Windows Suspicious Child Process Spawned From WebServer


Description

This analytic detects selected system, scripting, discovery, and administration utilities spawned by Windows web or application server processes. Parent processes include common web server and application server services; Java and JavaW parents are included when their command lines identify known server frameworks or applications. Unexpected child process activity may indicate that an exposed application or web server has been abused to run commands on the host. Review the parent command line, child process, user, and surrounding activity to determine whether the behavior is authorized.

Query · spl

| tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
  count max(_time) as lastTime
        min(_time) as firstTime

FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE

Processes.parent_process_name IN (
    "apache*.exe",
    "beasvc.exe",
    "caddy.exe",
    "coldfusion.exe",
    "frankenphp.exe",
    "http*.exe",
    "iisexpress.exe",
    "java.exe",
    "javaw.exe",
    "jbosssvc.exe",
    "jrun.exe",
    "lighttpd.exe",
    "lsphp*.exe",
    "nginx*.exe",
    "openresty.exe",
    "php*.exe",
    "roadrunner.exe",
    "tomcat*.exe",
    "traefik.exe",
    "UMWorkerProcess.exe",
    "w3wp.exe",
    "wildfly-service.exe",
    "ws_TomcatService.exe"
)
NOT Processes.parent_process_name IN ("phpstorm*")

Processes.process_name IN (
    "adfind.exe", "arp.exe", "at.exe", "bitsadmin.exe", "certreq.exe", "certutil.exe", "cmdkey.exe",
    "cscript.exe", "curl.exe", "dnscmd.exe", "dsget.exe", "dsquery.exe", "find.exe", "findstr.exe",
    "fsutil.exe", "getmac.exe", "hostname.exe", "ipconfig.exe", "klist.exe", "mshta.exe",
    "nbtstat.exe", "net.exe", "net1.exe", "netdom.exe", "netsh.exe", "netstat.exe", "nltest.exe",
    "nslookup.exe", "ntdsutil.exe", "pathping.exe", "perl.exe", "ping.exe", "python.exe",
    "qprocess.exe", "query.exe", "quser.exe", "qwinsta.exe", "reg.exe", "regsvr32.exe", "route.exe",
    "rundll32.exe", "sc.exe", "schtasks.exe", "scrcons.exe", "setspn.exe", "systeminfo.exe",
    "tasklist.exe", "tracert.exe", "vssadmin.exe", "wevtutil.exe", "wget.exe", "whoami.exe",
    "wmic.exe", "wscript.exe", "wusa.exe"
)

BY Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
   Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
   Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
   Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
   Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
   Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
   Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product

