Windows Remote Management Execute Shell


Description

This analytic detects selected processes spawned directly by Windows Remote Management Host processes winrshost.exe and wsmprovhost.exe. The selected children include shells, scripting hosts, and administrative, discovery, and file-transfer utilities. This target-side process relationship can indicate remote execution, but it can also result from authorized WinRM administration. Investigate the account, target host, available command line, and surrounding remote-logon activity to determine context.

Query · spl

| tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
  count min(_time) as firstTime
        max(_time) as lastTime

FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE

Processes.parent_process_name IN (
    "winrshost.exe",
    "wsmprovhost.exe"
)
`windows_shells`
NOT (
        Processes.process_name="powershell.exe"
        Processes.process="*-Version 5.1 -s -NoLogo -NoProfile"
    )
NOT (
        Processes.process_name="cmd.exe"
        (
            (
                Processes.process="*powershell -NoLogo -NonInteractive -NoProfile*"
                Processes.process IN (
                    "*Get-CimInstance MSFT_NetAdapter -Namespace *",
                    "*Get-Command exsetup *",
                    "*Get-Disk | ForEach-Object*",
                    "*HKLM:\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Uninstall*",
                    "*HKLM:\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Class\\*",
                    "*HKLM:\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\*",
                    "*New-Object Management.Automation.Host.Size*"
                )
            )
            OR
            Processes.process="* /c net start Veeam*"
        )
    )

BY Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
   Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
   Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
   Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
   Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
   Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
   Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product

| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_remote_management_execute_shell_filter`

Implementation guide

The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the Processes node of the Endpoint data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.

Known false positives

  • Authorized administrators and management software may launch these processes through WinRM. Shell and discovery activity may be routine; evaluate expected accounts, hosts, and workflows before tuning.

Analyst notes

Known false positives: Authorized administrators and management software may launch these processes through WinRM. Shell and discovery activity may be routine; evaluate expected accounts, hosts, and workflows before tuning.

Raw source Windows Remote Management Execute Shell · SPL
Esc
Published by splunk/security_content ↗, licensed under Apache 2.0 ↗. Reproduced here unmodified.
name: Windows Remote Management Execute Shell
id: 28b80028-851d-4b8d-88a5-375ba115418a
version: 9
creation_date: '2023-04-12'
modification_date: '2026-10-29'
author: Drew Church, Michael Haag, Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: |-
    This analytic detects selected processes spawned directly by Windows Remote Management Host processes winrshost.exe and wsmprovhost.exe.
    The selected children include shells, scripting hosts, and administrative, discovery, and file-transfer utilities. This target-side process relationship can indicate remote execution, but it can also result from authorized WinRM administration.
    Investigate the account, target host, available command line, and surrounding remote-logon activity to determine context.
data_source:
    - Sysmon EventID 1
    - Windows Event Log Security 4688
search: |-
    | tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
      count min(_time) as firstTime
            max(_time) as lastTime

    FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE

    Processes.parent_process_name IN (
        "winrshost.exe",
        "wsmprovhost.exe"
    )
    `windows_shells`
    NOT (
            Processes.process_name="powershell.exe"
            Processes.process="*-Version 5.1 -s -NoLogo -NoProfile"
        )
    NOT (
            Processes.process_name="cmd.exe"
            (
                (
                    Processes.process="*powershell -NoLogo -NonInteractive -NoProfile*"
                    Processes.process IN (
                        "*Get-CimInstance MSFT_NetAdapter -Namespace *",
                        "*Get-Command exsetup *",
                        "*Get-Disk | ForEach-Object*",
                        "*HKLM:\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Uninstall*",
                        "*HKLM:\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Class\\*",
                        "*HKLM:\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\*",
                        "*New-Object Management.Automation.Host.Size*"
                    )
                )
                OR
                Processes.process="* /c net start Veeam*"
            )
        )

    BY Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
       Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
       Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
       Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
       Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
       Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
       Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product

    | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
    | `windows_remote_management_execute_shell_filter`
how_to_implement: |
    The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents
    are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement
    this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally,
    you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk
    Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node
    of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and
    speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: |-
    Authorized administrators and management software may launch these processes through WinRM. Shell and discovery activity may be routine; evaluate expected accounts, hosts, and workflows before tuning.
references:
    - https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/winrshost.exe-6790044CEB4BA5BE6AA8161460D990FD.html
    - https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/wsmprovhost.exe-620CBF4C26A1E8871F1767C5F00F96E1.html
    - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/9b7fb0c0f3af2e53ed483e29e0d0f88ccf1c08ca/rules/windows/process_access/win_susp_shell_spawn_from_winrm.yml
    - https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2021/5/17/cve-2021-31166-a-wormable-code-execution-bug-in-httpsys
    - https://github.com/0vercl0k/CVE-2021-31166/blob/main/cve-2021-31166.py
drilldown_searches:
    - name: View the detection results for - "$dest$"
      search: '%original_detection_search% | search  dest = "$dest$"'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
    - name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$dest$"
      search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$dest$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
      earliest_offset: 7d
      latest_offset: "0"
intermediate_findings:
    entities:
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 20
          message: Windows Remote Management process [$parent_process_name$] spawned [$process_name$] with CommandLine [$process$] on [$dest$].
threat_objects:
    - field: process_name
      type: process_name
    - field: process
      type: process
analytic_story:
    - CISA AA23-347A
    - Crypto Stealer
    - Living Off The Land
    - Microsoft WSUS CVE-2025-59287
    - Rhysida Ransomware
    - Unusual Processes
asset_type: Endpoint
cve:
    - CVE-2021-31166
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1021.006
    - T1059
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.006/wirm_execute_shell/winrshost_pwh.log
          source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
          sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
      test_type: unit
    - name: WinRM Spawned Process Security 4688 Test
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.006/winrm_spawned_processes/winrm_spawned_processes_security.log
          source: XmlWinEventLog:Security
          sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
      test_type: unit
    - name: WinRM Spawned Process Sysmon Event ID 1 Test
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1021.006/winrm_spawned_processes/winrm_spawned_processes_sysmon.log
          source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
          sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
      test_type: unit

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