Windows Potential Cloudflared Tunnel Execution


Description

This analytic detects Cloudflare Tunnel client execution by its process name or original executable name, including renamed copies, and by command lines that create token-authenticated or Quick Tunnels. Threat actors have used cloudflared for covert command-and-control and persistent remote access, including renamed binaries and tunnels that expose local services through Cloudflare's edge. The command-line signatures focus on token-backed tunnel run, Quick Tunnel commands that publish a loopback service with --url, and config-backed tunnel --config ... run commands.

Query · spl

| tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
  count min(_time) as firstTime
        max(_time) as lastTime

from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where

Processes.process_name IN ("cloudflared.exe")
OR
Processes.original_file_name IN ("cloudflared.exe")
OR (
    Processes.process="*tunnel*"
    Processes.process IN ("*--token*", "*--url*", "*--config*")
)

by Processes.process Processes.vendor_product Processes.user_id Processes.process_hash
   Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.action
   Processes.dest Processes.process_current_directory Processes.process_path
   Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process
   Processes.parent_process_path Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id
   Processes.process_guid Processes.process_id Processes.user Processes.process_name

| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`

| eval has_exe_prefix=if(match(process, "(?i)^\\s*(?:\"[^\"]+\\.exe\"|[^\\s]+\\.exe)(?:\\s|$)"), 1, 0)

| eval is_tunnel_cmd=if(match(process, "(?i)\\btunnel(\\s|$)"), 1, 0)

| eval has_run=if(match(process, "(?i)\\srun(\\s|$)"), 1, 0)

| eval has_token=if(match(process, "(?i)\\s--token(-file)?([=\\s]|$)"), 1, 0)

| eval has_config=if(match(process, "(?i)\\s--config([=\\s]|$)"), 1, 0)

| eval quick_tunnel_loopback=if(match(process, "(?i)--url(?:=|\\s+)(?:\"?)(?:https?://)?(?:localhost|127\\.0\\.0\\.1|0\\.0\\.0\\.0|\\[::1\\])(?:[:/\\s\"]|$)"), 1, 0)

| eval token_tunnel_ordered=if(match(process, "(?i)\\btunnel\\b.*\\brun\\s+--token(-file)?([=\\s]|$)"), 1, 0)

| eval config_tunnel_ordered=if(match(process, "(?i)\\btunnel\\b.*--config(?:=|\\s+)(?:\"[^\"]+\"|[^\\s]+).*\\brun(?:\\s|$)"), 1, 0)

| eval quick_tunnel_ordered=if(match(process, "(?i)\\btunnel\\b.*--url(?:=|\\s+)(?:\"?)(?:https?://)?(?:localhost|127\\.0\\.0\\.1|0\\.0\\.0\\.0|\\[::1\\])(?:[:/\\s\"]|$)"), 1, 0)

| eval cloudflared_token_tunnel=if(has_exe_prefix=1 AND is_tunnel_cmd=1 AND has_run=1 AND has_token=1 AND token_tunnel_ordered=1, 1, 0)

| eval cloudflared_quick_tunnel=if(has_exe_prefix=1 AND is_tunnel_cmd=1 AND quick_tunnel_loopback=1 AND quick_tunnel_ordered=1, 1, 0)

| eval cloudflared_config_tunnel=if(has_exe_prefix=1 AND is_tunnel_cmd=1 AND has_run=1 AND has_config=1 AND config_tunnel_ordered=1, 1, 0)

| where process_name IN ("cloudflared.exe") OR original_file_name IN ("cloudflared.exe") OR cloudflared_token_tunnel=1 OR cloudflared_quick_tunnel=1 OR cloudflared_config_tunnel=1

| `windows_potential_cloudflared_tunnel_execution_filter`

Implementation guide

The detection uses endpoint process telemetry mapped to the Processes node of the Endpoint data model. Ingest full command lines, process names, original file names, parent process, user, and destination fields from Linux or Windows EDR or Sysmon data, and normalize them to the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM).

Known false positives

  • Authorized administrators, DevOps teams, and developers may run cloudflared to publish local services or establish config-backed tunnels. Review the executable location, parent process, user, token handling, destination service, and whether the activity is approved before tuning the detection.

Analyst notes

Known false positives: Authorized administrators, DevOps teams, and developers may run cloudflared to publish local services or establish config-backed tunnels. Review the executable location, parent process, user, token handling, destination service, and whether the activity is approved before tuning the detection.

Raw source Windows Potential Cloudflared Tunnel Execution · SPL
Esc
Published by splunk/security_content ↗, licensed under Apache 2.0 ↗. Reproduced here unmodified.
name: Windows Potential Cloudflared Tunnel Execution
id: 2e29b58e-0f5a-42fc-b435-0fdce8862831
version: 3
creation_date: '2026-05-05'
modification_date: '2026-11-14'
author: Raven Tait, Nasreddine Bencherchali, Splunk
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: |-
    This analytic detects Cloudflare Tunnel client execution by its process name or original executable name, including renamed copies, and by command lines that create token-authenticated or Quick Tunnels.
    Threat actors have used cloudflared for covert command-and-control and persistent remote access, including renamed binaries and tunnels that expose local services through Cloudflare's edge.
    The command-line signatures focus on token-backed `tunnel run`, Quick Tunnel commands that publish a loopback service with `--url`, and config-backed `tunnel --config ... run` commands.
data_source:
    - Sysmon EventID 1
    - Windows Event Log Security 4688
    - CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
search: |-
    | tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
      count min(_time) as firstTime
            max(_time) as lastTime

