Windows Potential Cloudflared Tunnel Execution
Description
This analytic detects Cloudflare Tunnel client execution by its process name or original executable name, including renamed copies, and by command lines that create token-authenticated or Quick Tunnels.
Threat actors have used cloudflared for covert command-and-control and persistent remote access, including renamed binaries and tunnels that expose local services through Cloudflare's edge.
The command-line signatures focus on token-backed tunnel run, Quick Tunnel commands that publish a loopback service with --url, and config-backed tunnel --config ... run commands.
Query · spl
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
count min(_time) as firstTime
max(_time) as lastTime
from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where
Processes.process_name IN ("cloudflared.exe")
OR
Processes.original_file_name IN ("cloudflared.exe")
OR (
Processes.process="*tunnel*"
Processes.process IN ("*--token*", "*--url*", "*--config*")
)
by Processes.process Processes.vendor_product Processes.user_id Processes.process_hash
Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.action
Processes.dest Processes.process_current_directory Processes.process_path
Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process
Processes.parent_process_path Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id
Processes.process_guid Processes.process_id Processes.user Processes.process_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| eval has_exe_prefix=if(match(process, "(?i)^\\s*(?:\"[^\"]+\\.exe\"|[^\\s]+\\.exe)(?:\\s|$)"), 1, 0)
| eval is_tunnel_cmd=if(match(process, "(?i)\\btunnel(\\s|$)"), 1, 0)
| eval has_run=if(match(process, "(?i)\\srun(\\s|$)"), 1, 0)
| eval has_token=if(match(process, "(?i)\\s--token(-file)?([=\\s]|$)"), 1, 0)
| eval has_config=if(match(process, "(?i)\\s--config([=\\s]|$)"), 1, 0)
| eval quick_tunnel_loopback=if(match(process, "(?i)--url(?:=|\\s+)(?:\"?)(?:https?://)?(?:localhost|127\\.0\\.0\\.1|0\\.0\\.0\\.0|\\[::1\\])(?:[:/\\s\"]|$)"), 1, 0)
| eval token_tunnel_ordered=if(match(process, "(?i)\\btunnel\\b.*\\brun\\s+--token(-file)?([=\\s]|$)"), 1, 0)
| eval config_tunnel_ordered=if(match(process, "(?i)\\btunnel\\b.*--config(?:=|\\s+)(?:\"[^\"]+\"|[^\\s]+).*\\brun(?:\\s|$)"), 1, 0)
| eval quick_tunnel_ordered=if(match(process, "(?i)\\btunnel\\b.*--url(?:=|\\s+)(?:\"?)(?:https?://)?(?:localhost|127\\.0\\.0\\.1|0\\.0\\.0\\.0|\\[::1\\])(?:[:/\\s\"]|$)"), 1, 0)
| eval cloudflared_token_tunnel=if(has_exe_prefix=1 AND is_tunnel_cmd=1 AND has_run=1 AND has_token=1 AND token_tunnel_ordered=1, 1, 0)
| eval cloudflared_quick_tunnel=if(has_exe_prefix=1 AND is_tunnel_cmd=1 AND quick_tunnel_loopback=1 AND quick_tunnel_ordered=1, 1, 0)
| eval cloudflared_config_tunnel=if(has_exe_prefix=1 AND is_tunnel_cmd=1 AND has_run=1 AND has_config=1 AND config_tunnel_ordered=1, 1, 0)
| where process_name IN ("cloudflared.exe") OR original_file_name IN ("cloudflared.exe") OR cloudflared_token_tunnel=1 OR cloudflared_quick_tunnel=1 OR cloudflared_config_tunnel=1
| `windows_potential_cloudflared_tunnel_execution_filter`
Implementation guide
The detection uses endpoint process telemetry mapped to the Processes node of the Endpoint data model. Ingest full command lines, process names, original file names, parent process, user, and destination fields from Linux or Windows EDR or Sysmon data, and normalize them to the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM).
Known false positives
- Authorized administrators, DevOps teams, and developers may run cloudflared to publish local services or establish config-backed tunnels. Review the executable location, parent process, user, token handling, destination service, and whether the activity is approved before tuning the detection.
Analyst notes
Known false positives: Authorized administrators, DevOps teams, and developers may run cloudflared to publish local services or establish config-backed tunnels. Review the executable location, parent process, user, token handling, destination service, and whether the activity is approved before tuning the detection.