Cisco Secure Firewall - Potential Data Exfiltration
Description
The following analytic detects potentially suspicious large volumes of data sent by the connection initiator on flows from internal to external networks. It leverages Cisco Secure Firewall Threat Defense ConnectionEvent logs and thresholds on InitiatorBytes (bytes transmitted by the initiator), which for typical inside-initiated client sessions approximates upload or outbound payload from the internal host and avoids flagging large downloads where most bytes appear in ResponderBytes. Connections where the initiator sent at least 100 MB are flagged, as these may indicate unauthorized data exfiltration, especially if associated with unusual users, hosts, or processes. This analytic is scoped to inside-to-outside flows using a macro (cisco_secure_firewall_inside_to_outside) to abstract environment-specific zone definitions. If confirmed malicious, this behavior may reflect data staging and exfiltration over an encrypted or stealthy transport.
Query · spl
`cisco_secure_firewall` EventType=ConnectionEvent `cisco_secure_firewall_inside_to_outside`
| eval initiator_mb = round(InitiatorBytes / 1024 / 1024, 2)
| where initiator_mb >= 100
| eval Potentially_Exfiltrated = initiator_mb + " MB"
| stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
Values(url) as url
Values(rule) as rule
Values(dest_port) as dest_port
by src, dest, Potentially_Exfiltrated, transport, action
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `cisco_secure_firewall___potential_data_exfiltration_filter`
Implementation guide
This search requires Cisco Secure Firewall Threat Defense Logs, which
includes the ConnectionEvent EventType. This search uses two input macros named cisco_secure_firewall and cisco_secure_firewall_inside_to_outside.
We strongly recommend that you specify your environment-specific configurations
(index, source, sourcetype, etc.) for Cisco Secure Firewall Threat Defense logs. Replace the macro definitions
with configurations for your Splunk environment. The search also uses a post-filter
macro designed to filter out known false positives.
The logs are to be ingested using the Splunk Add-on for Cisco Security Cloud (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/7404).
The access policy must also enable logging.
Known false positives
- Large initiator-side transfers may occur due to legitimate activities such as cloud backups, file syncing, or developer build deployments. Backup servers, CI/CD pipelines, and enterprise sync tools (e.g., OneDrive, Dropbox) may exhibit similar patterns. Uncommon connection initiation (e.g., certain server-initiated or asymmetric paths) can change which side is logged as the initiator; tune or filter those scenarios if needed. Additional validation using user context, scheduled task windows, or endpoint telemetry is recommended to reduce false positives.
Analyst notes
Known false positives: Large initiator-side transfers may occur due to legitimate activities such as cloud backups, file syncing, or developer build deployments. Backup servers, CI/CD pipelines, and enterprise sync tools (e.g., OneDrive, Dropbox) may exhibit similar patterns. Uncommon connection initiation (e.g., certain server-initiated or asymmetric paths) can change which side is logged as the initiator; tune or filter those scenarios if needed. Additional validation using user context, scheduled task windows, or endpoint telemetry is recommended to reduce false positives.