Windows Non Browser Process Access Browser Cache Dir


Description

This analytic detects non-browser processes accessing files in local browser cache directories using Windows Security EventCode 4663. A script or utility reading Firefox, Chrome, Edge, Brave, or Chromium cache entries may be extracting web-delivered content for staging or execution.

Query · spl

`wineventlog_security`
EventCode=4663
ObjectType="File"
ObjectName IN (
    "*\\Mozilla\\Firefox\\Profiles\\*\\cache2\\entries\\*",
    "*\\User Data\\*\\Cache\\Cache_Data\\*"
)
NOT ProcessName IN (
    "*:\\Program Files (x86)\\*",
    "*:\\Program Files\\*",
    "*:\\Users\\*\\AppData\\Local\\*",
)
NOT ProcessName IN (
        "*\\360se.exe",
        "*\\arc.exe",
        "*\\atlas.exe",
        "*\\avastbrowser.exe",
        "*\\avgbrowser.exe",
        "*\\blpbrowser.exe",
        "*\\brave.exe",
        "*\\braveupdate.exe",
        "*\\browser.exe",
        "*\\chrome.exe",
        "*\\chromium.exe",
        "*\\coccoc.exe",
        "*\\comet.exe",
        "*\\dragon.exe",
        "*\\duckduckgo.exe",
        "*\\firefox.exe",
        "*\\ghost.exe",
        "*\\iexplore.exe",
        "*\\iridium.exe",
        "*\\iron.exe",
        "*\\maxthon.exe",
        "*\\microsoftedge.exe",
        "*\\microsoftedgeupdate.exe",
        "*\\msedge.exe",
        "*\\msedgewebview2.exe",
        "*\\opera_autoupdate.exe",
        "*\\opera.exe",
        "*\\perplexity.exe",
        "*\\rave.exe",
        "*\\safari.exe",
        "*\\shift.exe",
        "*\\sidekick.exe",
        "*\\thorium.exe",
        "*\\torch.exe",
        "*\\vivaldi.exe",
        "*\\waterfox.exe",
        "*\\wavebrowser.exe",
        "*\\whale.exe",
        "*\\zen.exe"
    )

| eval cache_path=lower(ObjectName)

| eval cache_family=case(
    like(cache_path, "%\\mozilla\\firefox\\profiles\\%\\cache2\\entries\\%"), "Firefox",
    like(cache_path, "%\\google\\chrome\\user data\\%\\cache\\cache_data\\%"), "Chrome",
    like(cache_path, "%\\microsoft\\edge\\user data\\%\\cache\\cache_data\\%"), "Edge",
    like(cache_path, "%\\bravesoftware\\brave-browser\\user data\\%\\cache\\cache_data\\%"), "Brave",
    like(cache_path, "%\\user data\\%\\cache\\cache_data\\%"), "Chromium"
)

| stats count min(_time) as firstTime
              max(_time) as lastTime
              values(cache_family) as cache_family
              values(AccessMask) as AccessMask

  by ObjectName ObjectType ProcessName EventCode dest

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_non_browser_process_access_browser_cache_dir_filter`

Implementation guide

To successfully implement this search, you must ingest Windows Security Event logs and track event code 4663. For 4663, enable "Audit Object Access" in Group Policy. Then check the two boxes listed for both "Success" and "Failure." and configure a System Access Control List (SACL) on each monitored directory.

Known false positives

  • Endpoint security products, backup utilities, forensic tools, and browser cleanup utilities may access cache files. Review the process path, user, access mask, and nearby process or file events; tune known maintenance tools as needed.

Analyst notes

Known false positives: Endpoint security products, backup utilities, forensic tools, and browser cleanup utilities may access cache files. Review the process path, user, access mask, and nearby process or file events; tune known maintenance tools as needed.

