Windows Content Copied from Browser was Executed


Description

The following analytic correlates modifications to the Windows RunMRU registry key with clipboard content changes initiated by browsers. It aims to detect ClickFix scenarios in which commands copied from a browser are subsequently executed on the Windows system through the Run dialog box.

Query · spl

`sysmon`
EventID IN (13, 24)
(
    registry_key_name=*RunMRU*
    OR
    process_name IN (
    "360se.exe", "arc.exe", "atlas.exe", "avastbrowser.exe", "avgbrowser.exe", "blpbrowser.exe", "brave.exe", "braveupdate.exe",
    "chrome.exe", "chromium.exe", "coccoc.exe", "dragon.exe", "duckduckgo.exe", "epic.exe", "firefox.exe", "ghost.exe",
    "iexplore.exe", "iridium.exe", "iron.exe", "maxthon.exe", "microsoftedge.exe", "microsoftedgeupdate.exe", "msedge.exe",
    "msedgewebview2.exe", "opera.exe", "opera_autoupdate.exe", "perplexity.exe", "rave.exe", "safari.exe", "shift.exe",
    "sidekick.exe", "thorium.exe", "torch.exe", "vivaldi.exe", "wavebrowser.exe", "whale.exe", "zen.exe"
    )
)
| eval trimmed_command = rtrim(registry_value_data, "\1")
| eval utf16le_command = urldecode(replace(trimmed_command, "(.)", "\1%00"))
| eval sha256_process=upper(sha256(utf16le_command))
| eval hash_command=coalesce(SHA256,sha256_process)
| stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(process_name) as process_name
    values(trimmed_command) as process values(EventID) as EventID dc(EventID) as dc_EventID count
    by hash_command dest user
| search dc_EventID>1
| eval process_name = mvfilter(
    process_name IN (
    "360se.exe", "arc.exe", "atlas.exe", "avastbrowser.exe", "avgbrowser.exe", "blpbrowser.exe", "brave.exe", "braveupdate.exe",
    "chrome.exe", "chromium.exe", "coccoc.exe", "dragon.exe", "duckduckgo.exe", "epic.exe", "firefox.exe", "ghost.exe",
    "iexplore.exe", "iridium.exe", "iron.exe", "maxthon.exe", "microsoftedge.exe", "microsoftedgeupdate.exe", "msedge.exe",
    "msedgewebview2.exe", "opera.exe", "opera_autoupdate.exe", "perplexity.exe", "rave.exe", "safari.exe", "shift.exe",
    "sidekick.exe", "thorium.exe", "torch.exe", "vivaldi.exe", "wavebrowser.exe", "whale.exe", "zen.exe"
    )
  )
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_content_copied_from_browser_was_executed_filter`

Implementation guide

This detection requires Sysmon event logs. Configure your environment to ingest Sysmon registry modification (Event ID 13) and clipboard change (Event ID 24) events. Ensure that registry modification events are collected for the RunMRU registry key and clipboard change events are collected from common browser processes. Ingest the data through the appropriate Splunk technology add-on and normalize field names using the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM).

Known false positives

  • No false positives have been identified at this time.

Analyst notes

Known false positives: No false positives have been identified at this time.

