Suspicious Process With Discord DNS Query


Description

The following analytic identifies a process making a DNS query to Discord, excluding legitimate Discord application paths. It leverages Sysmon logs with Event ID 22 to detect DNS queries containing "discord" in the QueryName field. This activity is significant because Discord can be abused by adversaries to host and download malicious files, as seen in the WhisperGate campaign. If confirmed malicious, this could indicate malware attempting to download additional payloads from Discord, potentially leading to further code execution and compromise of the affected system.

Query · spl

`sysmon` EventCode=22 QueryName IN ("*discord*") Image != "*\\AppData\\Local\\Discord\\*" AND Image != "*\\Program Files*" AND Image != "discord.exe" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by answer answer_count dvc process_exec process_guid process_name query query_count reply_code_id signature signature_id src user_id vendor_product QueryName QueryResults QueryStatus | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_process_with_discord_dns_query_filter`

Implementation guide

his detection relies on sysmon logs with the Event ID 22, DNS Query.

Known false positives

  • Noise and false positive can be seen if the following instant messaging is allowed to use within corporate network. In this case, a filter is needed.

Analyst notes

Known false positives: Noise and false positive can be seen if the following instant messaging is allowed to use within corporate network. In this case, a filter is needed.

Raw source Suspicious Process With Discord DNS Query · SPL
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Published by splunk/security_content ↗, licensed under Apache 2.0 ↗. Reproduced here unmodified.
name: Suspicious Process With Discord DNS Query
id: 4d4332ae-792c-11ec-89c1-acde48001122
version: 14
creation_date: '2022-01-19'
modification_date: '2026-06-25'
author: Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: The following analytic identifies a process making a DNS query to Discord, excluding legitimate Discord application paths. It leverages Sysmon logs with Event ID 22 to detect DNS queries containing "discord" in the QueryName field. This activity is significant because Discord can be abused by adversaries to host and download malicious files, as seen in the WhisperGate campaign. If confirmed malicious, this could indicate malware attempting to download additional payloads from Discord, potentially leading to further code execution and compromise of the affected system.
data_source:
    - Sysmon EventID 22
search: '`sysmon` EventCode=22 QueryName IN ("*discord*") Image != "*\\AppData\\Local\\Discord\\*" AND Image != "*\\Program Files*" AND Image != "discord.exe" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by answer answer_count dvc process_exec process_guid process_name query query_count reply_code_id signature signature_id src user_id vendor_product QueryName QueryResults QueryStatus | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_process_with_discord_dns_query_filter`'
how_to_implement: his detection relies on sysmon logs with the Event ID 22, DNS Query.
known_false_positives: Noise and false positive can be seen if the following instant messaging is allowed to use within corporate network. In this case, a filter is needed.
references:
    - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/
    - https://medium.com/s2wblog/analysis-of-destructive-malware-whispergate-targeting-ukraine-9d5d158f19f3
    - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/
drilldown_searches:
    - name: View the detection results for - "$dest$"
      search: '%original_detection_search% | search  dest = "$dest$"'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
    - name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$dest$"
      search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$dest$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
      earliest_offset: 7d
      latest_offset: "0"
intermediate_findings:
    entities:
        - field: dvc
          type: system
          score: 20
          message: suspicious process $process_name$ has a dns query in $QueryName$ on $dvc$
threat_objects:
    - field: process_name
      type: process_name
analytic_story:
    - Data Destruction
    - WhisperGate
    - PXA Stealer
    - Cactus Ransomware
    - BlankGrabber Stealer
    - Phantom Stealer
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1059.005
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: network
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.005/discord_dnsquery/sysmon.log
          source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
          sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
      test_type: unit

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