Azure AD Guest User Type Changed To Member


Description

The following analytic detects when an Azure AD guest user account has its UserType property changed from Guest to Member. It leverages Azure Active Directory AuditLogs for the "Update user" operation and compares the UserType modifiedProperty old and new values. A legacy account whose UserType was null is not a guest promotion and does not match. Guest accounts carry inherent restrictions on tenant resource access; elevating to Member removes those restrictions. If confirmed malicious, this activity indicates an attacker is expanding the capabilities of a compromised or attacker-controlled guest account to gain broader access to tenant resources.

Query · spl

`azure_monitor_aad`
category=AuditLogs
operationName="Update user"
properties.targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.displayName="UserType"
properties.targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.oldValue=*Guest*
properties.targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.newValue=*Member*

| rename properties.* as *
| rename initiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName as initiatedBy
| rename initiatedBy.app.displayName as initiatedByApp

| eval actor = coalesce(initiatedBy, initiatedByApp)

| rename targetResources{}.userPrincipalName as targetUser
| rename userAgent as user_agent

| eval index_number = mvfind('targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.displayName', "UserType")
| eval oldUserType = mvindex('targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.oldValue', index_number)
| eval newUserType = mvindex('targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.newValue', index_number)

| search oldUserType="*Guest*" newUserType="*Member*"

| fillnull value="unknown" dest src vendor_account vendor_product user_agent actor targetUser oldUserType newUserType signature

| stats count min(_time) as firstTime
              max(_time) as lastTime
  BY dest src vendor_account vendor_product user_agent
     actor targetUser oldUserType newUserType signature

| rename actor as user

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `azure_ad_guest_user_type_changed_to_member_filter`

Implementation guide

You must install the latest version of Splunk Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services from Splunkbase (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3110/#/details). You must be ingesting Azure Active Directory events into your Splunk environment through an EventHub. This analytic was written to be used with the azure:monitor:aad sourcetype leveraging the AuditLogs log category.

Known false positives

  • Legitimate conversion of a guest account to a member account can occur when a contractor becomes a full-time employee or when an organization consolidates external identities. Validate the actor, target user, and whether a change management record exists for the conversion.

Analyst notes

Known false positives: Legitimate conversion of a guest account to a member account can occur when a contractor becomes a full-time employee or when an organization consolidates external identities. Validate the actor, target user, and whether a change management record exists for the conversion.

Raw source Azure AD Guest User Type Changed To Member · SPL
Esc
Published by splunk/security_content ↗, licensed under Apache 2.0 ↗. Reproduced here unmodified.
name: Azure AD Guest User Type Changed To Member
id: 487e9b86-49dc-48a9-bbb3-747df56b4db0
version: 1
creation_date: '2026-05-20'
modification_date: '2026-11-03'
author: descambiado, Onur Mustafa Erdogan, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: |-
    The following analytic detects when an Azure AD guest user account has its UserType property changed from Guest to Member.
    It leverages Azure Active Directory AuditLogs for the "Update user" operation and compares the UserType modifiedProperty old and new values.
    A legacy account whose UserType was null is not a guest promotion and does not match.
    Guest accounts carry inherent restrictions on tenant resource access; elevating to Member removes those restrictions.
    If confirmed malicious, this activity indicates an attacker is expanding the capabilities of a compromised or attacker-controlled guest account to gain broader access to tenant resources.
data_source:
    - Azure Active Directory Update user
search: |-
    `azure_monitor_aad`
    category=AuditLogs
    operationName="Update user"
    properties.targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.displayName="UserType"
    properties.targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.oldValue=*Guest*
    properties.targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.newValue=*Member*

    | rename properties.* as *
    | rename initiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName as initiatedBy
    | rename initiatedBy.app.displayName as initiatedByApp

    | eval actor = coalesce(initiatedBy, initiatedByApp)

    | rename targetResources{}.userPrincipalName as targetUser
    | rename userAgent as user_agent

    | eval index_number = mvfind('targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.displayName', "UserType")
    | eval oldUserType = mvindex('targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.oldValue', index_number)
    | eval newUserType = mvindex('targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.newValue', index_number)

    | search oldUserType="*Guest*" newUserType="*Member*"

    | fillnull value="unknown" dest src vendor_account vendor_product user_agent actor targetUser oldUserType newUserType signature

    | stats count min(_time) as firstTime
                  max(_time) as lastTime
      BY dest src vendor_account vendor_product user_agent
         actor targetUser oldUserType newUserType signature

    | rename actor as user

    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
    | `azure_ad_guest_user_type_changed_to_member_filter`
how_to_implement: |
    You must install the latest version of Splunk Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services from Splunkbase
    (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3110/#/details). You must be ingesting Azure Active Directory
    events into your Splunk environment through an EventHub. This analytic was written to be used with
    the azure:monitor:aad sourcetype leveraging the AuditLogs log category.
known_false_positives: |
    Legitimate conversion of a guest account to a member account can occur when a contractor becomes a
    full-time employee or when an organization consolidates external identities. Validate the actor,
    target user, and whether a change management record exists for the conversion.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/fundamentals/users-default-permissions
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/users/users-restrict-guest-permissions
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/
drilldown_searches:
    - name: View the detection results for - "$targetUser$"
      search: '%original_detection_search% | search  targetUser = "$targetUser$"'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
    - name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$user$"
      search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$user$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
      earliest_offset: 7d
      latest_offset: "0"
finding:
    title: Guest account [$targetUser$] was promoted to Member by [$user$]
    entity:
        field: user
        type: user
        score: 50
intermediate_findings:
    entities:
        - field: targetUser
          type: user
          score: 50
          message: Guest account [$targetUser$] was promoted to Member by [$user$]
analytic_story:
    - Azure Active Directory Persistence
    - Azure Active Directory Privilege Escalation
asset_type: Azure Active Directory
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1098
    - T1078.004
    - T1586.003
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: cloud
security_domain: identity
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1098/azure_ad_guest_user_type_changed_to_member/azure-audit.log
          source: Azure AD
          sourcetype: azure:monitor:aad
      test_type: unit

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