| `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")`

```Keep Java and JavaW parents only when their command line identifies a known web or application server.```

| where (
    NOT match(parent_process_name, "(?i)^javaw?(\.exe)?$")
    OR match(parent_process, "(?i)(org\.apache\.catalina\.startup\.Bootstrap|-Dcatalina\.base=|org\.eclipse\.jetty\.start\.Main|-Djetty\.home=|org\.jboss\.modules\.Main|-Djboss\.home\.dir=|weblogic\.Server|-Dweblogic\.Name=|weblogic-launcher\.jar|com\.ibm\.ws\.runtime\.WsServer|com\.ibm\.ws\.kernel\.boot\.cmdline\.Bootstrap|com\.sun\.enterprise\.glassfish\.bootstrap\.ASMain|com\.caucho\.server\.resin\.Resin)")
    OR match(parent_process, "(?i)(org\.springframework\.boot\.loader\.|quarkus-run\.jar|io\.quarkus\.runner\.GeneratedMain|io\.micronaut\.runtime\.Micronaut|io\.dropwizard\.cli\.ServerCommand|play\.core\.server\.ProdServerStart|io\.helidon\.microprofile\.server\.Main|io\.helidon\.webserver|io\.vertx\.core\.Launcher)")
    OR match(parent_process, "(?i)(org\.keycloak|org\.apereo\.cas|org\.elasticsearch\.bootstrap\.Elasticsearch|com\.atlassian\.jira\.startup\.Launcher|BitbucketServerLauncher|com\.google\.gerrit\.pgm\.Daemon|-Dsolr\.solr\.home=|jenkins\.war)")
)

| where NOT (
    process_name="tasklist.exe"
    AND match(
        lower(process),
        "^\"?tasklist(\.exe)?\"? +/fi +\"pid eq [0-9]+\" *$"
    )
)

| where NOT (
    (
        match(parent_process_path, "(?i)^C:\\\\Program Files\\\\Datacard\\\\AppContainer\\\\bin\\\\tomcat.*\.exe$")
        AND process_name="reg.exe"
        AND match(
            process,
            "(?i)^reg query \"HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\(SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Print\\\\Printers|SYSTEM\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\Print\\\\Monitors)"
        )
    )
    OR
    (
        match(parent_process_path, "(?i)^E:\\\\Program Files\\\\AeroScout\\\\MobileView\\\\services\\\\.*\\\\tomcat9\.exe$")
        AND process_name="sc.exe"
        AND match(process, "(?i)^sc qc (mv_[a-z-]+|mobileviewhttpserver)( [0-9]+)?$")
    )
)
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_suspicious_child_process_spawned_from_webserver_filter`

Implementation guide

The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the Processes node of the Endpoint data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.

Known false positives

  • Legitimate OS functions called by vendor applications, baseline the environment and filter before enabling. Recommend throttle by dest/process_name

Analyst notes

Known false positives: Legitimate OS functions called by vendor applications, baseline the environment and filter before enabling. Recommend throttle by dest/process_name

Raw source Windows Suspicious Child Process Spawned From WebServer · SPL
Esc
Published by splunk/security_content ↗, licensed under Apache 2.0 ↗. Reproduced here unmodified.
name: Windows Suspicious Child Process Spawned From WebServer
id: 2d4470ef-7158-4b47-b68b-1f7f16382156
version: 15
creation_date: '2023-04-12'
modification_date: '2026-11-18'
author: Steven Dick, Nasreddine Bencherchali, Splunk
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: |-
    This analytic detects selected system, scripting, discovery, and administration utilities spawned by Windows web or application server processes.
    Parent processes include common web server and application server services; Java and JavaW parents are included when their command lines identify known server frameworks or applications.
    Unexpected child process activity may indicate that an exposed application or web server has been abused to run commands on the host.
    Review the parent command line, child process, user, and surrounding activity to determine whether the behavior is authorized.
data_source:
    - Sysmon EventID 1
    - Windows Event Log Security 4688
    - CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
search: |-
    | tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
      count max(_time) as lastTime
            min(_time) as firstTime

    FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE

    Processes.parent_process_name IN (
        "apache*.exe",
        "beasvc.exe",
        "caddy.exe",
        "coldfusion.exe",
        "frankenphp.exe",
        "http*.exe",
        "iisexpress.exe",
        "java.exe",
        "javaw.exe",
        "jbosssvc.exe",
        "jrun.exe",
        "lighttpd.exe",
        "lsphp*.exe",
        "nginx*.exe",
        "openresty.exe",
        "php*.exe",
        "roadrunner.exe",
        "tomcat*.exe",
        "traefik.exe",
        "UMWorkerProcess.exe",
        "w3wp.exe",
        "wildfly-service.exe",
        "ws_TomcatService.exe"
    )
    NOT Processes.parent_process_name IN ("phpstorm*")

    Processes.process_name IN (
        "adfind.exe", "arp.exe", "at.exe", "bitsadmin.exe", "certreq.exe", "certutil.exe", "cmdkey.exe",
        "cscript.exe", "curl.exe", "dnscmd.exe", "dsget.exe", "dsquery.exe", "find.exe", "findstr.exe",
        "fsutil.exe", "getmac.exe", "hostname.exe", "ipconfig.exe", "klist.exe", "mshta.exe",
        "nbtstat.exe", "net.exe", "net1.exe", "netdom.exe", "netsh.exe", "netstat.exe", "nltest.exe",
        "nslookup.exe", "ntdsutil.exe", "pathping.exe", "perl.exe", "ping.exe", "python.exe",
        "qprocess.exe", "query.exe", "quser.exe", "qwinsta.exe", "reg.exe", "regsvr32.exe", "route.exe",