Raw source Windows Content Copied from Browser was Executed · SPL
Esc
Published by splunk/security_content ↗, licensed under Apache 2.0 ↗. Reproduced here unmodified.
name: Windows Content Copied from Browser was Executed
id: 5d1fdbcb-5ed9-4190-85c8-7f9026450a0b
version: 1
creation_date: '2026-09-07'
modification_date: '2026-09-07'
author: Onur Mustafa Erdogan, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: |-
    The following analytic correlates modifications to the Windows RunMRU registry key with clipboard content
    changes initiated by browsers. It aims to detect ClickFix scenarios in which commands copied
    from a browser are subsequently executed on the Windows system through the Run dialog box.
data_source:
    - Sysmon EventID 13 AND Sysmon EventID 24
search: |-
    `sysmon`
    EventID IN (13, 24)
    (
        registry_key_name=*RunMRU*
        OR
        process_name IN (
        "360se.exe", "arc.exe", "atlas.exe", "avastbrowser.exe", "avgbrowser.exe", "blpbrowser.exe", "brave.exe", "braveupdate.exe",
        "chrome.exe", "chromium.exe", "coccoc.exe", "dragon.exe", "duckduckgo.exe", "epic.exe", "firefox.exe", "ghost.exe",
        "iexplore.exe", "iridium.exe", "iron.exe", "maxthon.exe", "microsoftedge.exe", "microsoftedgeupdate.exe", "msedge.exe",
        "msedgewebview2.exe", "opera.exe", "opera_autoupdate.exe", "perplexity.exe", "rave.exe", "safari.exe", "shift.exe",
        "sidekick.exe", "thorium.exe", "torch.exe", "vivaldi.exe", "wavebrowser.exe", "whale.exe", "zen.exe"
        )
    )
    | eval trimmed_command = rtrim(registry_value_data, "\1")
    | eval utf16le_command = urldecode(replace(trimmed_command, "(.)", "\1%00"))
    | eval sha256_process=upper(sha256(utf16le_command))
    | eval hash_command=coalesce(SHA256,sha256_process)
    | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(process_name) as process_name
        values(trimmed_command) as process values(EventID) as EventID dc(EventID) as dc_EventID count
        by hash_command dest user
    | search dc_EventID>1
    | eval process_name = mvfilter(
        process_name IN (
        "360se.exe", "arc.exe", "atlas.exe", "avastbrowser.exe", "avgbrowser.exe", "blpbrowser.exe", "brave.exe", "braveupdate.exe",
        "chrome.exe", "chromium.exe", "coccoc.exe", "dragon.exe", "duckduckgo.exe", "epic.exe", "firefox.exe", "ghost.exe",
        "iexplore.exe", "iridium.exe", "iron.exe", "maxthon.exe", "microsoftedge.exe", "microsoftedgeupdate.exe", "msedge.exe",
        "msedgewebview2.exe", "opera.exe", "opera_autoupdate.exe", "perplexity.exe", "rave.exe", "safari.exe", "shift.exe",
        "sidekick.exe", "thorium.exe", "torch.exe", "vivaldi.exe", "wavebrowser.exe", "whale.exe", "zen.exe"
        )
      )
    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
    | `windows_content_copied_from_browser_was_executed_filter`
how_to_implement: |-
    This detection requires Sysmon event logs. Configure your environment to ingest Sysmon registry modification (Event ID 13)
    and clipboard change (Event ID 24) events. Ensure that registry modification events are collected for the RunMRU registry key
    and clipboard change events are collected from common browser processes. Ingest the data through the appropriate Splunk technology
    add-on and normalize field names using the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM).
known_false_positives: No false positives have been identified at this time.
references:
    - https://socradar.io/blog/doublecup-clickfix-loader-devicemanager-rats/
    - https://www.huntress.com/blog/clickfix-matanbuchus-astarionrat-analysis
drilldown_searches:
    - name: View the detection results for - "$dest$"
      search: '%original_detection_search% | search  dest = "$dest$"'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
    - name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$dest$"
      search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$dest$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
      earliest_offset: 7d
      latest_offset: "0"
finding:
    title: The content [$process$] was copied from [$process_name$] to the clipboard and was executed through the Run dialog box on [$dest$]
    entity:
        field: dest
        type: system
        score: 50
threat_objects:
    - field: process
      type: process
    - field: hash_command
      type: process_hash
analytic_story:
    - Fake CAPTCHA Campaigns
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1202
    - T1059.001
    - T1059.003
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1202/windows_browser_copy_paste/windows_browser_copy_paste.log
          source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
          sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
      test_type: unit

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