Time Provider Persistence Registry


Description

The following analytic detects suspicious modifications to the time provider registry for persistence and autostart. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, focusing on changes to the "CurrentControlSet\\Services\\W32Time\\TimeProviders" registry path. This activity is significant because such modifications are uncommon and can indicate an attempt to establish persistence on a compromised host. If confirmed malicious, this technique allows an attacker to maintain access and execute code automatically upon system boot, potentially leading to further exploitation and control over the affected system.

Query · spl

| tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
  count min(_time) as firstTime
        max(_time) as lastTime

FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE

Registry.registry_path="*\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\W32Time\\TimeProviders\\*"
Registry.registry_value_name = "DllName"
NOT Registry.registry_value_data IN
(
    "%SystemRoot%\\System32\\vmictimeprovider.dll",
    "%SystemRoot%\\System32\\w32time.dll",
    "C:\\Windows\\System32\\vmictimeprovider.dll",
    "C:\\Windows\\System32\\w32time.dll"
)

by Registry.action Registry.dest Registry.process_guid Registry.process_id
   Registry.registry_hive Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name
   Registry.registry_value_data Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_type
   Registry.status Registry.user Registry.vendor_product

| `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `time_provider_persistence_registry_filter`

Implementation guide

To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the registry value name, registry path, and registry value data from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 2.0 of the official Sysmon TA. https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709

Known false positives

  • No false positives have been identified at this time.

Analyst notes

Known false positives: No false positives have been identified at this time.

Raw source Time Provider Persistence Registry · SPL
Esc
Published by splunk/security_content ↗, licensed under Apache 2.0 ↗. Reproduced here unmodified.
name: Time Provider Persistence Registry
id: 5ba382c4-2105-11ec-8d8f-acde48001122
version: 16
creation_date: '2021-09-29'
modification_date: '2026-07-08'
author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk, Steven Dick
status: production
type: TTP
description: |-
    The following analytic detects suspicious modifications to the time provider registry for persistence and autostart. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, focusing on changes to the "CurrentControlSet\\Services\\W32Time\\TimeProviders" registry path.
    This activity is significant because such modifications are uncommon and can indicate an attempt to establish persistence on a compromised host.
    If confirmed malicious, this technique allows an attacker to maintain access and execute code automatically upon system boot, potentially leading to further exploitation and control over the affected system.
data_source:
    - Sysmon EventID 13
search: |-
    | tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
      count min(_time) as firstTime
            max(_time) as lastTime

    FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE

    Registry.registry_path="*\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\W32Time\\TimeProviders\\*"
    Registry.registry_value_name = "DllName"
    NOT Registry.registry_value_data IN
    (
        "%SystemRoot%\\System32\\vmictimeprovider.dll",
        "%SystemRoot%\\System32\\w32time.dll",
        "C:\\Windows\\System32\\vmictimeprovider.dll",
        "C:\\Windows\\System32\\w32time.dll"
    )

    by Registry.action Registry.dest Registry.process_guid Registry.process_id
       Registry.registry_hive Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name
       Registry.registry_value_data Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_type
       Registry.status Registry.user Registry.vendor_product

    | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`
    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
    | `time_provider_persistence_registry_filter`
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the registry value name, registry path, and registry value data from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 2.0 of the official Sysmon TA. https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709
known_false_positives: No false positives have been identified at this time.
references:
    - https://pentestlab.blog/2019/10/22/persistence-time-providers/
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/003/
drilldown_searches:
    - name: View the detection results for - "$dest$" and "$user$"
      search: '%original_detection_search% | search  dest = "$dest$" user = "$user$"'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
    - name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$dest$" and "$user$"
      search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$dest$", "$user$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
      earliest_offset: 7d
      latest_offset: "0"
finding:
    title: modified/added/deleted registry entry $registry_path$ on $dest$
    entity:
        field: user
        type: user
        score: 50
intermediate_findings:
    entities:
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 50
          message: modified/added/deleted registry entry $registry_path$ on $dest$
analytic_story:
    - Hermetic Wiper
    - Windows Privilege Escalation
    - Windows Persistence Techniques
    - Windows Registry Abuse
    - Data Destruction
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1547.003
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.003/timeprovider_reg/sysmon.log
          source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
          sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
      test_type: unit

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