        "rundll32.exe", "sc.exe", "schtasks.exe", "scrcons.exe", "setspn.exe", "systeminfo.exe",
        "tasklist.exe", "tracert.exe", "vssadmin.exe", "wevtutil.exe", "wget.exe", "whoami.exe",
        "wmic.exe", "wscript.exe", "wusa.exe"
    )

    BY Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
       Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
       Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
       Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
       Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
       Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
       Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product

    | `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")`

    ```Keep Java and JavaW parents only when their command line identifies a known web or application server.```

    | where (
        NOT match(parent_process_name, "(?i)^javaw?(\.exe)?$")
        OR match(parent_process, "(?i)(org\.apache\.catalina\.startup\.Bootstrap|-Dcatalina\.base=|org\.eclipse\.jetty\.start\.Main|-Djetty\.home=|org\.jboss\.modules\.Main|-Djboss\.home\.dir=|weblogic\.Server|-Dweblogic\.Name=|weblogic-launcher\.jar|com\.ibm\.ws\.runtime\.WsServer|com\.ibm\.ws\.kernel\.boot\.cmdline\.Bootstrap|com\.sun\.enterprise\.glassfish\.bootstrap\.ASMain|com\.caucho\.server\.resin\.Resin)")
        OR match(parent_process, "(?i)(org\.springframework\.boot\.loader\.|quarkus-run\.jar|io\.quarkus\.runner\.GeneratedMain|io\.micronaut\.runtime\.Micronaut|io\.dropwizard\.cli\.ServerCommand|play\.core\.server\.ProdServerStart|io\.helidon\.microprofile\.server\.Main|io\.helidon\.webserver|io\.vertx\.core\.Launcher)")
        OR match(parent_process, "(?i)(org\.keycloak|org\.apereo\.cas|org\.elasticsearch\.bootstrap\.Elasticsearch|com\.atlassian\.jira\.startup\.Launcher|BitbucketServerLauncher|com\.google\.gerrit\.pgm\.Daemon|-Dsolr\.solr\.home=|jenkins\.war)")
    )

    | where NOT (
        process_name="tasklist.exe"
        AND match(
            lower(process),
            "^\"?tasklist(\.exe)?\"? +/fi +\"pid eq [0-9]+\" *$"
        )
    )

    | where NOT (
        (
            match(parent_process_path, "(?i)^C:\\\\Program Files\\\\Datacard\\\\AppContainer\\\\bin\\\\tomcat.*\.exe$")
            AND process_name="reg.exe"
            AND match(
                process,
                "(?i)^reg query \"HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\(SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Print\\\\Printers|SYSTEM\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\Print\\\\Monitors)"
            )
        )
        OR
        (
            match(parent_process_path, "(?i)^E:\\\\Program Files\\\\AeroScout\\\\MobileView\\\\services\\\\.*\\\\tomcat9\.exe$")
            AND process_name="sc.exe"
            AND match(process, "(?i)^sc qc (mv_[a-z-]+|mobileviewhttpserver)( [0-9]+)?$")
        )
    )
    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
    | `windows_suspicious_child_process_spawned_from_webserver_filter`
how_to_implement: |-
    The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: |-
    Legitimate OS functions called by vendor applications, baseline the environment and filter before enabling. Recommend throttle by dest/process_name
references:
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/003/
    - https://github.com/nsacyber/Mitigating-Web-Shells
    - https://www.hackingarticles.in/multiple-ways-to-exploit-tomcat-manager/
drilldown_searches:
    - name: View the detection results for - "$user$" and "$dest$"
      search: '%original_detection_search% | search  user = "$user$" dest = "$dest$"'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
    - name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$user$" and "$dest$"
      search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$user$", "$dest$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
      earliest_offset: 7d
      latest_offset: "0"
intermediate_findings:
    entities:
        - field: user
          type: user
          score: 20
          message: Webshell Exploit Behavior - [$parent_process_name$] spawned [$process_name$] on [$dest$].
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 20
          message: Webshell Exploit Behavior - [$parent_process_name$] spawned [$process_name$] on [$dest$].
threat_objects:
    - field: parent_process_name
      type: parent_process_name
    - field: process_name
      type: process_name
    - field: process
      type: process
analytic_story:
    - BlackByte Ransomware
    - CISA AA22-257A
    - CISA AA22-264A
    - Citrix ShareFile RCE CVE-2023-24489
    - Compromised Windows Host
    - Flax Typhoon
    - GhostRedirector IIS Module and Rungan Backdoor
    - HAFNIUM Group
    - Java4Shell - CVE-2026-114938
    - Medusa Ransomware
    - Microsoft SharePoint Vulnerabilities
    - Microsoft WSUS CVE-2025-59287
    - PHP2Shell
    - ProxyNotShell
    - ProxyShell
    - SysAid On-Prem Software CVE-2023-47246 Vulnerability
    - WS FTP Server Critical Vulnerabilities
asset_type: Endpoint
cve:
    - CVE-2026-109618
    - CVE-2026-109619
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1505.003
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1505.003/generic_webshell_exploit/generic_webshell_exploit.log
          source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
          sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
      test_type: unit

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