Raw source Windows Non Browser Process Access Browser Cache Dir · SPL
Esc
Published by splunk/security_content ↗, licensed under Apache 2.0 ↗. Reproduced here unmodified.
name: Windows Non Browser Process Access Browser Cache Dir
id: 44037eba-9673-41ef-9fc6-3bec3de43d1f
version: 1
creation_date: '2026-11-02'
modification_date: '2026-11-02'
author: Raven Tait, Splunk
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: |-
    This analytic detects non-browser processes accessing files in local browser cache directories using Windows Security EventCode 4663.
    A script or utility reading Firefox, Chrome, Edge, Brave, or Chromium cache entries may be extracting web-delivered content for staging or execution.
data_source:
    - Windows Event Log Security 4663
search: |-
    `wineventlog_security`
    EventCode=4663
    ObjectType="File"
    ObjectName IN (
        "*\\Mozilla\\Firefox\\Profiles\\*\\cache2\\entries\\*",
        "*\\User Data\\*\\Cache\\Cache_Data\\*"
    )
    NOT ProcessName IN (
        "*:\\Program Files (x86)\\*",
        "*:\\Program Files\\*",
        "*:\\Users\\*\\AppData\\Local\\*",
    )
    NOT ProcessName IN (
            "*\\360se.exe",
            "*\\arc.exe",
            "*\\atlas.exe",
            "*\\avastbrowser.exe",
            "*\\avgbrowser.exe",
            "*\\blpbrowser.exe",
            "*\\brave.exe",
            "*\\braveupdate.exe",
            "*\\browser.exe",
            "*\\chrome.exe",
            "*\\chromium.exe",
            "*\\coccoc.exe",
            "*\\comet.exe",
            "*\\dragon.exe",
            "*\\duckduckgo.exe",
            "*\\firefox.exe",
            "*\\ghost.exe",
            "*\\iexplore.exe",
            "*\\iridium.exe",
            "*\\iron.exe",
            "*\\maxthon.exe",
            "*\\microsoftedge.exe",
            "*\\microsoftedgeupdate.exe",
            "*\\msedge.exe",
            "*\\msedgewebview2.exe",
            "*\\opera_autoupdate.exe",
            "*\\opera.exe",
            "*\\perplexity.exe",
            "*\\rave.exe",
            "*\\safari.exe",
            "*\\shift.exe",
            "*\\sidekick.exe",
            "*\\thorium.exe",
            "*\\torch.exe",
            "*\\vivaldi.exe",
            "*\\waterfox.exe",
            "*\\wavebrowser.exe",
            "*\\whale.exe",
            "*\\zen.exe"
        )

    | eval cache_path=lower(ObjectName)

    | eval cache_family=case(
        like(cache_path, "%\\mozilla\\firefox\\profiles\\%\\cache2\\entries\\%"), "Firefox",
        like(cache_path, "%\\google\\chrome\\user data\\%\\cache\\cache_data\\%"), "Chrome",
        like(cache_path, "%\\microsoft\\edge\\user data\\%\\cache\\cache_data\\%"), "Edge",
        like(cache_path, "%\\bravesoftware\\brave-browser\\user data\\%\\cache\\cache_data\\%"), "Brave",
        like(cache_path, "%\\user data\\%\\cache\\cache_data\\%"), "Chromium"
    )

    | stats count min(_time) as firstTime
                  max(_time) as lastTime
                  values(cache_family) as cache_family
                  values(AccessMask) as AccessMask

      by ObjectName ObjectType ProcessName EventCode dest

    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
    | `windows_non_browser_process_access_browser_cache_dir_filter`
how_to_implement: |-
    To successfully implement this search, you must ingest Windows Security Event logs and track event code 4663.
    For 4663, enable "Audit Object Access" in Group Policy. Then check the two boxes listed for both "Success"
    and "Failure." and configure a System Access Control List (SACL) on each monitored directory.
known_false_positives: |-
    Endpoint security products, backup utilities, forensic tools, and browser cleanup utilities may access cache
    files. Review the process path, user, access mask, and nearby process or file events; tune known maintenance
    tools as needed.
references:
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1005/
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105/
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/006/
    - https://sensepost.com/blog/2023/browsers-cache-smuggling/
    - https://x.com/MsftSecIntel/status/2106197481960706155
drilldown_searches:
    - name: View the detection results for - "$dest$"
      search: '%original_detection_search% | search dest = "$dest$"'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
    - name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$dest$"
      search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$dest$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
      earliest_offset: 7d
      latest_offset: "0"
intermediate_findings:
    entities:
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 20
          message: Non-browser process [$ProcessName$] accessed the [$cache_family$] browser cache path [$ObjectName$] on [$dest$].
threat_objects:
    - field: ProcessName
      type: process
analytic_story:
    - Browser Cache Smuggling
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1005
    - T1105
    - T1027.006
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1005/cache_smuggling/windows-security.log
          source: XmlWinEventLog:Security
          sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
      test_type: unit

Detection rules belong to the projects that publish them and remain under their own licenses. This site indexes and links to them; it claims no rights in them.