",mvindex(uris,0),
              "method",mvindex(methods,0),
              "carrier",mvjoin(carriers,","),
              "marker",mvjoin(request_markers,",")
          ),
          null()
      ),
      bucket=if(
          event_kind="request",
          mvappend(tostring(bucket-1),tostring(bucket),tostring(bucket+1),tostring(bucket+2)),
          bucket
      )

    | mvexpand bucket

    | eventstats values(request_json) AS candidate_requests BY target bucket

    | where event_kind!="request" AND isnotnull(candidate_requests)

    | mvexpand candidate_requests

    | eval request_uid=spath(candidate_requests,"uid"),
           request_time=tonumber(spath(candidate_requests,"time")),
           src=spath(candidate_requests,"src"),
           request_dest=spath(candidate_requests,"dest"),
           uri=spath(candidate_requests,"uri"),
           method=spath(candidate_requests,"method"),
           carrier=spath(candidate_requests,"carrier"),
           request_marker=spath(candidate_requests,"marker")

    | where (event_kind="jvm"
             AND last_seen>=request_time-3
             AND first_seen<=request_time+15)
            OR
            (event_kind="sysmon"
             AND last_seen>=request_time-3
             AND first_seen<=request_time+30)

    | stats min(request_time) AS request_time
            min(eval(if(argument_error=1,first_seen,null()))) AS exception_time
            max(last_seen) AS last_seen
            max(argument_error) AS argument_error
            max(decoder_evidence) AS decoder_evidence
            max(shell_child) AS shell_child
            max(child_process) AS child_process
            max(file_created) AS file_created
            max(java_terminated) AS java_terminated
            max(suspicious_file) AS suspicious_file
            values(src) AS src
            values(request_dest) AS dest_ips
            values(uri) AS uri
            values(method) AS method
            values(carrier) AS carrier
            values(request_marker) AS request_markers
            values(child_images) AS child_images
            values(created_files) AS created_files
            BY target request_uid java_pid

    | where argument_error=1 AND decoder_evidence=1

    | eval dest=mvindex(dest_ips,0),
           exception_delay=round(exception_time-request_time,3),
           confidence=case(
               shell_child>0 OR suspicious_file>0,"high",
               child_process>0 OR file_created>0 OR java_terminated>0,"medium",
               true(),"low"
           ),
           asset_id=target,
           firstTime=request_time,
           lastTime=last_seen

    | fields - argument_error decoder_evidence shell_child child_process file_created java_terminated suspicious_file dest_ips

    | sort 0 - firstTime

    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
    | `http_base64_activity_with_jvm_errors_filter`
how_to_implement: |
    Configure zeek_http_uri, zeek_http_request_headers, zeek_http_post_body, and java_hotspot_exceptions for the indexes and sourcetypes in your environment. Configure sysmon_linux if you collect that optional source.
    Install the TA for Zeek for standard HTTP logs. To collect the optional header and POST-body streams, install the custom scripts from https://gist.github.com/nasbench/8581572459af92b7c30599f1068c791f (request headers) and https://gist.github.com/nasbench/4cd18a938056cbfbc8a9832edb26f4c4 (POST bodies), following the corresponding data source instructions. These scripts are not included with ESCU or the TA for Zeek. Ensure uid, uri, id.orig_h, id.resp_h, header_name, header_value, body, and truncated are extracted as applicable. The sensor must see request plaintext.

    HotSpot exception diagnostics are not written to a standard file by default. Tomcat normally writes JULI logs under CATALINA_BASE/logs (and, on Unix with its startup scripts, console output to catalina.out); Spring Boot writes application logs to the console by default; and Elasticsearch application logs use /var/log/elasticsearch for Debian/RPM packages, ES_HOME/logs for tar/zip installs, or container stdout. Elasticsearch enables GC logs by default, but these are separate from the exception stream required here.
    Add this JVM startup option with a writable path chosen for the deployment:
      -Xlog:exceptions=debug:file=/var/log/myapp/exceptions-%p.log:utctime,pid,level,tags:filecount=8,filesize=16m
    For Tomcat scripts, place it in CATALINA_OPTS via CATALINA_BASE/bin/setenv.sh or setenv.bat; for a Windows Tomcat service, configure its Java options. For Spring Boot, add it to the Java service or container launch command. For Elasticsearch, add a .options file in config/jvm.options.d or /etc/elasticsearch/jvm.options.d, according to the installation method, and preserve existing JVM logging settings. Spring Boot logging.file.name and Tomcat logging.properties control application or container logs, not HotSpot unified logging.
    Forward the configured file and rotations as java:hotspot:exceptions. On the Splunk parsing tier, configure single-line event breaking and timestamps for utctime. Search-time extraction in props.conf is optional: use EXTRACT-jvm_unified (or a shared REPORT transform) for reusable jvm_pid, jvm_tags, and jvm_message fields, or leave those fields unconfigured and let this search parse the decorated _raw line with `rex`. The search coalesces raw and pre-extracted values, including jvm_tags, before correlating the Java PID. The Java HotSpot Exceptions data source gives the input and optional extraction pattern. Verify the raw format, host identity, file permissions, and retention before enabling the search. Exception logging can be high volume, and an exception event is not guaranteed during exploitation.

    Optionally ingest Sysmon for Linux EventID 1, 5, and 11 with ParentImage, ParentProcessId, Image, ProcessId, and TargetFilename. Process creation joins on ParentProcessId; file creation and process termination join on ProcessId.

    Configure Enterprise Security Assets and Identities so the Zeek destination IP and the JVM or Sysmon hostname resolve to the same dest_asset_id through `get_asset(dest)`. Synchronize the sensor and server clocks. The search permits JVM events from 3 seconds before to 15 seconds after each request marker, and optional Sysmon events up to 30 seconds after it. Tune these windows to measured collection delays.
known_false_positives: |
    One JVM can handle concurrent requests, so an exception may fall within 15 seconds of more than one malformed request. HotSpot logs do not carry the Zeek uid, and this search establishes time proximity rather than causation.
    Ordinary Java child processes and file writes can coincide with the request. Review the URI, Zeek uid, exception delay, Java PID, child image, and created path.
    Clock skew, PID reuse, and incorrect host/IP mapping can misassociate events. Sysmon evidence is supporting context and is not required for a result.
references:
    - https://calif.io/java4shell/
    - https://openjdk.org/groups/vulnerability/advisories/2026-11-17
intermediate_findings:
    entities:
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 20
          message: 'HTTP Base64 marker in request [$request_uid$] from [$src$] to [$dest$] aligned with a Base64-related argument exception in Java PID [$java_pid$] at a [$exception_delay$]-second offset. Confidence: [$confidence$]'
threat_objects: []
analytic_story:
    - Java4Shell - CVE-2026-114938
asset_type: Endpoint
cve:
    - CVE-2026-114938
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1190
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: application
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/emerging_threats/java4shell/java4shell_bro_http.log
          sourcetype: bro:http:json
          source: http.log
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/emerging_threats/java4shell/java4shell_zeek_body.log
          sourcetype: zeek:http_post_body:json
          source: http_post_body.log
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/emerging_threats/java4shell/java4shell_exception.log
          sourcetype: java:hotspot:exceptions
          source: exceptions.log
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/emerging_threats/java4shell/java4shell_sysmon.log
          sourcetype: sysmon:linux
          source: Syslog:Linux-Sysmon/Operational
      description: MANUAL TEST - This detection uses the A&I get_asset macro from Enterprise Security to resolve dest.
      test_type: experimental

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