Linux Auditd Shell Execution by Non-User Account


Description

The following analytic detects successful auditd execve events that launch an interactive Linux shell, identified by a TTY, under accounts that commonly do not log in. These are identified by a list of well-known service account names or by a system UID (between 1 and 999). An interactive shell for these accounts may indicate password-bypass abuse or unauthorized access.

Query · spl

`linux_auditd` type=SYSCALL
comm IN (
    "ash",
    "bash",
    "csh",
    "dash",
    "fish",
    "ksh",
    "mksh",
    "rbash",
    "sh",
    "tcsh",
    "yash",
    "zsh"
)
success=yes

| where isnotnull(tty) AND tty!="(none)"

| rex field=_raw "\\bUID=[[:punct:]]?(?<audit_user>[[:alnum:]_.-]+)"

| eval audit_user=lower(coalesce(audit_user, user))
| eval uid_num=tonumber(uid)

| where (uid_num>0 AND uid_num<1000) OR in(audit_user, "daemon", "bin", "sys", "sync", "shutdown", "halt", "games", "man", "lp", "mail", "news", "uucp", "operator", "www-data", "backup", "list", "irc", "gnats", "nobody", "_apt", "systemd-network", "systemd-resolve", "messagebus", "uuidd", "sshd", "ntp", "ftp", "chrony", "postfix", "redis", "mysql", "mariadb", "postgres", "alpine", "guest")

| rename host as dest

| stats count min(_time) as firstTime
              max(_time) as lastTime
              values(audit_user) as user
              values(uid) as uid
              values(euid) as euid
              values(comm) as shell
              values(exe) as executable
              values(tty) as tty
  by dest

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `linux_auditd_shell_execution_by_non_user_account_filter`

Implementation guide

To implement this detection, you should ingest auditd data, that consists of SYSCALL, TYPE, EXECVE and PROCTITLE events, which captures command-line executions and process details on Unix/Linux systems. These logs should be ingested and processed using Splunk Add-on for Unix and Linux (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/833), which is essential for correctly parsing and categorizing the data. The next step involves normalizing the field names to match the field names set by the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to ensure consistency across different data sources and enhance the efficiency of data modeling. This approach enables effective monitoring and detection of Linux endpoints where auditd is deployed.

Known false positives

  • System administrators and automation may run shells under service accounts or accounts that are not locked on a particular image. The search also matches any account with a UID between 1 and 999 (the system account range on most modern distributions), so administrators who use su or sudo to open an interactive shell as a service account such as jenkins or gitlab-runner will trigger it. On legacy systems (for example RHEL/CentOS 6) regular users may start at UID 500, so adjust the threshold if needed. Review the account's shadow state and the process context before escalating.

Analyst notes

Known false positives: System administrators and automation may run shells under service accounts or accounts that are not locked on a particular image. The search also matches any account with a UID between 1 and 999 (the system account range on most modern distributions), so administrators who use su or sudo to open an interactive shell as a service account such as jenkins or gitlab-runner will trigger it. On legacy systems (for example RHEL/CentOS 6) regular users may start at UID 500, so adjust the threshold if needed. Review the account's shadow state and the process context before escalating.

Raw source Linux Auditd Shell Execution by Non-User Account · SPL
Esc
Published by splunk/security_content ↗, licensed under Apache 2.0 ↗. Reproduced here unmodified.
name: Linux Auditd Shell Execution by Non-User Account
id: 543a973e-83cf-4d37-9562-9e16c99d3969
version: 1
creation_date: '2026-11-10'
modification_date: '2026-11-10'
author: Raven Tait, Splunk
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: |-
    The following analytic detects successful auditd execve events that launch an interactive Linux shell, identified by a TTY, under accounts that commonly do not log in.
    These are identified by a list of well-known service account names or by a system UID (between 1 and 999).
    An interactive shell for these accounts may indicate password-bypass abuse or unauthorized access.
data_source:
    - Linux Auditd Syscall
search: |-
    `linux_auditd` type=SYSCALL
    comm IN (
        "ash",
        "bash",
        "csh",
        "dash",
        "fish",
        "ksh",
        "mksh",
        "rbash",
        "sh",
        "tcsh",
        "yash",
        "zsh"
    )
    success=yes

    | where isnotnull(tty) AND tty!="(none)"

    | rex field=_raw "\\bUID=[[:punct:]]?(?<audit_user>[[:alnum:]_.-]+)"

    | eval audit_user=lower(coalesce(audit_user, user))
    | eval uid_num=tonumber(uid)

    | where (uid_num>0 AND uid_num<1000) OR in(audit_user, "daemon", "bin", "sys", "sync", "shutdown", "halt", "games", "man", "lp", "mail", "news", "uucp", "operator", "www-data", "backup", "list", "irc", "gnats", "nobody", "_apt", "systemd-network", "systemd-resolve", "messagebus", "uuidd", "sshd", "ntp", "ftp", "chrony", "postfix", "redis", "mysql", "mariadb", "postgres", "alpine", "guest")

    | rename host as dest

    | stats count min(_time) as firstTime
                  max(_time) as lastTime
                  values(audit_user) as user
                  values(uid) as uid
                  values(euid) as euid
                  values(comm) as shell
                  values(exe) as executable
                  values(tty) as tty
      by dest

    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
    | `linux_auditd_shell_execution_by_non_user_account_filter`
how_to_implement: |-
    To implement this detection, you should ingest auditd data, that consists of SYSCALL, TYPE, EXECVE and PROCTITLE events, which captures command-line executions and process details on Unix/Linux systems.
    These logs should be ingested and processed using Splunk Add-on for Unix and Linux (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/833), which is essential for correctly parsing and categorizing the data.
    The next step involves normalizing the field names to match the field names set by the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to ensure consistency across different data sources and enhance the efficiency of data modeling.
    This approach enables effective monitoring and detection of Linux endpoints where auditd is deployed.
known_false_positives: |-
    System administrators and automation may run shells under service accounts or accounts that are not locked on a particular image.
    The search also matches any account with a UID between 1 and 999 (the system account range on most modern distributions), so administrators who use su or sudo to open an interactive shell as a service account such as jenkins or gitlab-runner will trigger it.
    On legacy systems (for example RHEL/CentOS 6) regular users may start at UID 500, so adjust the threshold if needed.
    Review the account's shadow state and the process context before escalating.
references:
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/003/
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004/
    - https://sshhole.com
drilldown_searches:
    - name: View the detection results for - "$dest$"
      search: '%original_detection_search% | search  dest = "$dest$"'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
    - name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$dest$"
      search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$dest$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
      earliest_offset: 7d
      latest_offset: "0"
intermediate_findings:
    entities:
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 20
          message: Shell [$shell$] executed as non-user account [$user$] on [$dest$].
analytic_story:
    - Linux Privilege Escalation
    - SSHHole
asset_type: Endpoint
cve:
    - CVE-2026-123158
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1078.003
    - T1059.004
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/emerging_threats/sshhole/audit.log
          source: auditd
          sourcetype: auditd
      test_type: unit

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