    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where

    Processes.process_name IN ("cloudflared.exe")
    OR
    Processes.original_file_name IN ("cloudflared.exe")
    OR (
        Processes.process="*tunnel*"
        Processes.process IN ("*--token*", "*--url*", "*--config*")
    )

    by Processes.process Processes.vendor_product Processes.user_id Processes.process_hash
       Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.action
       Processes.dest Processes.process_current_directory Processes.process_path
       Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process
       Processes.parent_process_path Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id
       Processes.process_guid Processes.process_id Processes.user Processes.process_name

    | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`

    | eval has_exe_prefix=if(match(process, "(?i)^\\s*(?:\"[^\"]+\\.exe\"|[^\\s]+\\.exe)(?:\\s|$)"), 1, 0)

    | eval is_tunnel_cmd=if(match(process, "(?i)\\btunnel(\\s|$)"), 1, 0)

    | eval has_run=if(match(process, "(?i)\\srun(\\s|$)"), 1, 0)

    | eval has_token=if(match(process, "(?i)\\s--token(-file)?([=\\s]|$)"), 1, 0)

    | eval has_config=if(match(process, "(?i)\\s--config([=\\s]|$)"), 1, 0)

    | eval quick_tunnel_loopback=if(match(process, "(?i)--url(?:=|\\s+)(?:\"?)(?:https?://)?(?:localhost|127\\.0\\.0\\.1|0\\.0\\.0\\.0|\\[::1\\])(?:[:/\\s\"]|$)"), 1, 0)

    | eval token_tunnel_ordered=if(match(process, "(?i)\\btunnel\\b.*\\brun\\s+--token(-file)?([=\\s]|$)"), 1, 0)

    | eval config_tunnel_ordered=if(match(process, "(?i)\\btunnel\\b.*--config(?:=|\\s+)(?:\"[^\"]+\"|[^\\s]+).*\\brun(?:\\s|$)"), 1, 0)

    | eval quick_tunnel_ordered=if(match(process, "(?i)\\btunnel\\b.*--url(?:=|\\s+)(?:\"?)(?:https?://)?(?:localhost|127\\.0\\.0\\.1|0\\.0\\.0\\.0|\\[::1\\])(?:[:/\\s\"]|$)"), 1, 0)

    | eval cloudflared_token_tunnel=if(has_exe_prefix=1 AND is_tunnel_cmd=1 AND has_run=1 AND has_token=1 AND token_tunnel_ordered=1, 1, 0)

    | eval cloudflared_quick_tunnel=if(has_exe_prefix=1 AND is_tunnel_cmd=1 AND quick_tunnel_loopback=1 AND quick_tunnel_ordered=1, 1, 0)

    | eval cloudflared_config_tunnel=if(has_exe_prefix=1 AND is_tunnel_cmd=1 AND has_run=1 AND has_config=1 AND config_tunnel_ordered=1, 1, 0)

    | where process_name IN ("cloudflared.exe") OR original_file_name IN ("cloudflared.exe") OR cloudflared_token_tunnel=1 OR cloudflared_quick_tunnel=1 OR cloudflared_config_tunnel=1

    | `windows_potential_cloudflared_tunnel_execution_filter`
how_to_implement: |
    The detection uses endpoint process telemetry mapped to the Processes node of the Endpoint data model.
    Ingest full command lines, process names, original file names, parent process, user, and destination fields from Linux or Windows EDR or Sysmon data, and normalize them to the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM).
known_false_positives: |
    Authorized administrators, DevOps teams, and developers may run cloudflared to publish local services or establish config-backed tunnels. Review the executable location, parent process, user, token handling, destination service, and whether the activity is approved before tuning the detection.
references:
    - https://developers.cloudflare.com/cloudflare-one/connections/connect-networks/do-more-with-tunnels/trycloudflare/
    - https://developers.cloudflare.com/cloudflare-one/connections/connect-networks/get-started/create-remote-tunnel/
    - https://developers.cloudflare.com/cloudflare-one/networks/connectors/cloudflare-tunnel/monitor-tunnels/metrics/
    - https://developers.cloudflare.com/tunnel/reference/run-parameters/
    - https://github.com/cloudflare/cloudflared
    - https://web-assets.esetstatic.com/wls/en/papers/white-papers/cyberespionage-gamaredon-way.pdf
    - https://www-bleepingcomputer-com.cdn.ampproject.org/c/s/www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/hackers-increasingly-abuse-cloudflare-tunnels-for-stealthy-connections/amp/
    - https://www.guidepointsecurity.com/blog/tunnel-vision-cloudflared-abused-in-the-wild/
    - https://www.reconinfosec.com/articles/emergence-of-akira-ransomware-group/
    - https://www.veracode.com/blog/a-deep-dive-into-powerat-a-newly-discovered-stealer-rat-combo-polluting-pypi/
drilldown_searches:
    - earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
      name: View the detection results for - "$user$" and "$dest$"
      search: '%original_detection_search% | search  user = "$user$" dest = "$dest$"'
    - name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$user$" and "$dest$"
      search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$user$", "$dest$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
      earliest_offset: 7d
      latest_offset: "0"
intermediate_findings:
    entities:
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 20
          message: Potential Cloudflared tunnel execution observed on [$dest$] with the CommandLine [$process$].
threat_objects:
    - field: parent_process_name
      type: parent_process_name
    - field: process_name
      type: process_name
analytic_story:
    - Reverse Network Proxy
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1572
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1572/snapattack/snapattack.log
          source: XmlWinEventLog:Security
          sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
      test_type: unit

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